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Abstract 
This report presents the findings of two surveys, one on 
social work values in Hong Kong and the other on relationship 
between values and action in social work practice. 
It begins with a description of the meaning of social work, 
profession, value, and action. In this study, social work is 
defined as a developing profession within the social welfare 
institution. In social work practice, the social worker draws 
upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system of values, to 
produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his 
action, in an effort to bring about effective changes either in 
the person, or in society, or in both. 
The social work value system is composed of two subsystems, 
one consisting of twelve terminal values or end-states of 
existence and the other consisting of twelve instrumental values 
or modes of conduct. End-states of existence are further 
subdivided into an equal number of social values and personal 
values. Similarly, modes of conduct are subdivided into an equal 
number of moral values and competence values. 
The first survey reveals that democracy, equality, freedom, 
and love are conceived to be highly preferable among the terminal 
values, and among the instrumental values, empathy, justice, and 
respect are conceived. to be highly preferable. 
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The claim that values serve as a guide to action is not well 
substantiated. In the second survey, findings reveal that 
democracy, equality, love, and progress are conceived to be 
highly preferable among the terminal values, and among the 
instrumental values, honesty, justice, and prudence are conceived 
to be highly preferable. 
When findings of the two surveys are compared, democracy, 
equality, love, and justice are conceived as highly preferable in 
both surveys. However, freedom has been replaced by progress in 
the second survey. Moreover, empathy and respect have been 
replaced by honesty and prudence. 
On the whole, respondents are consistent in the way they 
rank these values. 
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Overview of the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
The thought of launching an exploratory study of social work 
values originates from an observation and an assumption. The 
observation is obvious to anyone who is involved in the field of 
social welfare. In Britain and in Australia, in the United 
States and in Canada, social workers are striving to acquire full 
professional status. The situation is no different in Hong Kong. 
For many years and in many ways, social workers in Hong Kong 
have pressed for recognition by Government as full professionals 
on par with doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, 
accountants, engineers, architects, and town planners. The 
establishment of the Hong Kong Social Workers' Association and 
the Hong Kong Social Workers' General Union, the introduction of 
formal training in social work, the decision of Government to 
limit its recruitment to the professionally trained for social 
work posts, and the proposal to set up licensing procedures for 
practising social workers are regarded as decisive steps toward 
professionalization. Regrettably, in an attempt to meet the 
demand for social workers, Government began, in the early years 
of the present decade, to recruit once again non-social-work- 
trained personnel for social work posts. Even though the 
Government emphasized that these recruitment exercises would be 
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no more than an interim measure to ease the problem of manpower 
shortage, and that the recruits would be provided with proper 
training at either of the two universities in the first years of 
their employment, the decision is strongly criticized by trained 
social workers as a violation of the spirit of this movement. 
Is this movement toward professionalization desirable? 
Understandably, the answers are mixed. One may perhaps argue for 
the professionalization of social work along the lines Paul 
Halmos (1970) introduced the personal service professions. Or, 
one may argue against the professionalization of social work 
along the lines Ivan Illich (1976) launched his attack on the 
medical profession. There is no end to this debate. 
Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this researcher, 
certainly not in this context and at this point in time, to 
become involved in such a debate because, whatever the outcome, 
one can hardly reverse the trend. The professionalization of 
social work will forge ahead in the foreseeable future. This 
prompts the researcher to come up with an assumption, that the 
professionalization of social work is desirable. At the minimum, 
it provides a direction for the development of social work in 
, 'Hong Kong 
in the next decade. 
What is professionalization? According to Geoffrey 
Millerson (1964), professionalization is "the process by which an 
occupation undergoes transformation to become a profession" (p. 
10). In the same context he identified several factors which 
contributed to success in the process: (1) ability to achieve a 
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definable basis of background knowledge and practice, plus a 
crystallization of the activities composing the occupational 
task; (2) opportunity to acquire knowledge and practice; (3) 
development of self-consciousness by emerging professionals; 
and (4) realization and recognition of the occupation as a 
profession, by those outside the occupation. (pp. 10-13) 
Among these factors, the first one highlights the problem of 
professionalization in social work. "An essential part of 
professionalization, " Millerson noted, "is the separation of the 
occupation from its milieu, enabling practitioners to profess a 
distinct speciality. " (p. 10) "The essence of separation, " he 
continued, "is the capacity to present new forms of knowledge, or 
practice. " (p. 11) Even though his statement may not be 
conclusive, it may well serve as a starting point for discussion. 
In his view, to become a profession, an occupation has to claim 
expertise in an area of service and to back it up with a body of 
knowledge and a method of practice. In the case of social work, 
this has never been successful, either in Hong Kong or elsewhere 
in the world. The reason for this will become obvious as soon as 
one begins to trace its emergence in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and its growth and development in this 
century. 
The emergence of social work in Britain, for instance, was 
not a planned event. It just happened. It emerged as society's 
response to the growing concern of destitution and social unrest. 
The nature of such response was, however, not standardized. 
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According to Philip Seed (1973), at least three forms of social 
action could be identified in that period: (1) social action 
within a system of social administration, (2) organization of 
private charity, and (3) direct social action. Moreover, he 
noted that social action could also exist in combined forms in 
the settlement movement, for instance. (p. 12) 
Since the turn of the century, each form of social action 
took its own course. This resulted in the growth and development 
of social casework, including medical social work, psychiatric 
social work, probation work, family welfare, child welfare, and 
moral welfare (Cormack and McDougall, 1950, p. 11); social group 
work, including group work with children, adolescents and adults, 
group work in churches, settlements, and community centres 
(Kuenstler, 1955, p. 9); and community work, including community 
work of the direct-service agencies, interorganizational co- 
ordination and social planning, and work with community groups 
(Jones, 1977, p. 173). With such a diversification of interest, 
the difficulties social work has encountered in its search for 
knowledge, method, and purpose seem unavoidable. 
In the United States, the emergence of social work followed 
the same path. What characterized its growth and development was 
its preoccupation with professionalization. Early in 1915, at a 
meeting of the National Conference on Charities and Corrections, 
Abraham Flexner, an authority on professional education, 
addressed the audience on the topic: Is Social Work a Profession? 
Organizers of the meeting apparently hoped that Flexner would 
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assure them that social work was, or was about to become, a full- 
fledged profession. Much to their disappointment, the speaker, 
using an absolute approach to evaluate professional status, 
concluded his address by noting that social work had not made it 
into the professional elite. (p. 20) 
Disappointed with the outcome, yet believing that the 
acquisition of knowledge and method was the lone path to 
professionalization, social workers devoted great effort, in the 
first decades of this century, toward the development of a body 
of knowledge and a method of practice which could be conceived as 
unique for social work. 
As it was mentioned previously, one difficulty confronting 
social workers of the time was their involvement in a wide 
variety of activities. In each field of practice, social workers 
tended to claim functional speciality and emphasize differences 
in knowledge and method which separated them from social workers 
in other fields. This led to the formation of the American 
Association of Hospital Social Workers in 1918, the American 
Association of Social Workers in 1921, the American Association 
of Psychiatric Social Workers in 1926, the American Association 
of Group Workers in 1936, and the Association for the Study of 
Community organization in 1946. Not unexpectedly, there were 
also others who believed that these functional specialities were 
merely segments within the social work profession. In an attempt 
to confirm their belief, seventeen executives and board members 
of six national organizations in the casework field met for two 
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days in October 1923 in Milford, Pennsylvania. This marked the 
beginning of the Milford Conference. After many years of regular 
meetings, the Conference finally produced its report in 1929. 
(American Association of Social Workers, 1929) 
At the Milford Conference and in the report they produced, 
members concentrated on one question: "Are there sufficient 
commonalities among the various specialities (of casework) to 
preserve the idea that all social workers (i. e., caseworkers) are 
part of one profession? " The answer was in the affirmative. As 
noted in the report, "the similarities among the various 
specialities overshadowed their differences and practitioners in 
the specialities required a common knowledge base and, therefore, 
common training programmes". (Briar, 1974) The conclusion of 
this report set the stage for the development of a common 
knowledge base for social work and substantiated the claim that 
social work was a single profession. 
The search for common knowledge bore fruit in the late 
nineteen-fifties. Reports published by the Commission on Social 
Work Practice of the National Association of Social Workers 
(Bartlett, 1958) and the Curriculum Study of the Council on 
Social Work Education (Boehm, 1959) were the first ones to 
describe in great detail the nature of social work, including its 
knowledge, method, and purpose. 
Since the release of these two reports, there was growing 
recognition that social work should not be dichotomized into 
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casework and community work, or personal change and social 
change. Moreover, there was an outcry among social workers to 
shift the focus of their attention from either the individual or 
the environment to the interaction between them. These changes 
led to the emergence of "integrating social work methods" (Specht 
and Vickery, 1977) in the early nineteen-seventies, including the 
contribution of Howard Goldstein (1973), Allen Pincus and Anne 
Minahan (1973), Ruth R. Middleman and Gale Goldberg (1974), 
Beulah R. Compton and Burt Galaway (1975), Max Siporin (1975), 
and many others. Regrettably, even with this advancement, there 
remains, even now, sharp differences of opinion among proponents 
of various methods on the knowledge base of social work and on 
the degree of emphasis to be given to changing the person, the 
environment, or the interaction between them. 
In 1974, the Publications Committee of the National 
Association of Social Workers and the Editorial Board of Social 
Work decided to stimulate discussion among social workers on the 
purpose of social work and to identify issues underlying this 
discussion. Their effort, and the first special issue on 
conceptual frameworks (NASW, 1977) that was produced as a result 
of their effort, generated much interest and heated debates. 
Many pointed to the fact that the problem remained unresolved and 
in the absence of an agreement on the purpose of social work, 
they believed that it was impossible to discuss productively the 
knowledge and method related to its practice. In response to 
these reactions, the Publications Committee and the Editorial 
Board decided to convene another group and charge it with the 
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task of developing a statement of social work purpose and 
applying it to different practice specialities to determine if 
there was any consensus that would cut across various practice 
interests. Again, no agreement could be reached in the second 
issue on conceptual frameworks. (NASW, 1981) 
In view of these conclusions it is no surprise if one hears, 
within the profession itself, candid statements such as the 
following: "Maybe social work has no mission! " (NASW, 1977, p. 
382) Mainly because of its failure to arrive at any form of 
agreement as to what constitutes the purpose of social work, some 
practitioners organize themselves into subgroups, each pursuing 
its own purpose, thus creating segments within the profession. 
Since earlier attempts at integration through the study of 
knowledge, method, and purpose have failed to produce significant 
progress, it is essential to look beyond these trio. In the 
opinion of this researcher, integration can be achieved through 
an examination of values. 
How different is the situation for social work in Hong Kong? 
There is not much difference, excepting that the emergence of 
social work in Hong Kong came very much later and it developed at 
a much faster pace. It emerged shortly after the Second World 
War as a response to the problem of population explosion and, 
within a period of four decades, has established itself as an 
essential service in society. 
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When Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese in 1941, about 
60 percent its population returned to China to take refuge, 
leaving the Colony with a population of 600,000. Shortly after 
the war, most of these people returned to Hong Kong, bringing its 
population back to the pre-war level of 1.60 million. By 1950, 
following a change of regime in China, more people came to Hong 
Kong to take refuge, causing a sharp increase in population to a 
record of 2.36 million. (Hong Kong Government, 1957, p. 3) 
Needless to say, Hong Kong was totally unprepared for such a 
population increase. It was found wanting in every respect. 
There was a shortage of land to build houses, schools, hospitals, 
and clinics for the new immigrants. Even food and drinking water 
was in short supply. To make the situation worse, the economy of 
Hong Kong came to a stand still when China became involved in the 
Korean War of 1951. Jobs were simply unavailable. Confronted 
with these and many other social problems such as teen-age 
prostitution and abandoned children, organized charity, 
spearheaded by the Government, religious organizations, and 
benevolent societies, began to emerge. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
This is an exploratory study. The central purpose of this 
study is to make a contribution to the professionalization of 
social work in Hong Kong by suggesting a more acceptable and 
culturally compatible. definition of social work. To achieve this 
i"ýurpose, the study attempts to accomplish two tasks: (1) to 
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identify a system of social work values which is conceived as 
preferable by social workers in Hong Kong, and (2) to explore 
the 
relationship between between values and action in social work 
practice. These tasks also require an analysis of the meaning of 
values and action, and the relation between them. 
The study has a secondary purpose. It tries to uncover the 
potential of this method of inquiry for further research on 
social work values. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study can be approached from two 
perspectives. It can be approached from its contribution to the 
professionalization of social work in Hong Kong, and it can also 
be approached from its contribution to the conceptualization of 
social work, profession, value, and action, and how these 
concepts relate to one another. 
Hong Kong is a fast growing, rapidly changing, metropolitan 
city. It is fast growing in population, in economy, in 
technology, and in the provision of public services. This pace 
of growth brings other rapid changes. One can often detect, for 
instance, changes in the landscape of this city. More subtle and 
yet profound are changes in culture, including beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and norms. As a city, Hong Kong is metropolitan in 
terms of the influences it has received, and is still receiving, 
from countries in the East and the West. All these growth, 
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changes, and influences have important implications for social 
work. 
In any discussion of social work a concept that is bound to 
come up is value. Until recently, research and publication on 
social work values are limited. So far as research is concerned, 
one can possibly cite the work of Donna L. McLeod and Henry J. 
Meyer (1967). In their view, each value is seen as a continuum 
with poles representing contrasting positions held within the 
society or by some segments of the population. In many cases, 
they noted, both positions were viewed as preferable by social 
work. The hypothesis they set out to confirm was that social 
workers were closer than the rest of the population to the pole 
they defined as social work value. In the following value 
dimensions, the first-named poles represent social work values: 
(1) individual worth vs. system goals, (2) personal liberty vs. 
societal control, (3) group responsibility vs. individual 
responsibility, (4) security-satisfaction vs. struggle, 
suffering, and denial, (5) relativism-pragmatism vs. absolutism- 
sacredness, (6) innovation-change vs. traditionalism, (7) 
diversity vs. homogeneity, (8) cultural determinism vs. inherent 
human nature, (9) interdependence vs. individual autonomy, and 
(10) individualization vs. stereotyping. (pp. 402-5) 
According to the authors, seven of these value dimensions 
were found to be significantly related to levels of social work 
training. On the basis of this finding, they concluded that 
selection and training combined to produce a professional group 
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distinguishable in terms of certain basic value positions. (p. 
407) 
So far as literature on social work values is concerned, one 
can possibly cite the work of Felix P. Biestek (1967), Charles S. 
Levy (1973), and Noel Timms (1983). 
In a pamphlet on values, Biestek listed a number of belief 
statements and treated them as social work values. Levy adopted 
this approach and produced another set of beliefs which was, 
incidentally, quite similar to Biestek's. However, the 
importance of Levy's work does not rely on the list he produced 
but on the framework which he developed for organizing values 
into three groups: (1) value as preferred conceptions of people, 
(2) value as preferred outcomes for people, and (3) value as 
preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. (p. 38) 
Both of these works have been widely quoted since their 
appearance in the literature. 
There seems to have been a shift in focus since the 
nineteen-seventies. In his publication, Timms identified three 
ways in which social work values had been discussed. Firstly, 
they appeared in the form of generalized accounts of values. 
(See, for example, Biestek, 1967) Secondly, they were the 
subjects of essays in which some critical assessment was 
attempted of a value or a number of values. (See, for example, 
McDermott, 1975) Thirdly, they were subject to some form of 
empirical investigation. (See, for example, McLeod and Meyer, 
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1967) (p. 24) 
Timms was highly critical of both the "literature-based 
approach", i. e., a specification of what social work values 
should be, and the "empirically-based approach", i. e., a 
specification of what social work values are. He criticized the 
literature-based approach for not treating the subject of social 
work values with sufficient "rigour" and "conceptualization": 
"Value" appears frequently in social work literature, but 
value talk is underdeveloped and conversation about ... 
social work values has hardly started. This is mainly 
because it is assumed that everyone knows what values ... 
are; that is, a value is a value; and that values may be 
elaborated, but cannot be argued about. (p. 32) 
The empirically-based approach to social work values was 
also criticized for its tendency to compile lists and for its 
inadequate attention to conceptual analysis of the values it 
listed. He described such empirical work as "premature in so far 
as its grasp on 'value' is hesitant and clumsy" (p. 28). In his 
criticism of McLeod and Meyer he argued that the study lacked 
"conceptual exploration". For example, he noted that "it is not 
easy to avoid the judgment that more conceptual preparation would 
have produced a better result" (p. 30). In another context, 
Timms (1970) suggested that what was needed was a study of social 
work values, based on what social workers actually did when faced 
with a choice between "valued" courses of action, rather than 
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studies based on what social workers mentioned or listed as being 
important: "The question to ask is not so much what things, 
concepts, states of affairs, do social workers value, but how 
much do they value them? " (p. 120) 
Timms is probably fair in his criticism of the literature- 
based approach and the empirically-based approach and he is 
certainly right in suggesting that what is needed is a study 
based on what social workers actually do when faced with a choice 
between valued courses of action, but his sole reliance on "value 
talk" is equally inadequate. 
Undeniably, value talks are vital to the understanding and 
practice of social work. However, knowledge as well as practice 
in the field have indicated that the concept is not easy to 
comprehend, and those values which have so far been expounded by 
social workers are not as easy to accept as they appear to be. 
What account for these difficulties? Timms have mentioned some 
of them. In the opinion of this researcher, it seems to be a 
result of some or all of the following: 
1. The word value means different things to different people. 
Not too infrequently, one finds in the social work literature 
under the rubric of values almost any set of beliefs about man 
and society, any objective to be accomplished within a short or a 
long period of time, or any type of behaviour preferred for any 
reason or for no apparent reason at all. Until the concept of 
value is clarified, any discussion of these "so-called" social 
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work values will not be productive. 
2. The selection of social work values is based largely on 
ideologies of the West, namely, Britain and the United States. 
Dominant values of British and American social work have their 
roots in religion, psychology, sociology, political science, and 
human ecology. In religion, the early Christian doctrine places 
special emphasis on man's relationship with God and holds that to 
be his goal and source of happiness; the Protestant work ethic 
says that character is all that matters, that the moral man is 
the one who works and is independent, and that pleasure is 
sinful; the Social Darwinists deny God's existence and claim that 
the fittest survive while the weak perish in a natural 
evolutionary process that produces the strong individual and 
society. In psychology, the psychoanalytic view emphasizes man's 
pathology and irrationality; the humanistic view, on the other 
hand, emphasizes man's potential for growth and his rationality. 
In sociology, the consensus theorists stress the co-operative and 
harmonious elements in social life; the conflict theorists, 
however, focus on the coercive and divisive elements; the 
interactionists, unaffected by either, place strong emphasis on 
the importance of investigating social action from the standpoint 
of the actors involved and hence the importance of the meanings 
that actors give to their actions. In political science, the 
liberal view stresses the importance of man's rationality and his 
ability to be self-determining and rule-following; the democratic 
ideal emphasizes the equality of all men and man's right to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; the socialists hold to the 
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view that man is a social animal defined by his social 
relationship. Finally, the human ecologists believe that a 
minimal degree of integration is necessary between the person and 
various environments in order to maintain and enhance the 
problem-solving capacities and growth of constituent members in 
their own habitat. Values derived from these views are sometimes 
conflicting and often foreign to social work practitioners and 
students in Hong Kong. Furthermore, in view of their own 
cultural heritage - an adherence to Confucianism, they often find 
these values somewhat difficult to understand and to accept. 
3. Although there is apparent consensus among social workers on 
the importance of certain values, this is not always the case 
even at the most generalized level. Instead, as a result of 
ideological differences, one often finds that a value and its 
countervalue co-exist and both seem to enjoy wide acceptance. A 
pair of values that comes to mind is individual responsibility 
and group responsibility. Confusion often arises in case 
situations when both values seem to be relevant, thus leaving the 
social worker with the impossible task of making rational 
choices. Furthermore, even though a value may receive general 
consensus within the profession, justification for the acceptance 
of and interpretation given to the meaning of this particular 
value vary. Equality, for instance, is generally accepted as an 
essential value in social work. However, whether it implies an 
equality of opportunity or an equality of outcome remains a 
subject of debate. 
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4. In social work literature values are often listed 
individually rather than presented as an organized whole. There 
is little attempt to establish the relationship between one value 
and another. There is also little attempt to arrange them in 
order of preference. What should a social worker do, for 
instance, when a client's well-being is affected by his own 
decision? Should the social worker adhere to the value of client 
self-determination even though the client's right to well-being 
is being threatened? 
5. One often experiences yet tends to ignore the discrepancy 
between one's personal values and professional values, one's 
personal values and organizational values, one's personal values 
and societal values, or one's professional values and societal 
values. What should a social worker do, for instance, when the 
profession's preference for change comes into conflict with 
society's preference for stability. Should the social worker 
adhere to his professional value or societal value? 
These problems need to be addressed in any fruitful discussion of 
social work value, or values. 
Second to values, the discussion of action is also of 
central importance to the understanding and practice of social 
work. What is action? What are the determinants of action? It 
is often claimed that social work is a value-laden profession. 
This statement seems. to imply that once a social worker is 
socialized into the profession, his action will be guided by 
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professional values. To what extent is this statement valid? 
Can the validity of this statement be verified empirically? 
The significance of this study can also be approached on the 
level of conceptual thinking. Similar to many other sociological 
concepts, the formulation of definitions for social work, 
profession, value, and action in a clear and unambiguous way has 
never been easy. Morris L. Cogan (1953), for instance, came up 
with this conclusion in his attempt to identify some patterns 
implicit in generally accepted definitions of a profession: "No 
broad acceptance of any 'authoritative' definition has been 
observed. " (p. 47) 
To pursue this a little further, the word profession, for 
instance, appears to have a wide variety of meanings in popular 
usage. Millerson (1964) referred to this as a problem of 
semantic confusion. (pp. 1-3) A brief look at the following 
dialogue will help to illustrate this point. 
"What is your profession? " 
"I am a social worker by profession, but I have recently 
retired from full-time employment, and I am planning to take 
up voluntary work in the same field. " 
"I have always wondered: is social work a profession or is 
it a semi-profession? " 
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"I would consider it a profession but I don't believe it is 
recognized as such by the government. Afterall, our 
starting salary is much lower than that of clinical 
psychologists. " 
In the first statement, the word "profession" is used as a 
polite synonym for anyone of the following words: "job", 
"occupation", or "vocation". They are often used interchangeably 
to mean a type of employment. The question, "what is your 
profession? " may, therefore, be considered by the inquirer as a 
genteel form of "what is your job? " "what is your occupation? " or 
"what is your vocation? " 
In the second statement, the word "profession", or, more 
appropriately, "professional", is used as a contrast to the word 
"volunteer" in service provisions, or "amateur" in sports and 
leisure time activities. Here, the volunteer or amateur is one 
who performs certain tasks, on a part-time basis, simply for the 
intrinsic pleasure obtained from them, and not for any financial 
reward or profit. The professional, on the other hand, regards 
the same process as a full-time operation, providing the main 
income. 
In the third statement, a distinction is made between "a 
profession" and "a semi-profession". This form of semantic 
confusion comes from the addition of prefixes as in para- 
profession, semi-profession and sub-profession, or qualifying 
words, as in marginal profession. The main intention of adding 
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these prefixes or qualifying words is to derogate attempts by 
members of an occupation to establish professional status for 
themselves. Those struggling are often judged to be unworthy of 
the classification. 
Finally, in the last statement, a subjective evaluation is 
made as to which occupation should be given a professional 
status, and by whom it is given. 
Even among sociologists the word "profession" is used to 
convey different meanings. George Ritzer (1977), for instance, 
identified three approaches to defining the concept: (1) the 
process approach, (2) the structural-functional (or traits) 
approach, and (3) the power approach. (pp. 41-67) 
How should the problem of definition be tackled? This 
researcher shares with Eliot Freidson (1983) the view that the 
problem of defining "a profession" or any other concept mentioned 
previously cannot be resolved by struggling to formulate a single 
definition which is hoped to gain the consensus of all. In 
Freidson's view, "the concrete, historical character of the 
concept and the many perspectives from which it can legitimately 
be viewed and from which sense can be made of it, preclude the 
hope of any widely accepted definition of general analytic 
value". To circumvent the problem, he suggested that "serious 
writers on the topic should be obliged to display to readers what 
they have in mind when the word is used - that is, to indicate 
the definition upon which their exposition is predicated and, for 
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even greater clarity, examples of the entity they mean to include 
and those they mean to exclude". (p. 35) 
Following Freidson's suggestion, how should one proceed to 
define the concepts listed above? Anthony Giddens (1982) was of 
the opinion that: "An understanding of the social world initiated 
by the contemporary industrialized societies ... can only be 
achieved by virtue of a threefold exercise of the imagination. 
These forms of the sociological imagination involve an 
historical, an anthropological, and a critical sensitivity. " (p. 
16) 
Elaborating on the need for an historical sensitivity, 
Giddens stated that: 
The first effort ... that has to be exercised ... 
is that of 
recovering our own immediate past - the "world we have 
lost". Only by such an effort of the imagination, which ... 
involves an awareness of history, can we grasp just how 
differently those in the industrialized societies live today 
from the way people lived in the relatively recent past. 
(p. 17) 
Relating to the cultivation of an anthropological insight, 
Giddens pointed out that: 
The fostering of an historical sense ... is difficult. But 
it is perhaps even more challenging to break away from the 
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belief ... that the modes of 
life which have developed in 
the West are somehow superior to those of other cultures 
.... The anthropological 
dimension of the sociological 
imagination is important because it allows us to appreciate 
the diversity of modes of human existence which have been 
followed on this earth. (pp. 22-4) 
The exercise of both forms of the sociological imagination 
made it possible, according to Giddens, "to break free from the 
straitjacket of thinking only in terms of the type of society we 
know in the here and now". This made room for the third form of 
the sociological imagination which concerned the possibilities 
for the future to emerge. He explained that: 
As human beings, we are not condemned to be swept along by 
forces that have the inevitability of laws of nature. But 
this means we must be conscious of the alternative futures 
that are potentially open to us. In its third sense, the 
sociological imagination fuses with the task of sociology in 
contributing to the critique of existing forms of society. 
(p. 26) 
These three forms of sociological imagination, when taken 
together, seem to point the way for defining sociological 
concepts. In each case, a definition of the concept is 
formulated only after a brief review of the work of early masters 
(i. e. historical), a brief overview of the work of contemporary 
writers (i. e. anthropological), and a critique of their work 
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(i. e. critical) have been made. 
The first concept to be discussed in this report is "social 
work". What is social work? Is social work a profession? The 
first question can be approached by considering a series of 
questions: Is it a movement, social or political? Is it an 
institution, an occupation, or a profession? Is it an art, a 
science, or a technology? How is social work defined in terms of 
the methods and purposes of its practice? These questions have 
long been in the mind of social workers and have aroused long 
discussions within the profession. The conclusion in each case 
seems to be unanimous, and its sentiment has been vividly 
captured by Scott Briar (1977) in the following statement: 
The seemingly inescapable conclusion is that at this time in 
the history of social work there is not a widespread 
consensus about the profession's mission and purpose. 
(p. 415) 
Thus the major purpose of this study is to come up with a 
definition of social work which is based on an understanding of 
the meaning of value and an explication of what social work 
values are. 
The second concept to be discussed in this report is 
"profession". What is a profession? What is the function of the 
professions in society? Can we find in the professions 
distinctive characteristics, or attributes, or traits that cannot 
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be found in the nonprofessions? Is there a path along which each 
occupation must travel before it can acquire full professional 
status? What is the meaning of professional power? What is the 
basis of this power? Is there a set of rules which serves as a 
guide to professional conduct? Is professional conduct binding 
for all professionals? What happens if the professional is at 
the same time an employee of a bureaucratic organization and the 
two sets of rules happen to be in conflict? Understanding of 
this concept will lead us to an answer to the second question we 
have just raised, Is social work a profession? 
The concept of "value" has not been given a central place it 
deserves in sociology. In most introductory textbooks on the 
subject, the concept is rarely included as a separate chapter. 
(See, for example, Giddens, 1989) Talcott Parsons is perhaps one 
of the few early masters who gives value a prominent place in his 
work. Elaborating on this, Percy S. Cohen (1968) noted that: 
The emphasis on fundamental values is the cornerstone of 
Parsonian theory. The argument behind this ... is as 
follows: Men's actions are neither random nor simply 
governed by impulses; quite the contrary, they are orderly 
in the two senses that they do not result in a war of all 
against all, nor do they vary unpredictably. These two 
characteristics of order can only exist if all or most 
members of a society share certain ultimate values which 
define their goals and prescribe the permitted means for 
their attainment. These values introduce order and meaning 
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into the conduct of the individual and restrict conflict and 
chaos in a society. (p. 105) 
This statement in no way implied that "the fundamental value 
system so affects all aspects of social life as to ensure that 
they are completely consistent or compatible with one another". 
Quite the contrary, Parsons fully acknowledged that "there must 
be inherent 'strains' in every social system because the 
requirements of different parts of it are not necessarily 
compatible with one another". However, he seemed to have 
"abiding faith in the capacity of the social systems and 
personality to provide compensating mechanisms to cope with these 
problems". (Quoted by Cohen, 1968, p. 105) 
In view of its importance in introducing order and meaning 
into the conduct of the individual and restricting conflict and 
chaos in a society, what explains the lack of enthusiasm among 
sociologists in the study of value, or values? Answers to this 
question seem to have centred on three important issues: the 
meaning of value, the measurement of value, and the relation 
between value and action. 
The situation seems to have improved in recent decades. 
Reports on the study of values have been produced by Adler 
(1956), Allport (1931), Catton (1959), Kluckhohn (1951), Kohn 
(1969), Morris (1956), Pepper (1958), Perry (1926), Rokeach 
(1973), and many others. Now we are more certain about what it 
means by value, what is included as value, and how it can be 
46 
measured. We are, however, less certain about the extent it can 
be used to explain and predict human behaviour. 
The last concept to be discussed is "action". It is as much 
a philosophical concept as it is a sociological concept. In 
sociology, Graham Kinlock (1977) noted that the foundation of any 
theory, including the theory of action, was its paradigm or model 
of reality. He added that these paradigms appeared to take one 
of three major forms: (1) the organic-structure-functional model, 
(2) the conflict-radical model, and (3) the social-behaviourist- 
social-psychological model. (p. 5) 
In summary, the organic-structure-functional model aims at 
developing a general theory of society which has as its emphasis 
the maximization of societal goals and orderly social change. 
The result is a conceptualization of society as an organic system 
defined by laws of nature. The foundation of this system is its 
division of labour, upon which the normative system is based. 
Moreover, this system is seen as evolving from the traditional 
toward the modern and industrial, with distinct modifications of 
its normative structure in the process. This model is best 
represented by the work of Durkheim and Parsons. (pp. 31-2) 
The conflict-radical model also aims at developing a general 
theory of society, but the purpose is to make use of the theory 
to analyze conflict and domination within contemporary industrial 
society. The result is a conceptualization of society as a 
systemic, evolving system of groups competing for domination and 
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control of resources. Various social and demographic conditions 
are seen to define the intensity, duration, and form of social 
conflict, while the social structure represents the type of 
domination present in the society at a particular stage of its 
evolution. This model is best represented by the work of Marx 
and Weber. (pp. 32-3) 
In contrast to the above, the social-behaviourist-social- 
psychological model aims at developing an understanding of 
individual as a social product of society and the purpose is to 
make use of this understanding to analyze social interaction 
between individuals. The result is a conceptualization of 
society as located within the individual, as dynamic and emergent 
through social exchange and interaction, and as discovered 
through the processes of individual introspection and 
observation. This model is best represented by the work of 
Weber, and Blumer. (p. 33) 
Each of these models throws light on action. Each has its 
strengths and weaknesses. However, which of these paradigms 
should we use in the study of action? 
What are the relations of these concepts? To begin with, is 
social work a profession? Or, more appropriately, where is 
social work situated along the path which leads to 
professionalism? What needs to be done if social work is to move 
further along the professional end of the continuum? In a much 
quoted article in the social work literature, Ernest Greenwood 
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(1957) matched social work against five professional attributes 
and concluded that social work had already acquired full 
professional status. (pp. 44-55) 
This researcher is, however, of the opinion that social work 
in Hong Kong, same as elsewhere, has not, as yet, acquired full 
professional status. Based on his understanding of the concept 
of a profession this researcher contends that if social work is 
to become a full profession, social workers need to come to some 
consensus as to what constitutes the profession's authority, its 
sphere of functional specialty, its body of knowledge, and its 
code of practice. Undeniably, the task is difficult, but not 
impossible. It depends, most important of all, on success in 
identifying a system of values which is acceptable to most of its 
members. 
Secondly, what is the relationship between values and 
action? More particularly, what is the relationship between 
social work values and social work action? To what extent is 
value a predisposition to action. This leads us right back to 
the purpose of this study. 
1.4 Method of the Study 
The framework for this study is based on the researcher's 
conceptual understanding of social work, profession, value, and 
action. For this reason, four chapters are devoted to discussing 
the meaning of these concepts. 
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The study itself is divided into three parts. The first 
part involves an identification of a cluster of social work 
values. The second part involves a value survey the objective of 
which is to transform this cluster of values into a value system. 
The last part involves a value-action relationship survey the 
objective of which is to find out if there is any relationship 
between values and action in social work practice. 
To come up with a list of social work values, one can either 
rely on "what social work values are" or "what social work values 
should be". Values that are included as social work values are 
not easy to identify. Over the years there are very few 
empirical studies on values in social work. 
On the other hand, values that should be included as social 
work values can be obtained from the literature. Levy (1973), 
for instance, has come up with a highly respectable list of 
social work values. An alternative is to trace the historical 
development of social work since its emergence in the mid- 
nineteenth century. Both of these methods are used in this 
study. By tracing the historical development of social work, 
this researcher hopes to identify important dimensions in the 
developmental process and dominant ideologies associated with 
each. This provides a framework for the selection of values when 
one goes through the literature. Moreover, it allows the 
researcher to include values which may be important to social 
work but may not have been mentioned by the authors. It also 
allows him to include values which reflect the local situation. 
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In view of the uniqueness of Hong Kong, a city where the east 
meets the west, the set of values so identified must be able to 
reflect the ideologies of both parts of the world, notably the 
ideologies of the Christians and the Confucians; the 
Conservatives, the Liberals, and the Socialists. 
Basically, the historical development of social work in Hong 
Kong follows the path of the British, and in Britain, the 
following dimensions can be identified: 
1. the moral dimension, 
2. the organizational dimension, 
3. the psychological dimension, and 
4. the political dimension. 
In each of these dimensions, one type of values seems to 
predominate, namely, moral values, competence values, personal 
values, and social values. Based on these four types of values, 
two sets of values can be obtained. The first set includes 
twelve terminal values or end-states of existence. The second 
set includes twelve instrumental values or modes of conduct. 
Subsequently, each of these values is defined. 
To organize these two sets of values into a value system, 
this researcher adopts the research method Rokeach used in his 
study of the Nature of Human Values (1973). In his view, the 
value of an object is one of its properties. The possession of 
this property by the object, and its magnitude, can be determined 
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by ranking. Thus the second part of this study involves a rank 
ordering process. From the lists of values identified in the 
first part of this research, respondents to the value survey are 
requested to rank items in each of these lists in order of 
preference in their capacity as social workers. 
The last part of this study involves an exploration of the 
relationship between values and action in social work practice. 
This value-action relationship survey attempts to determine if 
there is any indication that by placing one value on top of 
another, one will perform the action which reflect one's 
preference for this value rather than another. To accomplish 
this purpose, a small number of case situations have been 
prepared. Since social workers in most situations will act 
almost routinely, without weighting their value preferences, 
these case situations are formulated according to issues which 
normally arouse serious value conflicts in the social worker. 
1.5 Summary of the Report 
The report is divided into four sections, which are further 
divided into ten chapters. Immediately following this first 
section and introductory chapter is Section Two which consists of 
four chapters on conceptual clarification. In Chapter Two, a 
sample of social work definitions is presented in order to 
highlight the difficulty of coming to terms with what social work 
is. In Chapter Three, a broad overview of the definitions of a 
profession is conducted. The chapter ends with a proposed 
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definition of the concept for this particular study. In Chapter 
Four, the focus is shifted to the concept of value. Based on the 
work of Rokeach, a slightly modified version of his definition of 
value is proposed. In the final chapter of this section, 
attention is focused on what action is and what its determinants 
are. Based on the work of Giddens, the meaning of action and its 
relation to value is discussed. This provides the framework for 
this study. 
Section Three consists of four chapters. Chapter Six is 
devoted to a discussion of research methodology. Findings of the 
study are reported in the remaining chapters of this section. 
Chapter Ten, the only chapter in the final section, is 
reserved for summary of findings and concluding remarks. 
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Section Two 
Conceptual Clarification 
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Chapter Two 
What is Social Work? 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Philip Seed (1973), the term social work was 
first used in Britain at the end of the nineteenth century "in 
connection with the activities of people who had a sense of 
belonging to a movement which aimed at social advance based on 
disciplined and principled forms of social action" (p. 3). As a 
social movement, its main concern was "to find more realistic 
remedies to social problems and to social distress than 
traditional forms of philanthropy and charity" (p. 3). 
In the United States, social work also began as a social 
movement, struggling for a "cause", which, in the opinion of Max 
Siporin (1975), was "to abolish the evils of poverty and 
injustice, to create a more equitable, integrated, and democratic 
society" (p. 9). 
Both of these definitions were based on the assumption that 
"social problems" and "social distress" could be remedied, and 
the "evils of poverty and injustice" could be abolished through 
the institutionalization of social welfare. The mission of 
social work was, therefore, to humanize the capitalist society, 
not to transform it. 
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Written in the last quarter of the twentieth century, Jeffry 
Galper (1980) expressed an entirely different view. To him, 
"radical social work" would contribute to "building a movement 
for the transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through 
the social services" (p. 10). In this understanding, social work 
was not connected with a social movement, but with a political 
movement which had as its mission the transformation of a society 
from capitalism to socialism. 
Very few social workers at this moment in time are committed 
to the idea of social work as a movement, neither social nor 
political. The reason for this was ably explained by Porter R. 
Lee (1929) when he distinguished social work as "cause" and 
social work as "function". In his own words: 
A cause is usually a movement directed toward the 
elimination of an entrenched evil ... the establishment of a 
new way of meeting human need or a new opportunity for 
satisfaction .... Whether we emphasize the elimination of 
evil or the establishment of a positive good as the 
objective of the cause, it seems to be true that once the 
elimination of the evil is accomplished, once the new 
positive good is established, interest in it is likely to 
slacken. The momentum of the cause will never carry over 
adequately to the subsequent task of making its fruits 
permanent. The slow [methodically] organized effort needed 
to make enduring the achievement of the cause calls for 
different motives, different skill, different machinery. At 
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the moment of its success, the cause tends to transfer its 
interest and its responsibility to an administrative unit 
whose responsibility becomes a function of well-organized 
community life. (pp. 22-3) 
Even though the statement was made more than half-a-century 
ago, its argument remains sound even today. Siporin (1975), for 
instance, was of the opinion that, with the institutionalization 
of social welfare, "social work then became a 'function' of a 
'well-organized community', giving 'corporate life' to the idea 
and ideal of social welfare" (p. 9). Siporin did not mean to 
imply that social work would no longer continue to speak and 
fight for the poor and disadvantaged in our society but, 
concurring with Lee, he contended that social work should 
"continue to be both a cause and a function" (p. 9). 
Siporin was not alone in holding this view. Neil Gilbert, 
Henry Miller, and Harry Specht (1980), for instance, also 
referred to social work as a function, "the practice of helping 
people use their social environment to meet their needs" (p. 11). 
Similarly, Martin Davies (1985) noted that the major task of 
social work was "to enable the citizen to retain his independence 
in the community for as long as possible, and to superintend his 
movement into or out of institutional care in a way that serves 
both the client's and the community's long-term interests" (p. 
10). 
In the very beginning of its existence, social work and 
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social welfare were regarded as synonyms. Kenneth L. M. Pray 
(1949), for instance, identified social work as "a normal 
constructive social instrument ... a necessary part of the 
structure of a civilized, well-planned society" (pp. 33-4). In 
this view, social work was equivalent to social welfare and both 
were defined as a social institution. However, this old 
equivalence has long been forgotten. Siporin (1975), for 
instance, claimed that social welfare was the social institution 
that "encompasses a wide variety of helping occupations and 
services to meet social needs, beyond the resources naturally 
provided by family and community groups" (p. 4). Social work, in 
this view, became one of the occupations within the social 
welfare institution. Gisela Konopka (1958) went a step further 
and defined social work as a profession that "presents a unique 
constellation of value, knowledge, and method" (p. 200). 
Moreover, Harold L. Wilensky and Charles N. Lebeaux (1965) 
identified social work as a profession, "a group of people with 
more or less specified training and skills, who occupy key 
positions, along with other groups, in the provision of welfare 
services" (p. 17n). Their views were echoed by Gilbert, Miller, 
and Specht (1980) who claimed that social work had become "the 
main source of professional personnel to operate the social 
welfare system" (p. 12). 
Instead of being referred to as an institution, an 
occupation, or a profession, social work was often referred to as 
an art, a science, or a technology. Mary Richmond (1915), for 
instance, defined social work as "the art of doing different 
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things for and with different people by cooperating with them to 
achieve at one and the same time their own and society's 
betterment" (pp. 374 f. ). 
For some social workers, social work as art helps to enhance 
one's sensitivity, creativity, and critical ability. - Elizabeth 
E. Irvine (1969), for instance, advocated the use of literature 
to heighten the sensitivity of social workers. She contended 
that "there is more to be learned about the mind of man from 
literature than from ... psychology" (p. 192). In another 
context, Irvine (1975) elaborated on this by claiming that: 
Literature (including drama) studies the whole man (not 
those abstractions: economic man, psychological man, 
sociological man) and observes him in his natural habitat 
(not the laboratory or the consulting-room) and in dynamic 
interaction with his family, his social circle and the wider 
society in which they exist. Furthermore, this whole man is 
observed by a whole man, not by that bit of a man contained 
in the role of social scientist; by an observer using 
greater empathy than the man in the street, unlike the 
social scientist, who use less (he may have the capacity, 
but usually feels obliged to inhibit or disregard it so that 
it will not contaminate his objectivity). (pp. 197-8) 
Lydia Rapoport (1968), on the other hand, noted general 
similarities between social work and art and concluded that : 
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Social work, like art, is engaged in problem solving, be it 
the problem of expression, communication, transformation, or 
change. Both deal with human materials or human themes and 
both require an intimate "knowing and contact". Both call 
for creative and imaginative use of self. Both require a 
special kind of distance and objectivity. (p. 151) 
In the rest of the article, she elaborated on the implications of 
"creativity in social work". 
Much more recently, Hugh England (1986) indicated interest 
in criticism, one of the key components in the tradition of art. 
He was of the opinion that: 
Criticism in social work, as an art, is integral to practice 
.... The social worker 
is critic in two distinct respects. 
Initially he is the critic of his client .... The social 
worker has to be particularly skilled at the evaluation, or 
understanding, of his client's meaning and is thus his 
client's critic. But the worker's subsequent behaviour and 
communication is his "art", and as this must necessarily be 
evaluated (to ensure that it serves the best interests of 
his client), the worker is also critic in the more profound 
sense that he must evaluate his "art" .... Criticism then, 
for both these reasons, is an integral though unrecognized 
element in the practice of social work. Its proper 
development will lead directly to the improvement of the 
general standard of practice. It will also serve a wider 
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end, for the development of an adequate criticism will make 
social work "visible" and will thus allow for its much 
broader understanding. It will be the means to a real 
exploration and analysis of social work. (p. 119) 
Social work has also been described as a science. According 
to Louise C Johnson and Charles L Schwartz (1988), , its 
scientific nature can best be illustrated by pointing out that 
when social workers help people, they employ the problem-solving 
process, which is an application of scientific principles and 
methods" (p. 304). Thus the science of social work implies the 
conscious application of acquired knowledge. Ruth E. Smalley 
(1967), for instance, defined social work as "the body of 
knowledge, skill, and ethics, professionally employed in the 
administration of the social services and in the development of 
programmes for social welfare" (p. 4). 
Charles R. Atherton (1969), however, had a totally different 
view. He claimed that social work was nothing more than "the 
technology which has been given the responsibility for the 
control of dependency" (p. 421). In this case, the knowledge of 
social work gives way to its skills. 
The most popular view must be that social work is both art 
and science. Louise C. Johnson (1986), for instance, described 
social work as a creative blending of knowledge, values and 
skills. (p. 53) The way these components are blended together 
may be referred to as method. Siporin (1975), for instance, was 
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of the opinion that social work was "a social institutional 
method of helping people to prevent and resolve their social 
problems, to restore and enhance their social functioning" (p. 
3). 
As "a social institutional method" of helping people, social 
work has been categorized and defined in a variety of ways. In a 
recent publication Robert L. Barker (1987) categorized and 
defined social work according to its field of practice, including 
forensic social work (p. 58), hospital social work (p. 72), 
industrial social work (p. 78), international social work (pp. 
81-82), medical social work (p. 96), military social work (p. 
99), occupational social work (p. 110), police social work (p. 
121), psychiatric social work (p. 128), rural social work (p. 
141), and school social work (p. 145). He also categorized and 
defined social work in terms of direct practice (p. 42) and 
indirect practice (p. 78); macro practice (p. 92), mezzo practice 
(p. 98), and micro practice (p. 98). 
The method of categorization and definition which remains 
with us even today is by looking at the methods of and approaches 
to social work practice. These methods of social work practice 
often include social casework, social group work, and community 
work. However, since the beginning of the 1970s, there is a 
growing interest in the unitary method, one that "would provide a 
common set of principles and concepts which all social workers 
could use in dealing with social problems as they are manifest in 
a single individual, a group or a community" (Specht and Vickery, 
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1977, p. 15). 
Within each method of social work practice, one can easily 
identify a number of practice approaches. In social casework, 
one often finds the psychosocial approach (Hollis, 1970), the 
functional approach (Smalley, 1970), and the problem-solving 
approach (Perlman, 1970). In social group work, one is inclined 
to include the organizational and environmental approach (Glasser 
and Garvin, 1977), the interactionist approach (Schwartz, 1977), 
and the developmental approach (Tropp, 1977). In community work, 
one can hardly leave out community development, community 
organization, and social action (Barker, 1987, pp. 29; 29; 151). 
There is, however, hardly any consensus in the selection of 
unitary approaches to social work practice. To serve the purpose 
of this study, the following approaches are included: radical 
social work (Galper, 1980), clinical social work (Northen, 1982), 
community social work (NISW, 1982), and essential social work 
(Davies, 1985). 
The uniqueness of social work was identified by Gilbert, 
Miller, and Specht (1980). In their own words, they stated that: 
[There] is no other profession that takes as its central 
concern the interaction of people with their social 
environment. Other professionals work with social 
interactions in particular parts of the social environment 
.... But the concern of social workers is with the entire 
social environment .... In modern life these different 
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institutional systems tend to function separately. Most of 
them are very large and complex. A major concern of social 
work is with helping people deal effectively with each of 
these systems as well as linking these systems with one 
another. (pp. 11-2) 
In addition to this unique concern with the entire 
social environment, social work has become the main source 
of professional personnel to operate the welfare system .... 
Of course, other professionals are employed in this 
enterprise, too .... But social work is the primary source 
of professionals in social welfare. Conversely, although 
the majority of social workers are employed in different 
parts of the social welfare system, they work in other 
institutional systems such as trade unions and educational 
and medical care agencies, helping to carry out the social 
welfare functions of these systems. (p. 12) 
These, then, are the two features of social work that 
distinguish it from other professions: it is primarily 
concerned with enabling people to make full use of their 
social environment and with the development and functioning 
of the institution of social welfare. (p. 12) 
In concluding this brief review, we can, for the moment, 
define social work as an occupation within the social welfare 
institution which aspires to become a profession. However, there 
is no agreement regarding the nature of social work. Is social 
64 
work a "cause" or a "function"? Should social work be considered 
as "art", "science", or "technology"? If social work is to be 
considered as a method, how should it be defined? In the next 
section, we will have a brief overview of some of the definitions 
which look at social work as a method. 
2.2 Approaches to Definition 
There are in existence in the social work literature a large 
number of definitions of social work but, understandably, none of 
these is able to satisfy all those who claim to be involved in 
its practice. In this section, only a few of those which look at 
social work as a method will be presented. 
2.2.1 Social work as social casework 
In Britain, the term "case-work" was used from the inception 
of the Charity Organization Society in 1869. Henceforth, it was 
widely used as the method of providing services to children, 
families, offenders, patients of general and mental hospitals. 
Parallel developments could be observed in the United States. 
The most widely accepted definition of social casework in 
the United States in the mid-twentieth century must be the one 
offered by Swithun Bowers (1949). After reviewing definitions of 
social casework in his country since 1915, Bowers suggested the 
following definition: 
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Social casework is an art in which knowledge of the science 
of human relations and skill in relationship are used to 
mobilize capacities in the individual and resources in the 
community appropriate for better adjustment between the 
client and all or any part of his total environment. (p. 
19) 
In Britain, the definition provided in the Younghusband 
Report was also representative of the thinking of casework 
practitioners in the first half of the twentieth century: 
Casework is a personal service provided by qualified workers 
for individuals who required skilled assistance in resolving 
some material, emotional or character problem. It is a 
disciplined activity which requires a full appreciation of 
the needs of the client in his family and community setting. 
The caseworker seeks to perform this service on the basis of 
mutual trust and in such ways as will strengthen the 
client's own capacities to deal with his problems and to 
achieve a better adjustment with his environment. The 
services required of a caseworker cover many kinds of human 
need, ranging from relatively simple problems of material 
assistance to complex personal situations involving 
emotional disturbance or a character deficit, which may 
require prolonged assistance and the careful mobilization of 
resources and of different professional skills. (Ministry 
of Health & Department of Health for Scotland, 1959, pp. 
182-3) 
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A much more updated definition was provided by Barker (1987) 
in the Social Work Dictionary: 
[Social casework is] the orientation, value system, and type 
of practice used by professional social workers in which 
psychosocial, behavioural, and systems concepts are 
translated into skills designed to help individuals and 
families solve intrapsychic, interpersonal, socioeconomic, 
and environmental problems through direct face-to-face 
relationships. (p. 151) 
All these definitions make it perfectly clear that social 
casework is concerned with social as well as personal factors; 
with the adjustment of the environment as well as the individual; 
with mobilizing community resources as well as personal 
resources. There is also the implicit assumption in the practice 
of casework that it benefits not only the individual but society 
as well. The betterment of society, however, follows from the 
betterment of the individual and casework is concerned primarily 
with the development and adjustment of the individual rather than 
with societal arrangements in any general sense. 
There are in existence a number of approaches to social 
casework, including the psychosocial approach, the functional 
approach, and the problem-solving approach. Each of these 
approaches has its own emphasis. In the eyes of Florence Hollis 
(1970), "casework treatment (using the psychosocial approach) is 
conceptualized as a blend of processes directed as diagnostically 
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indicated toward modification in the person or his social 
environment or both, and of the exchanges between them" (pp. 36- 
7). The functional approach, however, has a different emphasis. 
Ruth E. Smalley (1970), one of its chief advocates, is of the 
opinion that social casework is "not a form of social treatment 
of individuals" but "a method for engaging a client through a 
relationship process, essentially one to one, in the use of a 
social service toward his own and the general welfare" (pp. 80- 
1). Finally, according to Helen H, Perlman (1970), the primary 
goal of the problem-solving approach is "to help a person cope as 
effectively as possible with such problems in carrying social 
tasks and relationships which he now perceives, feels as 
stressful, and finds insuperable without outside help" (p. 139). 
2.2.2 Social work as social group work 
A definition of social group work which can satisfy the many 
different kinds of workers who claim to be taking part in its 
practice is much more difficult to find. The reason for this was 
made obvious by Peter Kuenstler (1955) when he stated that "under 
the heading of Social Group Work in Britain it might be 
justifiable to include a survey of almost all types of human 
activity in the country, on the grounds that they are social 
activities of human beings in groups" (p. 16). Such activities 
might well include group work with young children, adolescents 
and adults, group work in industry and in commerce, in hospitals, 
in churches, in settlements, and in community centres. In this 
understanding, social group work became "a method which can be 
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applied consciously and skilfully to particular kinds of social 
and educational work, so that the purpose of such groups is more 
successfully achieved" (p. 21). 
A more acceptable definition could be found in the 
Younghusband Report which stated that social group work was a 
form of social work which was "directed towards giving people a 
constructive experience of membership in a group so that they may 
develop further as individuals and be better able to contribute 
to the life of the community" (Ministry of Health & Department of 
Health for Scotland, 1959, p. 183). 
Social group work was much better developed as a method in 
the United States than in Britain in the first half of twentieth 
century. In 1942, Gertrude Wilson emphasized the use of group 
work in effecting changes in the values of individuals and 
society as a whole. She believed that "group work was a process 
through which group life was influenced by a worker who directed 
the process toward the accomplishment of a social goal conceived 
in a democratic philosophy" (Quoted by Reid, 1981, p. 143). The 
functions of social group work were described as "(1) 
developmental, as it provided for normal social growth; (2) 
protective or corrective, in that it could be offered to people 
without groups; and (3) instrumental, in achieving of socially 
desirable ends" (pp. 143-4). 
A few years later, Grace Coyle, while serving as chairperson 
of a committee of the American Association of Group Workers 
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(AAGW), issued a statement, Definition of the Function of the 
Group Worker (1949). This statement was adopted by AAGW and 
became the official description of the function of the 
professional group worker. In the statement, Coyle noted that: 
The group worker enables various types of groups to function 
in such a way that both group interaction and programme 
activities contribute to the growth of the individual and 
the achievement of desirable social goals. 
The objectives of the group worker include provision 
for personal growth according to individual capacity and 
need, the adjustment of the individual to other persons, to 
groups and to society, and the motivation of the individual 
toward the improvement of society; the recognition by the 
individual of his own rights, limitations and abilities, as 
well as his acceptance of the rights, abilities and 
differences of others. (Quoted by Reid, 1981, p. 146) 
Much more recently, social group work was defined by Barker 
(1987) to read: 
(Social group work is] an orientation and method of social 
work intervention in which small numbers of people who share 
similar interests or common problems convene regularly and 
engage in activities designed to achieve their common goals. 
In contrast to group psychotherapy, the goals of group work 
are not necessarily the treatment of emotional problems. 
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The objectives also include exchanging information, 
developing social and manual skills, changing value 
orientations, and diverting antisocial behaviours into 
productive channels. Intervention techniques include, but 
are not limited to, controlled therapeutic discussions. 
Some groups also include education and tutoring, sports, 
arts and crafts, recreational activities, and discussion 
about such topics as politics, religion, sexuality, values, 
and goals. (p. 152) 
These definitions perhaps give a reasonably concrete idea of 
social group work. Here too there is the assumption that the 
activity will result in community betterment but the focus is 
clearly on the development of the individual and of the group-as- 
a-whole; the community benefits through the consequent better 
functioning of individuals and groups. 
There are in existence a variety of approaches to social 
group work, including the organizational and environmental 
approach, the interactionist approach and the developmental 
approach. (Middleman and Goldberg, 1985, p. 717) Each of these 
approaches has its own emphasis. As a spokesman of the 
organizational and environmental approach, Charles Garvin (1987) 
is of the opinion that the purpose of a group is to facilitate 
the socialization or resocialization of the member. Furthermore, 
he emphasizes that the purpose for which the group is established 
determines the way the members will respond to their group 
experience and the way the worker will work with the group. This 
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approach to group purpose recognizes that the ultimate 
fulfillment of the purpose will be a result of interactions 
involving the agency, the worker, the members, as well as others 
in the environment. (pp. 2-4) 
William Schwartz, the initiator of the interactionist 
approach, draws more strongly than others from systems concepts 
to portray members, groups, agencies, and other complex 
environments in interaction with each other and in a constant 
process of mutual adaptation. The social worker facilitates this 
process by functioning as a mediator. This approach focuses on 
the process whereby individuals engage with others to meet mutual 
needs. (Garvin, 1987, p. 20) 
Emanuel Tropp contends that "group self-direction toward a 
common goal is the most effective group vehicle for the social 
growth of its members". In the group the individual is helped to 
achieve growth through participation in establishing and 
accomplishing the group's goal or purpose. He does not describe 
group work as "treatment" and its beneficiaries as "abnormal or 
pathological". Instead, he feels that "all are seen as people 
who face stressful developmental stages, life situations, 
challenges, and crises with which they must cope in some way". 
(Garvin, 1987, p. 21) 
2.2.3 Social work as community work 
Community work is a form of social work which takes the 
72 
quality of the social activities and social relationships of a 
whole community as its starting point. The community worker may 
appear under a number of different titles, e. g., community 
development officer, neighbourhood worker, social development 
officer, social relations officer, or simply liaison officer. As 
an occupation, as distinct from a voluntary activity of citizens, 
it is generally accepted as embracing both direct work with 
community groups and work at the inter-organizational and 
planning level. It is undertaken with communities, which may be 
large or small, and based on geography or community of interest. 
Its basic concern is to enable their members collectively to 
overcome problems and improve their conditions of life while at 
the same time enhancing the sense of common feeling, solidarity 
and competence of the community. 
There are in existence several approaches to community work: 
community development, community organization, and social action. 
According to Noel and Rita Timms (1982), community 
development started as a post-war response to help and to 
stimulate people in the under-developed parts of the world to 
improve their way of life. Such improvement was believed to 
depend on the active participation of people themselves. 
Community development has since been identified as one of the 
interwoven strands of community work. It involves direct, face- 
to-face action directed towards mobilizing people in a locality 
or neighbourhood around one or more issues or concerns. (p. 37) 
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Much more recently, community development is defined as 
"efforts made by professionals and community residents to enhance 
the social bonds among members of the community, motivate the 
citizens for self-help, develop responsible local leadership, and 
create or revitalize local institutions" (Barker, 1987, p. 29) 
Insofar as community organization has been talked about in 
Britain, it has been in terms of the work of Councils of Social 
Service, Old People's Welfare Committees, Committees for the 
Physically Handicapped and similar organizations engaged in the 
co-ordination, promotion, and development of the work of a number 
of bodies in a particular field at the local, regional or 
national level. 
However, in the United States, community organization has 
meant the bringing together of organizations involved in social 
welfare so as to co-ordinate and develop their capacities in 
order to meet community needs more adequately. Over time the 
meaning of the term has broadened to include a wide range of 
activities including that which is referred to as "community 
work" in Britain. One of the most elaborate attempts at a 
comprehensive definition - and certainly one of the most widely 
quoted - is that of Murray Ross (1967): 
Community organization ... is ... a process by which a 
community identifies its needs and objectives, orders (or 
ranks) these needs or objectives, develops the confidence 
and will to work at these needs or objectives, finds the 
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resources (internal and/or external) to deal with these 
needs or objectives, takes action in respect to them, and in 
so doing extends and develops co-operative and collaborative 
attitudes and practices in the community. (p. 40) 
Much more recently, community organization is defined as "an 
intervention process used by social workers and other 
professionals to help individuals, groups, and collectives of 
people with common interests or from the same geographic areas to 
deal with social problems and to enhance social well-being 
through planned collective action" (Barker, 1987, p. 29). 
In the same publication, social action is described as: 
A coordinated effort to achieve institutional change in 
order to meet a need, solve a social problem, correct an 
injustice, or enhance the quality of human life. This 
effort may occur at the initiative and direction of 
professionals in social welfare, economics, politics, 
religion, or the military, or it may occur through the 
efforts of the people who are directly affected by the 
problems or change. (Barker, 1987, p. 151) 
2.2.4 Social work as a unitary approach 
In the 1970s, there was a move in the United States toward 
integrating methods of social work. Social work was no longer 
seen as dividing into social casework, social group work, and 
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community work. It was seen as a unitary approach which had as 
its focus the interaction between individuals and their 
environment. The National Association of Social Workers (1973), 
for instance, offered the following definition for social work: 
Social work is the professional activity of helping 
individuals, groups, or communities to enhance or restore 
their capacity for social functioning and creating societal 
conditions favorable to that goal. 
Social work practice consists of the professional 
application of social work values, principles, and 
techniques to one or more of the following ends: helping 
people to obtain tangible services; providing counseling and 
psychotherapy with individuals, families and groups; helping 
communities or groups provide or improve social and health 
services; and participating in relevant legislative 
processes. 
The practice of social work requires knowledge of human 
development and behavior; of social, economic, and cultural 
institutions; and of the interaction of all of these 
factors. (Quoted in Barker, 1987, p. 154) 
Back in England, the British Association of Social Workers 
also adopted, in 1977, a formal definition of social work. It 
stated that: 
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Social work is the purposeful and ethical application of 
personal skills in interpersonal relationships directed 
towards enhancing the personal and social functioning of an 
individual, family, group or neighbourhood, which 
necessarily involves using evidence obtained from practice 
to help create a social environment conducive to the well- 
being of all. (p. 19) 
Finally, in China, a definition of social work was recently 
produced. It described social work as "the management of social 
welfare services, under the direction of the Party and the 
Government, mobilizing the resources of the people and people's 
organizations, for those who have lost or have never acquired the 
ability to function effectively in the society". Through the use 
of appropriate measures, social work aimed at "helping them 
resume a normal social life, maintaining social orders, and 
safeguarding the stability of essential social institutions". 
(Shehuixue Gailun, 1985, p. 336, tr. ) 
Along this same line, Helen Northen (1982), author of 
Clinical Social Work, stated that: 
Social work, as a profession with a major responsibility for 
the quality of human relations, is concerned with the 
promotion of opportunities for the enhancement of potentials 
and for the prevention of problems. It has a responsibility 
also for the remediation of difficulties and conflicts that 
have developed. (p. 15) 
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In other words, enhancement, prevention, and remediation are 
all appropriate functions for social work. 
In a recent report published by the National Institute for 
Social Work (1982), a move toward community social work was 
advocated. In the report, it noted that: 
[Community social work] is concerned both with responding to 
the existing social care needs of individuals and families 
and with reducing the number of such problems which arise in 
the future .... It rests ... upon a recognition that the 
majority of social care in England and Wales is provided, 
not by the statutory or voluntary social services agencies, 
but by individual citizens who are often linked into 
informal caring networks. (p. 205) 
In comparing these definitions, one can easily identify some 
commonalities. Charles D. Garvin and Brett A. Seabury (1984) 
have included the following: 
1. The focus of social work practice is upon the way in 
which the individual seeks to meet needs in the environment 
and the way in which the environment responds to the needs 
of the individual. 
2. The role of social workers in responding to this 
relationship between individuals and environments may be 
fulfilled in several ways: 
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a. By reducing or resolving problems that grow out of 
dysfunctional individual-environmental interactions; 
b. By preventing the emergence of dysfunctional 
individual-environmental interactions; 
c. By strengthening the potential of people to lead 
creative and satisfying lives in their environments. 
3. The improvement of conditions or resolution of problems 
related to individual-environmental transactions can be 
brought about in several ways, such as 
a. By enhancing the problem-solving and developmental 
capacities of people; 
b. By helping people deal with their environments and 
develop their creative potential through improving the 
quality of their associations with the groups of people 
with whom they are most intimately involved (e. g., their 
families, friends, neighbours, and fellow workers); 
c. By promoting the responsive, effective, and humane 
operation of systems that provide people with resources 
and services; 
d. By linking people with systems that provide them 
with resources, services, and opportunities. (p. 2) 
What is the problem with social work? After reviewing these 
definitions, one tends to agree with the following statement 
which describes very succinctly the situation social workers find 
themselves: 
79 
Too much is generally expected of social workers. We load 
upon them unrealistic expectations .... It has grown rapidly 
as the flow of legislation has greatly increased the range 
and complexity of its work .... There is confusion about 
the direction in which they are going and unease about what 
they should be doing and the way in which they are organized 
and deployed .... They operate uneasily on the frontier 
between what appears to be almost limitless needs on the one 
hand and an inadequate pool of resources to satisfy those 
needs on the other. (NISW, 1982, p. vii) 
To overcome this problem, some authors have chosen to define 
social work in the way they want it to be. The Barclay Report, 
for instance, described social work as counselling and social 
care planning. (NISW, 1982) On the other hand, Davies (1985) 
focused on social work as a mechanism for maintaining stability 
in the society while Galper (1980) perceived social work as an 
active participant in helping to bring about the transformation 
from capitalism to socialism. Finally, Northen (1982) chose to 
retain her interest in clinical practice. 
Other authors have chosen to define social work in broader 
terms. Definitions formulated by the National Association of 
Social Workers and the British Association of Social Workers are 
examples of this approach. 
Each approach has its merits but neither one is able to 
satisfy all social workers in the field of social welfare. In 
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the final section of this chapter, a definition of social work 
which is based on the second approach is proposed. 
2.3 A Proposed Definition 
Among the numerous attempts to define social work, the most 
widely quoted and discussed seems to be the Working Definition of 
Social Work Practice of the National Association of Social 
Workers. Published in 1958, the statement stated that: 
Social work practice, like the practice of all professions, 
is recognized by a constellation of value, purpose, 
sanctions, knowledge, and method. No part alone is 
characteristic of social work practice nor is any part ... 
unique to social work. It is the particular content and 
configuration of this constellation which makes it social 
work practice and distinguishes it from the practice of 
other professions. (Bartlett, 1958) 
According to the Working Definition, the practice of social 
work has as its purposes: 
1. To assist individuals and groups to identify and resolve 
or minimize problems arising out of disequilibrium between 
themselves and their environment. 
2. To identify potential areas of disequilibrium between 
individuals or groups and the environment in order to 
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prevent the occurrence of disequilibrium. 
3. In addition to the curative and preventive aims, to seek 
out, identify and strengthen the maximum potential 
in 
individuals, groups and communities. (Bartlett, 1958) 
The major contribution of the Working Definition lies in the 
Report's stipulation that the practice of social work is 
recognized by a constellation of five components. Many 
definitions of social work formulated after this make reference 
to some or all of these components. The Working Definition is, 
however, not without limitations. 
In a critique of the Working Definition, William E. Gordon 
(1962) identified three of its limitations. Firstly, the working 
definition "tells us how to recognize social work practice, but 
not what social work practice is,,. Secondly, "the components ... 
appeared to stand separate and equal to each other, held together 
only by the assertion that all must be present to some degree for 
the practice to be considered social work practice". Lastly, and 
as a direct result of the absence of relationships between 
components, "the Working Definition does not easily relate itself 
to other frames of reference or permit ready reduction of further 
implications and hypotheses for examination". Therefore, in 
Gordon's view, the working definition "cannot readily serve as a 
guide for further study and development until its components are 
functionally related". (pp. 4-5) 
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In an attempt to define what social work practice is and to 
identify the hierarchical relationships between its components, 
Gordon (1962) introduced the idea of practice as the social 
worker-in-action. His rationale was clearly explained in the 
following statement. 
The idea of practice as worker action not only specifies 
what social work practice is, but it also specifies the 
functional relationship of the components to that action. 
Thus the action is directed toward some purpose, occurs 
under some sanction, and is under the conscious guidance of 
knowledge and values, and is patterned to some extent by 
methods. (p. 5) 
Building upon this central idea of worker action, he offered 
the following definition for social work practice. 
Social work practice is interventive action directed to 
purposes and guided by the values, knowledge, and techniques 
which are collectively unique, acknowledged by and 
identified with the social work profession. (p. 11) 
Elaborating on this statement, he stated that 
While action itself is the stuff of practice, the elements 
that make it social work practice reside in the purposes for 
which the action is taken, the value-knowledge-determined 
perception of the situation toward which action is directed, 
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and the patterning of action by such techniques as are 
available to guide it. (p. 12) 
He further contended that: 
Since purposes are largely set by values and techniques are 
derived from knowledge, the most obvious implication of this 
formulation is to place much more emphasis than before on 
the values and knowledge on which practice (interventive 
action) is based. (p. 12) 
It needs to be pointed out that sanction was not included in 
this statement and method was replaced by techniques. In 
explaining his decision to exclude sanction as a basic component, 
Gordon argued that: 
While one might choose to say that interventive action 
guided by purpose, value, knowledge, and technique is not 
professional practice unless it is authorized by society and 
legitimated through law, agency, or professional 
organization, the action itself cannot be distinguished from 
unsanctioned action. In other words, sanction classifies 
one of the conditions under which the action occurs, but it 
does not influence the action itself. (p. 12) 
He also explained his reason for replacing method by techniques 
by saying that: 
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Since method seemed so recalcitrant to clarification, the 
current subcommittee on the Working Definition experimented 
with two related action-oriented concepts - professional 
intervention and techniques. Professional intervention is 
used to refer to the action of the practitioner .... 
Techniques when used ... guide the interventive action. 
(p. 11) 
Looking back over the pages, one has to admit that both 
Bartlett and Gordon have contributed significantly to the 
understanding of social work practice. By stipulating that 
social work is recognized by a constellation of five components, 
Bartlett have successfully laid the foundation. Gordon, by 
introducing the idea of practice as worker action, has, with 
equal success, identified the relationships between the 
components. However, several improvements can still be made. 
The first improvement involves the basic components that should 
be included in the definition. The second improvement involves 
the relations between one component and another. Finally, the 
third improvement relates to the content of each of these basic 
components. 
What are the basic components of social work? Since social 
work aspires to become a profession, it seems logical to make 
reference to the attributes of a profession while determining its 
basic components. This and the other improvements will be 
discussed in the next few chapters. In the meantime, it is 
proposed that Gordon's definition of social work practice be 
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amended to read as follow: 
Social work is an occupation within the social welfare 
institution which aspires to become a profession. Its 
practice involves social action directed to purposes and 
guided by a creative blending of knowledge, values, and 
techniques, which are collectively unique, acknowledged by 
and identified with social work. 
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Chapter Three 
What is a Profession? 
3.1 Introduction 
The emergence of a growing number of professions and 
professionals has long been accepted by sociologists as a major 
characteristic of modern industrial societies. Talcott Parsons 
(1939), for instance, noted that the modern society was a 
professional society: it was neither capitalistic as was 
described by Karl Marx, nor bureaucratic, by Max Weber. Paul 
Halmos (1970) went a step further when he noted that the modern 
society was becoming a personal service society, i. e., a society 
of personal service professions. Much more recently, John 
Goldthorpe (1982) noted the emergence of "the service class", 
including the professionals, as a characteristic of the modern 
society. Reasons for the emergence of the professions may be 
outlined as following: 
1. The growth of industry created a demand for highly 
specialized, theoretical, and technical knowledge, resulting in 
the development of academic professions such as science and 
practice professions such as engineering. 
2. The expansion of trade and commerce accounted for the demand 
for financial experts. such as accountants and legal experts such 
as lawyers. 
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3. The creation of the welfare state stimulated the growth and 
development of a wide range of personal service professions, 
including medicine, psychiatry, psychology, and social work. 
Alongside with this is an increase in interest in the 
sociology of the professions. Even though the professions have 
never been among the core subjects in sociology, a surprisingly 
large number of early masters in the discipline have included the 
professions in the discussion of topics that are of interest to 
them. 
Among the early masters Karl Marx had relatively little to 
say about the professions. This is understandable because, in 
his theory of society, he looked at capitalism as a structure 
within society that alienated individuals, particularly 
labourers. It erected barriers between the labourer and the 
production process, the product of that process, and other 
labourers. It even divided the labourer himself. In other 
words, capitalism had evolved into a two-class system in which a 
few capitalists owned the production process, the product, and 
the time of those labourers who worked for them. In his view, 
the professions were nothing more than instruments of the 
capitalists to exercise control over the labourers. This view of 
the professions is particularly devastating for the personal 
service professions. Employed mainly in the service of the 
government, which was technically under the control of the 
capitalists, these helping professions had no alternative but to 
serve in the interest of the capitalists rather than the 
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labourers. From a Marxian perspective, therefore, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, doctors, and social workers served to clamp down 
on opposition to capitalist exploitation by defining individuals 
as psychiatric, psychological, medical, or moral problems, and 
treating them as such. In this way it was argued that attention 
would be diverted from the real cause of these problems. 
Max Weber had a more positive view of the professions. Even 
though his main interest was not in the professions, he 
identified its linkage to the Protestant Ethic, Calvinism in 
particular, and the rise of bureaucratization, rationalization, 
and capitalism in the Western world. To Weber, the process of 
professionalization was viewed as occurring largely within 
bureaucracies. In his view, Calvinism helped to promote the 
development of a disciplined and methodical organization of 
conduct, and it was the bureaucratic-professional that best 
represented this type of behaviour. He saw the priest as an 
ideal-typical of a bureaucratic-professional that lied on one end 
of the continuum of professionalism and the sorcerer as an ideal- 
typical of a non-professional that lied on the opposite end. 
Research in the sociology of the professions is, today, 
largely founded on the contribution of three persons, Emile 
Durkheim and Talcott Parsons, both representatives of the 
organic-structure-functional model, and Everett C. Hughes, a 
Canadian who was at one time a member of the Chicago School, home 
of the social-behaviourist-social-psychological model. 
89 
Much of the early work looked at the professions from the 
perspective of structural-functionalism and dealt with their 
roles within the social structure. This often involved a 
comparison between business and the professions or, more 
specifically, between the egoistic motive of businessmen and the 
altruistic motive of the professionals. Among the structural- 
functionalists, Emile Durkheim is particularly important in 
assigning to the professions a distinctively positive role in 
society. 
While Marx hold the view that problems of modern societies 
were inherent in the social structure, Durkheim believed that 
social disorders which existed in these societies could be 
minimized through gradual social reform. In his effort to 
explain how order was maintained within the social structure, 
Durkheim contrasted the mechanistic solidarity of pre-industrial 
societies with the organic solidarity of industrial societies. 
In the case of pre-industrial societies, unity stemmed, at least 
in part, from the fact that everyone did essentially the same 
things. Such a society was characterized by a powerful common 
morality that played a central role in making it cohesive. As 
for industrial societies, unity was the result of differences in 
the tasks performed by individuals. Societies of this type were 
held together by the fact that people who performed specialized 
jobs needed the contributions of many other specialists in order 
to ensure survival. It was this mutual need for specialized work 
that held modern societies together. 
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Although Durkheim postulated that organic solidarity was the 
normal consequence of the division of labour, he also recognized 
that abnormal forms might develop which would turn the division 
of labour into a divisive force rather than a cohesive one. 
In his view, the anomic form of the division of labour was a 
real threat to the social structure of his time. It created 
social conflict by separating interdependent parts of the social 
structure which had provided the basis for the normal form of 
organic solidarity. It was in business activity and the economic 
philosophy of laissez-faire that the problems of anomie could be 
seen most clearly. 
To re-establish this contact he looked to the formation of 
occupational groups, particularly professional groups. In his 
view, the formation of professional associations provided the 
means to facilitate the integration of individual members into 
occupational groups. Through its control of education and 
training, these associations were able to establish both 
professional competence and professional ethics and it was the 
provision of an ethical codes which accounted for the 
professions' contribution to the maintenance of social order. 
Since the turn of the century, interest in the differences 
between business and the professions has given way to their 
similarities. Talcott Parsons, for instance, published an 
influential paper in 1939 claiming that the similarities between 
business and the professions were more important than their 
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differences. In the paper he contended that: 
The fact that the professions have reached a uniquely high 
level of development in the same society which is also 
characterized by a business economy suggests that the 
contrast between business and the professions ... is not the 
whole story. Possibly there are elements common to both 
areas ... which are at least as important to their 
functioning as is self-interest to business, 
disinterestedness to the professions. (pp. 35-6) 
These common elements were, in his view, rationality, specificity 
of function, and universalism. Moreover, in both cases, they 
sought "success" and "recognition of their success" in their own 
delimited areas of functional specificity, even though the manner 
in which success was concretely defined and pursued might differ 
in each case. (pp. 36-44) 
Thus, according to Parsons, professionals were not 
"altruistic" while businessmen were not "egoistic"; both were 
simply conforming to the standards deemed appropriate in their 
specific areas of activity. Moreover, he envisioned businessmen 
as professionals. To the charge that the professions had become 
commercialized, he counteracted by saying it was commerce that 
had become professionalized. (pp. 45-9) 
The major alternative to the functionalist view of 
professionalism is inspired by Everett C. Hughes (1963). In his 
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view, the word profession originally meant the act of professing. 
Each profession professed to know better than others the nature 
of certain matters, and to know better than their clients what 
ailed them or their affairs. It had come to mean an occupation 
which one professed to be skilled in and to follow, or a vocation 
in which professed knowledge of some branch of learning was used 
in its application to the affairs of others, or in the practice 
of an art based upon it. (p. 656) 
Thus, for Hughes, the search for criteria which defined the 
professions is quite misconceived. Profession, in his view, was 
a lay term with no precise meaning. It was nothing more than a 
symbolic label granted by others to some occupational groups. 
Perhaps the way to understand what professions meant in our 
society, Hughes suggested, was to note the ways in which 
occupations tried to change themselves or their image, or both, 
in the course of a movement to become professionalized. (p. 658) 
Two concepts were important in his thought: licence and 
mandate. Since the professionals did profess, they asked for the 
exclusive right to practice, as a vocation, the art which they 
professed to know, and to give the kind of advice derived from 
their special lines of knowledge. In other words, they claimed 
the exclusive right to carry out certain activities which were 
different from those of others. This formed the basis of 
license. (p. 656) 
If the professionals had any sense of community by virtue of 
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their shared work experience, they would also claim a mandate to 
define, for themselves and others, proper conduct in relation to 
their work, to influence its technical content, styles of 
delivery and, more crucially, the patterns of public demand and 
response. (p. 657) 
It is important to emphasize that Hughes regarded these 
features as differences of degree rather than kind, present in 
all occupations. In consequence, any occupation may acquire 
similar privileges if it tries to reconstruct its licence and win 
acceptance of an enlarged mandate. 
These early masters left a series of open questions. The 
one which is of concern to us here is "How are we to know a 
profession when we see one? " 
3.2 Approaches to Definition 
Even among sociologists the word "profession" is used to 
convey different meanings. In this section, three approaches to 
definition will be discussed: (1) the traits approach, (2) the 
process approach, and (3) the power approach. 
These approaches have one thing in common. They are all 
interested in defining and delimiting occupations to be 
considered as professions. Both the traits approach and the 
process approach offer some very important insights into the 
sociology of the professions. The former provides us with basic 
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criteria for distinguishing between the professions and the 
nonprofessional occupations and the latter attunes us to the 
stages of development of the professions. The power approach, on 
the other hand, helps us to understand the dynamics involved in 
the developmental process. 
3.2.1 The traits approach 
Much of the literature on the professions since the turn of 
the century have been devoted to the question of what constitutes 
a profession. Under the influence of Durkheim, supporters of the 
traits approach argue that if the professions are different from 
business and other nonprofessional occupations, they must have in 
possession a constellation of characteristics which is not 
possessed by business and nonprofessional occupations. What 
constitutes this constellation of characteristics which is 
distinctive of the professions? With this question in mind, the 
traits supporters begin from the basic assumption that it is 
possible to draw up a list of fixed criteria for recognizing a 
profession on which there will be general consensus. These 
criteria can then be used to distinguish between the professions 
and other nonprofessional occupations in a relatively clear and 
unproblematic fashion. 
Howard S. Becker (1962) identified the origin of this 
approach with a paper by Abraham Flexner (p. 87). In this 
classic work, Flexner. (1915) noted that the word profession had 
been used pretty indiscriminately by almost any occupation other 
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than business. To rectify the situation, he stressed the need to 
identify the characteristics of the profession. In his attempt 
to do so he came up with the following conclusion: 
... professions involve essentially intellectual operations 
with large individual responsibility; they derive their raw 
material from science and learning; this material they work 
up to a practical and definite end; they possess an 
educationally communicable technique; they tend to self- 
organization; they are becoming increasingly altruistic in 
motivation. (p. 10) 
Subsequently, in his discussion of the professional status 
of social work, Flexner modified his view by claiming that the 
single most important criterion of a profession was none of those 
mentioned above, but the possession of professional spirit. He 
ended his discussion by saying that: 
But after all, what matters most is professional spirit .... 
In so far as accepted professions are prosecuted at a 
mercenary or selfish level, law and medicine are ethically 
no better than trades. In so far as trades are honestly 
carried on, they tend to rise towards the professional 
level. Social work appeals strongly to the humanitarian and 
spiritual element. It holds out no inducement to the 
worldly, - neither comfort, glory, nor money. The 
unselfishly devotion of those who have chosen to give 
themselves to making the world a fitter place to live in can 
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fill social work with the professional spirit and thus to 
some extent lift it above all the distinctions which I have 
been at such pains to make. In the long run, the first, 
main and indispensable criterion of a profession will be the 
possession of professional spirit, and that test social work 
may, if it will, fully satisfy. (p. 24) 
His absolute approach set the tone for discussion of the 
characteristics which constitute the professions in the first 
half of this century. He was followed by many others, including 
A. M. Carr-Saunders and P. A. Wilson (1933), Morris L. Cogan 
(1953,1955), William J. Goode (1957,1960), Ernest Greenwood 
(1957), Robert K. Merton (1978), Geoffrey Millerson (1964), and 
George Ritzer (1977,1986). 
According to Carr-Saunders and Wilson (1933), the term 
profession clearly implied the existence of a complex of 
characteristics. The acknowledged professions possessed all or 
most of these characteristics. They stood at the centre, and all 
around them on all sides were grouped vocations exhibiting some 
but not all of these characteristics. In their words: 
The ancient professions of law and medicine stand near the 
centre. The practitioners, by virtue of prolonged and 
specialized intellectual training, have acquired a technique 
which enables them to render a specialized service to the 
community .... They develop a sense of responsibility for 
the technique which they manifest in their concern for the 
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competence and honour of the practitioners as a whole .... 
They build up associations, upon which they erect ... 
machinery for imposing tests of competence and enforcing the 
observance of certain standards of conduct. Material 
considerations of income and status are not neglected, but 
the distinguishing and overruling characteristic is the 
possession of a technique. It is the existence of 
specialized intellectual techniques, acquired as the result 
of prolonged training, which gives rise to professionalism 
and accounts for its peculiar features. 
Cogan (1953) was more concerned with the problem of 
definition. By drawing upon a wide variety of disciplines such 
as law, history, philosophy, government, and sociology, he 
concluded that: 
A profession is a vocation whose practice is founded upon an 
understanding of the theoretical structure of some 
department of learning or science, and upon the abilities 
accompanying such understanding. This understanding and 
these abilities are applied to the vital practical affairs 
of man. The practices of the profession are modified by 
knowledge of a generalized nature and by the accumulated 
wisdom and experience of mankind, which serve to correct the 
errors of specialism. The profession, serving the vital 
needs of man, considers its first ethical imperative to be 
altruistic service to the client. (pp. 48-9) 
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Goode (1957) felt that each profession should be considered 
as "a community within a community". Thus he was more concerned 
with "the structural strains and supports between a contained 
community and the larger society of which it is a part and on 
which it is dependent" (p. 194). In another context, Goode 
(1960) adopted a relative approach by suggesting that occupations 
should be thought of as falling somewhere along a continuum of 
professionalism, the continuum being made up of characteristics 
distinctive of the professions. As an occupation moved toward 
the professional end of the continuum, it acquired more of these 
characteristics. Moreover, he identified a prolonged specialized 
training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or 
service orientation as the core characteristics from which all 
others were derived. (p. 903) 
In an influential paper, "Attributes of a Profession", 
Greenwood (1957) expressed the view that all professions seemed 
to possess the following attributes: (1) a systematic body of 
theory; (2) professional authority recognized by the clientele; 
(3) community sanction of this authority; (4) a code of ethics 
regulating relations of professional persons with clients and 
colleagues; and (5) a professional culture sustained by formal 
professional associations. (pp. 44-55) 
Merton (1978), however, was of the opinion that the 
professions could be thought of as rooted in a triad of human 
values: knowing, the value assigned to systematic knowledge and 
specialized intellect; doing, the value assigned to trained 
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capacity and technical skill; and helping, the value embedded in 
the professional role of getting this conjoint knowledge and 
skill to work in the disciplined service of others. (pp. 114-5) 
In social work literature, Morales and Sheafor (1989) 
distinguished two models of professionalism: the private model 
and the public model. In the private model, the individual 
client contracted directly with the professional for service and 
in the public model, the professionals operated primarily under 
the auspices of formal organizations and directed their services 
to the common good. Law and medicine were listed as examples of 
the private model while teachers and city planners were listed as 
examples of the public model. For social work, with its dual 
focus on person and environment, both the private and the public 
models of professionalism could apply. (pp. 41-2) 
In the same piece of work, they listed autonomy, authority, 
and responsibility as essential characteristics of the 
professions. In their view, the possession of autonomy implied 
that the professionals were free from constraints that might 
limit their ability to act in the best interest of their clients. 
In addition, the possession of authority implied that the 
professional had been granted a monopoly in their field of 
expertise. In granting this professional authority, society, in 
essence, gave up the right to judge the competence of these 
professionals except in extreme cases of incompetent or unethical 
practice. After relinquishing its right to judge practice, 
society became vulnerable and rightfully expected the professions 
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to protect its people from abuses that might accrue from the 
professional monopoly. In other words, the professions must be 
accountable to the public that granted them the sanction to 
perform these services. In order to establish and maintain this 
professional responsibility, professions developed codes that 
identified the expected ethical behaviour of practitioners and 
established mechanisms for policing their membership regarding 
unethical or incompetent practice. (pp. 38-9) 
The first comprehensive review of the traits approach to 
definition was completed by Millerson (1964). He reviewed the 
work of no less than twenty-one authors who tried to define the 
essential characteristics of the professions. Out of a total of 
twenty-three attributes which were regarded as essential, not a 
single one was accepted by all the authors. Even so, he 
concluded that certain attributes were mentioned repeatedly. 
They were: "(1) A profession involves a skill based on 
theoretical knowledge. (2) The skill requires training and 
education. (3) The professional must demonstrate competence by 
passing a test. (4) Integrity is maintained by adherence to a 
code of conduct. (5) The service is for the public good. (6) 
The profession is organized. " (P. 4) 
Similar attempt was made by Ritzer (1977). He surveyed a 
variety of previous efforts to delineate the defining 
characteristics of a profession and ended up with six basic 
characteristics that were considered to be the most frequently 
mentioned. In his view, established and new professions had, or 
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were believed to have, all of these characteristics and to a high 
degree. Would-be professions might be lacking one or two, and 
those that they possessed were thought to be less pronounced than 
in the established or new professions. Nonprofessions, had, or 
were believed to have, few, if any of these characteristics, and 
those that they did possess were likely to be of a low degree. 
In listing these characteristics, the traits supporters generally 
argued that these were "real" qualities that professions 
possessed and nonprofessions did not. These characteristics may 
now be listed as following: "(1) A body of general systematic 
knowledge that is their exclusive possession. (2) A norm of 
autonomy that the public and law are bound to respect. (3) A 
norm of altruism that entitles the profession to special 
treatment and respect. (4) A norm of authority over clients 
that the public feels is its duty to obey. (5) A distinctive 
occupational culture. (6) Recognition by the community and law 
that the occupation is a profession. " (pp. 48-55) 
Much debate, going back at least as far as Flexner, has 
centred around how professions should be defined - which 
occupations should be called professions, and by what 
institutional criteria. But while most definitions overlap in 
the characteristics they include, a number of tallies, including 
that of Millerson mentioned previously, have demonstrated a 
persistent lack of consensus about which characteristics are to 
be emphasized. Explanation for this have been offered by many 
who are supporters of. this approach, including Goode (1960) and 
Greenwood (1980). 
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Goode (1960), for instance, pointed out that although there 
was a great deal of unanimity in the definitions of the traits 
supporters, there were also continuing disagreement. He 
explained that: 
Occupations may rank high on one of these [core 
characteristics], but low on the other. Thus, nursing ranks 
high on the variable of service orientation, but has been 
unable to demonstrate that its training is more than a 
lower-level medical education. (p. 903) 
Greenwood (1980) called for a dichotomy of professional 
attributes into the generating or basic and the consequential or 
derived attributes. He contended that the basic attributes were 
few and essential while the derived ones were many and varied. 
Based on this categorization, Greenwood came up with three basic 
attributes: (1) the cognitive or intellectual component, (2) the 
normative or service component, and (3) the monopolistic 
component of professionalism. He added that a profession might 
rank higher on one attribute than on another. (pp. 263-5) 
3.2.2 The process approach 
If the professions cannot be defined by a constellation of 
characteristics recognized as unique to themselves, how can they 
be defined? Adherents of the process approach turn to the 
process of professionalization for an answer. Harold L. Wilensky 
(1964), for instance, asked the following questions: 
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Can a comparison of the few occupations which are clearly 
recognized and organized as professions tell us anything 
about the process of professionalization? Is there an 
invariant progression of events, a path along which they 
have all travelled to the promised professional land? Do 
the less-established and marginal professions display a 
different pattern? (p. 142) 
Carr-Saunders in England is perhaps the first sociologist to 
look into the process of professionalization (Vollmer and Mills, 
1966, p. 2), but it is probably the work of Theodore Caplow which 
has created the greatest impact. Caplow (1954) believed that 
there were four essential steps in professionalization, that the 
steps involved in the process were quite definite, and even the 
sequence was explicit. 
However, Wilensky (1964) was of the opinion that the steps 
listed by Caplow could only be considered as suggestive. "To 
establish anything firm here, " he said, "we need both detailed 
social histories of occupations and more systematic comparison of 
the cases in hand. " That was exactly what he did. By 
summarizing the history of eighteen occupations for which 
satisfactory information could be obtained, he showed that "only 
32 of 126 dates for crucial events in the push toward 
professionalization deviate from the following order", thus 
confirming the existence of a typical sequence of events. (pp. 
142-5) 
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Even though Caplow and Wilensky ended up with different 
number of steps, their conclusions had much in common. Both 
shared the view that the steps were quite definite and even the 
sequence was explicit. In their view, these essential steps are: 
1. The very first step is to start doing full time the things 
needs to be done. This implies that a strict reliance on 
volunteers will not be sufficient. At this early stage the 
practitioners usually come from other occupations. 
2. Next in line is the establishment of training schools. 
Under the pressure of the new recruits or its clientele, training 
schools are soon established. The first teachers are usually 
enthusiastic leaders of a movement or protagonists of some new 
techniques, or both. If these training schools do not begin 
within universities, they always eventually seek contact with 
universities. 
3. The third step is the establishment of a professional 
association. Those pressing for prescribed training and the 
first ones to go through it tend to engage in much soul-searching 
work on whether the occupation is a profession, what the 
professional tasks are, and how to raise the quality of recruits. 
At this point they may change the name of the occupation. The 
change in label may function to reduce identification with the 
previous, less professional occupation. All this is accompanied 
by a campaign to separate the competent from the incompetent. 
This involves further definition of essential professional tasks, 
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the development of internal conflict among practitioners of 
varying background, and some competition with outsiders who do 
similar work. 
4. The fourth step is the development and promulgation of a 
code of ethics which asserts the social utility of the 
occupation, occupation, sets up public welfare rationale, and 
develops rules which serve as further criteria to eliminate the 
unqualified and unscrupulous, rules to reduce internal 
competition, and rules to protect clients. 
5. The last step is a prolonged political agitation which aims 
to obtain the support of law for the protection of the job 
territory and its sustaining code of ethics. Where the area of 
competence is not clearly exclusive, legal protection of the 
title will be the aim; where definition of the area of competence 
is clearer, then mere performance of the act by someone outside 
the fraternity may be declared a crime. Licensing and 
certification as weapons in the battle for professional authority 
are the least important of these events. 
In his criticism of the process approach, Ritzer (1977) was 
of the opinion that it tended to become rather routine. Any 
occupation which had gone through all these stages would earn the 
label of a profession. Another problem mentioned by the same 
author was its tendency to generalize from the past to the 
present and future. Yet it seems clear enough that occupations 
that underwent professionalization years ago were involved in a 
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very different occupational world than those seeking it today. 
Perhaps the most devastating criticism mentioned was its 
underestimation of the significance of the political process - in 
other words, of the power wielded by professions in their drive 
toward professionalization and the power of opposing forces that 
must be overcome. (pp. 47-8) 
3.2.3 The power approach 
The power approach tends to focus on the power needed by an 
occupation to acquire professional recognition as well as the 
power such an occupation wields once it has achieved that 
position. This approach is best represented by the work of 
Freidson (1970) and Johnson (1972). 
Freidson (1983) is highly critical of the process approach. 
He noted that the outcome of such a position was to avoid 
entirely any conscious definition while in fact covertly 
advancing an implicit and unsatisfactorily vague definition of a 
profession as an occupation that had gained professional status. 
(pp. 21-2) 
What was special about "a profession, Freidson (1970) 
insisted, was that it was an occupation which had assumed a 
dominant position in a division of labour, so that it gained 
control over the determination of the substance of its own work. 
The success of the professions, he continued, was primarily in 
the hands of society's dominant elites. Thus the would-be 
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professions must endeavour to convince the elites of their worth, 
but the elites always had the power to deny their claims. 
Moreover, the elites could allow a profession's status to lapse, 
or it could even actively remove it. The profession must, 
therefore, continue to convince the elite of its worthiness (or 
at least its harmlessness) if it was to continue to be accorded 
professional status. (pp. 71-3) 
Freidson's contention that the term profession is best 
understood simply as a description of a certain pattern of 
occupational control is valuable in alerting us to what is 
clearly a central professional aspiration. It seems to be able 
to discriminate effectively between occupation which would 
generally be accepted as a profession and those which merely 
aspire to such acceptance. It also embraces the goals which 
occupations seeking professional status are usually pursuing: a 
state of enforced monopoly of the task in which they engage; 
control of entry to the occupational group both in terms of 
overall number and of individual candidates; control of the 
length and content of training; and finally, determination of the 
conditions of work of members of the occupation. 
The key weakness of his approach is that he tries to perform 
the same operation as the traits supporters. Just as Flexner 
thought he had found an essential characteristic in "professional 
spirit", so Freidson believed he had found one in "professional 
autonomy". He derived this attribute from his data and turned it 
into a postulate for identifying other professions in the same 
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way as the traits supporters. 
For Johnson (1972) professionalism is a peculiar type of 
occupational control, social closure, for instance, rather than 
an expression of the inherent nature of particular occupations. 
Thus, in his view, professionalism should not be referred to as 
the status of an occupation, but should be referred to as a means 
of controlling an occupation. Likewise, professionalization 
should be seen as a historically specific process which some 
occupations had undergone at a particular time, rather than a 
process which all occupations must undergo because of their 
essential qualities. (p. 45) 
What then is the future of the professions? According to 
Johnson (1982), professionalism was an important occupational 
strategy for collective mobility during the nineteenth century 
when there was a minimum of government involvement in the labour 
market. Since the turn of the century, however, this function 
had largely been taken up by state-managed bureaucratic 
organizations and state-approved labour unions. Consequently, he 
concluded that professionalism was less relevant than in the past 
as an occupational strategy for collective mobility. (p. 121) 
John Goldthorpe (1982) holds a different view. He referred 
to the rise of "the service class", an idea originated with Karl 
Renner (1953), as a development within the advanced societies of 
the West. Borrowing from Renner, he explained that the service 
class comprised three main elements: employees in public service 
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(including civil servants and other officials); employees in 
private economic service (including business administrators, 
managers, and technical experts); and employees in social 
services (including "distributive agents of welfare"). He went 
on to say that "while these groupings do not share in the 
ownership of the means of production, they are still to be 
distinguished from the working class in that the labour they 
perform is non-productive: they are not themselves a source of 
surplus value but, rather, a charge on the surplus value which is 
extracted, directly or indirectly, from the working class" (p. 
167). He added that there was a basic difference between the 
"service relationship" and that of employer to wage worker. The 
former relationship, in contrast with the latter, necessarily 
involved an important measure of trust. Moreover, he explained 
that: 
(The] requirement for trust in the employment relationship 
derives from two main exigencies that an employer, or 
employing organization, may face: first, that which arises 
when authority must be delegated; and second, that which 
arises when specialist knowledge and expertise must be drawn 
upon. For what in both these cases is implied is that 
social control within the organization must be weakened or 
diffused; it can no longer be exerted directly and in a 
detailed fashion from a single source. Those employees to 
whom authority is delegated or to whom responsibility for 
specialist functions is assigned are thereby given some 
legitimate area of autonomy and discretion. And it must 
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then ... be a matter of trust that they will act ... 
in ways 
that are consistent with organizational goals and values. 
In other words, how well these employees perform from the 
standpoint of the organization will in crucial respects 
depend on the degree of their moral commitment to the 
organization, rather than on the efficacy of "external" 
sanctions and rewards. (p. 168) 
In view of what has been described, what is the relationship 
between the state and the professions? Johnson (1982) was of the 
opinion that "state intervention, implying as it does the 
existence of some external, repressive public authority, has the 
consequence of transforming professionals into functionaries and 
their associations into outposts of corporatist organization or 
branches of the ideological state apparatus" (p. 187). Moreover, 
he added that "the developing relationship of the professions to 
the state helped to define the limits and potentialities of state 
powers, functions and capacities ... " (p. 207). 
In conclusion, he suggested the following modification of 
conventional analyses of the professions. 
[The] concept professionalization can only refer to a 
process toward partial autonomy, being limited to specific 
areas of independent action which are defined by an 
occupation's relationship to the state; area of autonomy 
which vary from time to time and place to place. 
Professionalization, where it occurs, is indicative of a 
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particular form of articulation between the state and those 
occupations which have been of particular significance in 
the state's historical formation. As the state and the 
professions and their relations have been transformed over 
time, so the areas of partial autonomy enjoyed by the 
professions themselves change and are refocused .... 
(p. 
207) 
3.3 A Proposed Definition 
Based on our understanding of the traits approach, the 
process approach and the power approach, we can now propose a 
definition of the concept: 
a profession is an occupation which has been granted, by 
significant others in society, a status and, along with it, 
the power to deliver services and to control its work in a 
delimited area of human activity, after having undergone a 
developmental process whereby it succeeded in leading 
significant others to believe that it has acquired a high 
degree of a constellation of characteristics society has 
come to accept as distinctive of a profession. 
The proposed definition has incorporated the perspectives of 
both the functionalist and the symbolic interactionist. It has 
also taken into consideration the contributions of the traits 
approach, the process. approach, and the power approach. However, 
since no agreement has been reached among the traits supporters 
112 
as to what constitutes the characteristics of a profession, the 
characteristics that have so far been identified have not been 
listed in the definition. Moreover, since no agreement has been 
reached among adherents of the process approach as to what steps 
should be included in the developmental process, the steps that 
have so far been identified have not been listed either. 
Nevertheless, the existence of professional attributes is assumed 
and the perception of professionalization as a developmental 
process with clearly delineated steps is recognized. This allows 
supporters of the traits approach to continue with their work in 
identifying distinctive characteristics of the professions and 
those of the process approach, in delineating historical steps in 
the professionalization of established professions or occupations 
which are struggling to acquire the status. This also allows 
them to make changes through adding to or deleting from their 
lists. Changes are made necessary when new professions are being 
accepted or old professions are being re-examined. Even though 
the influence of power has not been given a place as central as 
advocates of the power approach would like it to be, its 
importance is reflected in the definition. 
There is a need for further elaboration on some of the ideas 
expressed in this definition. A profession is, first of all, an 
occupation. Even though the word profession was used in a more 
restricted sense to mean a learned vocation in 1541, its meaning 
has been generalized, since 1576, to indicate "any calling or 
occupation by which _a person habitually earns his living". 
(Cogan, 1953, p. 34) The person may either be employed or self- 
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employed to engage in a delimited area of human activity. 
Secondly, a profession is an occupation which has been 
granted, by significant others in society, a status and, along 
with it, the power to deliver services and to control its work in 
a delimited area of human activity. This statement reflects the 
viewpoint of the power advocates. While the traits advocates, 
Greenwood (1957), for instance, treated community sanction as one 
of the characteristics that served to differentiate occupations 
in terms of their degree of professionalism, it assumes a far 
more central position among the power advocates. 
What is the nature of power? Power, in our definition, 
encompasses monopoly, autonomy, and authority. Hughes (1958), 
for instance, contended that profession was nothing but "a 
symbolic label for a desired status" (p. 44). The same was 
expressed by Becker (1962) who argued that profession should be 
viewed as "an honorific symbol" (p. 93). Moreover, the status or 
symbol brings to the profession "a monopoly" (Greenwood, 1957, p. 
12) and "a legitimate, organized autonomy" (Freidson, 1970, p. 
71). According to Freidson (1970), this monopoly and autonomy 
included the exclusive right to provide services and to control 
its work, i. e., the right to determine who could legitimately do 
its work and how the work should be done. (p. 72) This may not 
be enough in the case of social work. Since social work is 
responsible for the allocation of community resources, power in 
the case of social work should also include the authority to 
allocate resources as it sees appropriate. Undoubtedly, the 
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power of the profession is not without limit, particularly in 
view of the relationship between the state and the profession 
mentioned above. Its function is necessarily confined to those 
specific areas within which the profession has been educated. 
Greenwood (1957), for instance, expressed the view that the 
possession of knowledge and skill pertinent to the profession 
imparts to the professional worker a sense of authority. "The 
professional, " he noted, "cannot prescribe guides of facets of 
the client's life where his theoretical competence does not 
apply. " "To venture such prescriptions, " he warned, "is to 
invade a province wherein he himself is a layman, and, hence, to 
violate the authority of another professional group. " The 
profession claims authority over the content of work by virtue of 
its expertise and it claims authority over the terms of work by 
virtue of its ethicality, or service orientation. Its claim to 
authority becomes invalid when its content of work is not 
confined to those specific areas within which it has been 
educated or, when its terms of work is inconsistent with its code 
of conduct. (pp. 44-55) 
The profession's status is not seized from society. It 
attains and maintains its prestigious position by virtue of the 
protection and patronage of some elite segments within society 
which has been persuaded that there is some special value in its 
work. Its position is thus secured by the political and economic 
influence of the elite which sponsors it. However, if its work 
eventually diverges from that expected by the elite, it may have 
difficulty surviving. Its status may be allowed to lapse or may 
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even be taken away. It is, therefore, essential for survival 
that the dominant elite remains convinced of the positive value, 
or at least the harmlessness, of the profession's work, so that 
it continues to protect the profession from encroachment. 
(Freidson, 1970, p. 73) 
Thirdly, the profession has undergone a developmental 
process. This idea is advocated by supporters of the process 
approach which has as its focus a series of historical stages 
through which an occupation must go en route to becoming a 
profession. However, in view of the absence of consensus at this 
period in time, this researcher tends to adopt the view that the 
exact number of steps and the proper sequence of these steps are 
not nearly as important as the idea of professionalization as a 
process. 
In any attempt to explain the development of the social 
position and influence of a particular occupation, Douglas Klegon 
(1978) felt that an exploration of both internal and external 
dynamics were essential. He went on to say that: 
The internal dynamic consists of efforts of practitioners to 
raise their status, define services which they perceive only 
they can perform properly, and to achieve and maintain 
autonomy and influence. This is seen in the attempt of many 
occupations to claim professional status by announcing that 
they are trustworthy, have a code of ethics, a professional 
association, and perform importance services which only they 
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are qualified to do, and, therefore, are deserving of 
autonomy and prestige. 
[The external] dynamic ... involves relating 
professional organization and control to other institutional 
forces and arrangements of power. 
One consequence of focusing on wider social forces is 
that the utility of an historical perspective becomes 
apparent .... Adopting an historical perspective allows one 
to examine the interplay of various forces in the 
development of the modern professional form of occupational 
control. 
Adopting an historical approach is not, however, 
sufficient for understanding the external dynamic of 
professionalization. It is also necessary to consider 
occupational resources - to investigate the possible sources 
of power which can result in an occupation gaining and 
maintaining the expanded social significance of a 
profession. (pp. 268-72) 
Finally, the profession has succeeded in leading significant 
others to believe that it has acquired a high degree of a 
constellation of characteristics society has come to accept as 
distinctive of a profession. This idea is advocated by 
supporters of the traits approach which has as its focus the 
development of a constellation of characteristics which are used 
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to differentiate the professions from other nonprofessional 
occupations. 
In listing the characteristics of the professions, this 
researcher shares the view of Becker (1962) who noted that: 
we are not concerned with the characteristics of existing 
occupational organizations themselves but with conventional 
beliefs as to what those characteristics ought to be. In 
other words, we want to know what people have in mind when 
they say an occupation is a profession, or that it is not a 
profession. Although people disagree as to what occupations 
are "really" professions and quibble over just which 
characteristics are "really" professional, I shall argue 
that beneath these surface disagreements we can find 
substantial agreement on a set of interconnected 
characteristics which symbolize a morally praiseworthy kind 
of occupational organization. (p. 93) 
This researcher is also conscious of the view of Ritzer 
(1977) who noted that: 
The vast majority of occupational sociologists subscribe to 
the notion that there are degrees of professionalization 
rather than a simple dichotomy between professions and 
nonprofessions. That is, all occupations can be placed on a 
continuum ranging from the nonprofessions on one end to the 
established professions on the other. The'idea of a 
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continuum grows out of the focus on social change among 
those who operate from either a process or power 
perspective. By viewing professionalization in this way 
they are able to study how and why an occupation moves up or 
down the scale. Those who favour the process approach tend 
to be concerned with how an occupation moves, especially 
what historical stages it needs to navigate en route to the 
professional end of the continuum. The power supporters are 
more concerned with why an occupation moves up or down; they 
focus on the power needed to move up, and the loss of it 
that causes an occupation to slip down. 
The place of an occupation on the professional 
continuum is determined by how many professional 
characteristics it has, or is believed to have (whether or 
not it "really" has them), and to what degree it possesses, 
or is believed to possess, each of them. (pp. 43-4) 
In drawing up a list of professional characteristics, this 
researcher makes reference to the work of Flexner (1915), Carr- 
Saunders and Wilson (1933), Parsons (1939), Cogan (1953), Goode 
(1957,1960), Greenwood (1957,1980), Millerson (1964), Ritzer 
(1977), and Merton (1978). 
In his view, in addition to the power to deliver services, 
to control its work, and to allocate resources, there are four 
essential characteristics a profession must have in possession or 
must have convinced the public that it possesses them. These 
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characteristics are: (1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body of 
knowledge, (3) a code of conduct, and (4) a culture. 
The first major characteristic a profession must have in 
possession is a statement of purpose. In other words, to be 
recognized as a profession, an occupation has to curve out an 
area of service which it can claim sole responsibility and, 
following that, to obtain legal sanction from the community to 
become the sole provider of such service. This characteristic of 
a profession has been described by Greenwood as the monopolistic 
component of professionalism. 
Another major characteristic a profession must have in 
possession is a body of knowledge. This characteristic has been 
referred to by Greenwood (1980) as the cognitive or intellectual 
component of professionalism. In his view, the main difference 
between a professional and a nonprofessional occupation lies in 
the former's possession of a set of skills which is supported by 
a body of theory. Acquisition of the professional skill, 
therefore, requires a prior or simultaneous mastery of the theory 
underlying that skill. In other words, the expertise of the 
professional is grounded in a body of theory which is constantly 
replenished with concepts and data derived from disputation and 
research, and mastery of which requires higher education that is 
carefully planned and intellectually demanding. 
Similar views have been expressed by Merton (1978). In his 
view, the professions can be thought of as rooted in a triad of 
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human values: knowing, doing, and helping. The value of knowing 
can be interpreted as the importance the professions give to 
theoretically and empirically derived knowledge that is not 
widely distributed among the population at large. The value of 
doing, on the other hand, can be referred to as the importance of 
trained capacity and technical skill employed by the professions 
in coping with paramount problems in their clients' life. 
The optimal base of professional knowledge is, therefore, a 
combination of intellectual knowing and practical doing, some of 
which is explicit, some implicit. The theoretical aspects of 
professional knowledge and tacit elements in both intellectual 
and practical knowing combine to make long training necessary and 
to persuade the public of the mystery of the craft. Those in 
professions argue that nonprofessional occupations do not require 
such an elaborate system of training because their knowledge base 
is less general, less systematic, and derivatively, less complex 
and less important to the functioning of society. 
The third characteristic a profession must have in 
possession is a regulative code of ethics. This characteristic 
has also been referred to as the collectivity orientation or the 
normative or service component of professionalism. 
Before elaborating on the regulative code of ethics, it 
seems essential to begin with a discussion of professional 
conduct. What is professional conduct? According to Millerson 
(1964), professional conduct can be divided into parts: first, 
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the separation into Professional Practice and Professional 
Ethics; secondly, the breakdown of Professional Ethics into Rules 
and Etiquette. 
1. Professional Practice relates to the adoption of 
schedules of uniform professional fees and charges, standard 
forms of contract, regulation of competition for projects. 
2. Professional Ethics are concerned with moral 
directives, which guide the relationship between the 
professional and others. They are designed to distinguish 
right from wrong action. Professional ethics are composed 
of Rules and Etiquette. Rules are obligatory customs, which 
may be implicit or explicit codes enforced by a recognized 
authority. Etiquette is a loose form of permissive 
conventions observed generally, but not enforced by any 
central authority, though a breach can lead to censure by 
colleagues. (p. 149) 
Of all the conduct included in the professional code of 
ethics, the one that is mostly frequently mentioned is altruism. 
Durkheim, 'to begin with, emphasized the importance of 
altruism which, in the eyes of Flexner, became a genuine 
professional spirit, i. e., an unselfish devotion to give 
themselves to making the world a fitter place to live in. Their 
emphasis on altruism was echoed by Cogan, Ritzer and Merton. 
Others, including Carr-Saunders and Wilson, Goode, Greenwood and 
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Millerson also incorporated this attribute in the professional 
code of conduct. 
To accomplish all its functions the profession has often 
relied on the development of formal as well as informal 
organizations within the profession. The formal organizations 
that help to create a distinctive culture are the professional 
association, the training institutions, and the organizations in 
which professionals work. 
This brings us to the last characteristic - culture. 
Culture consists of beliefs, values, attitudes, and norms held by 
members of a society and its constituent groups and 
organizations. Its contents can be dissected into two 
categories. First, culture consists of practical ideas about the 
world which enable people to adapt to their environment and solve 
the problems they confront. In the case of social work it 
includes knowledge about how to conduct interviews, write 
reports, and compile statistics. Second, culture consists of 
norms, rules, codes of conduct, and values that focus upon human 
conduct and guide the relationships that exist between people. 
In the case of social work it includes the proper ways of 
relating to clients, colleagues, and the public. What is and is 
not acceptable is defined by culture. 
The idea of a professional culture has been expanded by 
Goode (1960). He treated a profession as a community because he 
felt that the members were bound by a common identity; it was 
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terminal in the sense that once in it very few would leave; its 
members shared common values, its roles were defined and were the 
same for all members; within the community there was a common 
language; it had power over its members; its limits were 
reasonably clear; and it controlled the selection of professional 
trainees, and through its training processes it sent these 
recruits through an adult socialization process. 
He added that many of the traits that made the professions 
sociologically interesting grew from the dimension of community. 
Typically a profession, through its association and its members, 
controlled admission to training and required far more education 
from its trainees than the containing community demanded of them. 
Training in a profession was mainly concerned with transmitting 
its culture to the neophyte through formal training schools or 
informal devices such as sponsorship. Such long training was 
assumed to be necessary in order to learn the science and 
technique essential to the practice of the professions. 
From what has been discussed above, it seems obvious that 
the question Is Social Work a Profession? is somewhat 
misconceived. Unquestionably social work has in possession, to a 
certain extent, the characteristics of a profession. However, it 
would not be appropriate to claim that social work is already a 
full-fledged profession. What can be said is that social work 
aspires to become a full-fledged profession and it is moving in 
that direction. In other words, social work is a developing 
profession. 
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What are the components of social work? Since a profession 
is expected to have in possession, in addition to the power to 
deliver services and to control its work, the following 
attributes: (1) a statement of purpose; (2) a body of knowledge; 
(3) a code of ethics; and (4) a culture, it seems reasonable to 
include these as the basic components of social work. 
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Chapter Four 
What is a Value? 
4.1 Introduction 
The word "value" means different things to different people. 
It may be taken to mean that which is acquired by any object of 
any interest (Perry, 1926, p. 185), that aspect of things whereby 
they are cared about (Lee, 1949, p. 147), and that which is 
considered good or bad (Pepper, 1958, p. 7). 
Ralph B. Perry (1926), for instance, defined value as that 
which was acquired by any object of any interest. Elaborating on 
this, he said, 
It is characteristic of the living mind to be for some 
things and against others .... To be "for" or "against" 
is 
to view with favour or disfavour .... It implies ... a 
tendency to create or conserve, or an opposite tendency to 
prevent or destroy. This duality appears in many forms, 
such as liking and disliking ... or seeking and avoiding. 
It is to this ... state, act, attitude or disposition of 
favour or disfavour, to which we propose to give the name of 
"interest" .... That which 
is an object of interest is ... 
invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires 
value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; 
just as anything whatever becomes a target when anyone 
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whosoever aims at it. (p. 185) 
In the way it is used, value refers to an object. 
In a slightly different way, Harold N. Lee (1949) noted that 
value was that aspect of things whereby they were cared about. 
In other words, value refers to the property of an object. 
However, he added that, 
Man knows things. He also cares about them. Things happen, 
and sometimes he cares [about] what happens: he feels that 
it is of some importance .... That aspect of things whereby 
they are cared about is their value. My caring for 
something and the value of that something are the obverse 
and reverse of the same state of affairs. The thing that is 
cared about is valued. That which is valued is valuable; 
that is, it has value. (p. 147) 
Stephen C. Pepper (1958) believed that the word value could 
be dispensed with even though he would not recommended it, 
because he felt that it would be safer to keep them equated with 
the various selective systems than floating loose where ingenious 
men might note their freedom from attachment and proceed to 
hypostatize facts for them to refer to. In line with this 
thinking, he enlisted in the field of value a wide spectrum of 
values: (1) affective values, (2) conative-achievement values, 
(3) prudential values., (4) character values, (5) social values, 
(6) cultural values, and (7) survival values. (pp. 668-73) When 
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required, he would define value as anything good or bad and 
include as value such things as: 
pleasures and pains; desires, wants, and purposes; 
satisfactions and frustrations; preferences; utility, means, 
conditions, and instruments; correctness and incorrectness; 
integration and disintegration; character, vitality, self- 
realization; health; survival, evolutionary fitness; 
adjustability; individual freedom, social solidarity; law, 
duty, conscience; virtues, ideals, norms; progress; 
righteousness and sin; beauty and ugliness; truth and error; 
reality and unreality. (p. 7) 
In ordinary speech, the word value can be used in the noun 
sense, designating a property or a characteristic of an object; 
or in the verb sense, designating an act. Lee, Perry, and 
Pepper, for instance, used value as a noun. John Dewey, however, 
used it as a verb. Elaborating on this, Lee (1957) noted that: 
To Dewey ... the verb sense seems to be basic. He holds the 
meaning of "value" to be closely connected with some or 
several of the following words: prizing, desiring, holding 
dear, or liking, taking interest in, enjoying, or 
appraising. (p. 180) 
Economists have also drawn our attention to the distinction 
between "the value of. things" and "the values of individuals and 
societies". In their view, the word value, used in the sense of 
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the value of things, implied the exchange or market value of a 
commodity. In welfare economics, the same word appeared to refer 
more to the values of individuals and societies, to their 
preferences or tastes. (Baier, 1969, pp. 36-41) 
The first sociological definition of value appeared in The 
Polish Peasant where Thomas and Znaniecki (1921) noted that "by a 
social value we understand any datum having an empirical content 
accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with 
regard to which it is or may be an object of activity" (p. 21). 
The content of a social value could be sensual or imaginary, or 
it could be partly sensual and partly imaginary. Its meaning 
became explicit only when it was considered in connection with 
human actions. 
For Talcott Parsons, values were seen neither as objects nor 
as properties of objects: they were ideas which influenced human 
choice. As defined, values were seen as "those moral beliefs to 
which people appealed for the ultimate rationales of action" 
(Spates, 1983, p. 28). 
Similarly, Gordon W. Allport noted that a value was a belief 
upon which a man acted by preference. This definition 
acknowledged choice in man and moved the concept of value to the 
centre of life and its apsirations. 
In his study on Social Class and Parental Values, Melvin L. 
Kohn (1969) conceived of value in a different way. He conceived 
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of it as "standards of desirability - criteria of preference". 
(P- 18) 
As an illustration of the diversity of its meaning Pat Duffy 
Hutcheon (1972) noted that value had been used as norms, cultural 
ideals, assessments of action, beliefs, objects, value 
orientations, behaviour probabilities, and generalized attitudes. 
(pp. 174-7) 
4.2 Approaches to Definition 
Three approaches to defining values will be discussed in 
this section, and one in the next. All of these definitions have 
one thing in common: they all make reference to value as 
something preferred or preferable; desired or desirable. 
4.2.1 Charles Morris 
In one of the most influential study on values, Charles 
Morris (1956) distinguished three ways in which the term was 
commonly employed. 
In his view, the term "operative value" was usually employed 
to refer to the tendencies or dispositions of man to prefer one 
kind of object rather than another. All men, for instance, 
prefer living in affluence rather than in poverty. Reference to 
value in this case is simply a way of referring to the actual 
direction of preferential behaviour toward one kind of object 
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rather than another. Elaborating on this, he noted that: 
At times, the term "value" is employed to refer to the 
tendencies or dispositions of living beings to prefer one 
kind of object rather than another .... Thus if a person is 
shown pairs of paintings one after another and is asked to 
select in each pair the paintings he likes better, it may 
turn out that the selected paintings have in common a number 
of features which differentiate them from the rejected 
paintings. On this basis it may be said, for instance, that 
the person values paintings with contrasting colours, 
vigorous action, and open spaces, and the hypothesis may be 
hazarded that he in general values contrasts, strength, and 
spaciousness. Reference to "value" in such cases is simply 
a way of referring to the actual direction of preferential 
behaviour toward one kind of object rather than another. 
Such values may be called operative values. (p. 10) 
On the other hand, the use of the term "conceived value" was 
often restricted to those cases of preferential behaviour 
directed by "an anticipation or foresight of the outcome" of such 
behaviour. A conceived value thus involves preference for a 
symbolically indicated object. Again, he noted that: 
The term "value" is often restricted to those cases of 
preferential behaviour directed by "an anticipation or 
foresight of the outcome" of such behaviour. Thus a drug 
addict may repeatedly take a certain drug and yet firmly 
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believe that it is preferable not to be a drug addict. He 
anticipates the outcome of not using drugs, in virtue of 
this anticipation approves the state of not being an addict, 
and conceives this as desirable or preferable. In contrast 
to operative values, such values may be called conceived 
values. A conceived value thus involves preference for a 
symbolically indicated object. (pp. 10-1) 
Finally, the term "object value" was often concerned with 
what was preferable (or "desirable") regardless of whether it was 
in fact preferred or conceived as preferable. The emphasis is 
upon the properties of the object. He explained that: 
A third employment of the term "value" is concerned with 
what is preferable (or "desirable") regardless of whether it 
is in fact preferred or conceived as preferable. Thus a 
person with diabetes seeks advice from a dietitian as to the 
preferable diet for diabetics and for himself in particular 
.... The diet that the dietitian judges to be preferable 
may not coincide with the foods preferred by either the 
diabetic or the dietitian, and the judgment of the dietitian 
may itself be mistaken. Value here is not characterized in 
terms of what is in fact preferred but in terms of what in 
fact is preferrable if the patient prefers to live rather 
than to die. Since the stress is upon the properties of the 
object, such values may be called object values. (pp. 11-2) 
It is important to note that all of these three common 
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usages are explicated with respect to some form of the term 
"prefer": value as the preferred, value as a conception of the 
preferable, and value as the preferable. The main contrast is 
between preferred and preferable (desired and desirable, valued 
and valuable, esteemed and estimable). (p. 12) 
Operative values, as far as Morris is concerned, can be 
found through a study of preferential behaviour. On the other 
hand, what is conceived to be preferable can be studied through 
the symbols employed in preferential behaviour and the 
preferential behaviour directed toward symbols. In effect, then, 
operative values are operationally defined as factors to be found 
through an analysis of preferences among non-symbolic desiderata 
whereas conceived values are operationally defined as factors to 
be found through an analysis of preferences among symbolic 
desiderata. Operative values are, however, not operationally 
defined, perhaps implying that they cannot be studies 
empirically. (p. 12) 
4.2.2 Clyde Kluckhohn 
Another important definition of value is offered by Clyde 
Kluckhohn (1951) who defined it as "a conception, explicit or 
implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a 
group, of the desirable which influences the selection from 
available modes, means, and ends of action" (p. 395). In this 
understanding, affective (i. e., desirable), cognitive (i. e., 
conception), and conative (i. e., selection) elements are all 
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essential to this notion of value. Moreover, since his use of 
the phrase "conception of the desirable" is well received and 
widely discussed, it deserves further elaboration. To him: 
A value is not just a preference but is a preference which 
is felt and/or considered to be justified .... Even 
if a 
value remains implicit, behaviour with reference to this 
conception indicates an undertone of the desirable - not 
just the desired. The desirable is what it is felt or 
thought proper to want. It is what an actor or group of 
actors desire - and believe they "ought" or "should" desire 
- for the individual or a plurality of individuals. This 
means that an element, though never an exclusive element, of 
the cognitive is always involved; and hence the word 
conception was deliberately included in the definition. 
(pp. 395-6) 
4.2.3 Franz Adler 
Frank Adler's consideration of values is based on his 
criticism of Kluckhohn. His major concern is the measurment of 
values. According to Kluckhohn, one should restrict the use of 
value to something combining the characteristics of Morris' 
conceived values and object values. But if object values could 
not be found empirically, how could one hope to study, Alder 
asked, by the method of science, values so conceived? 
To circumvent this difficulty, Adler (1956) began by 
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distinguishing four types of values: (1) values which are 
considered as absolutes (Type A) ; (2) values which are 
considered as being in the object (Type B); 
(3) values which 
are seen as located in man (Type C); and (4) values which are 
equated with actions (Type D). (p. 272) 
Absolutes, according to Adler, whether pure as in Type A, or 
combined with Types B and C, were not accessible to sense 
perception and, consequently, were not suited to study by methods 
of natural science. He explained that the statement was not 
about their existence or non-existence. It only stated that 
reliable knowledge about them was impossible; faith, intuition, 
and speculation being the only possible approaches. (pp. 272-3) 
Included as Type B values are objects which are of need to 
someone, whether this need be conscious or unconscious. In other 
words, values of this type were seen as arising in the object 
where and when desire or need pointed to it. Unfortunately, the 
capacity of an object to satisfy needs could hardly be observed 
before the needs were expressed and satisfied. Moreover, the 
object itself could not indicate all the needs it might be able 
to satisfy. Forgotten needs or undiscovered ones, for instance, 
could not be observed in the object and used as a basis for 
assessing its value. Thus a value should be seen as something 
outside the person that came into existence by the value-giving 
activity inside the person. This led to the conclusion that the 
observation of objects for the discovery of values was futile and 
the person should be taken as the proper observational target. 
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(pp. 273-4) 
Type C locates values within the person. Instead of 
defining values as the object of esteem as in Type B, they were 
described here as "the esteem which we attach to the valuables 
capable of satisfying desires". Viewed as located or at least 
originated within the person, individually or collectively, Adler 
contended that values became internal behaviour and, hence, were 
not directly accessible to observation other than introspection. 
As such, they were said to precede action and to guide it; they 
might be wholly or partially the cause of action. Thus the 
values in an object could be discovered only by the way the 
object was being acted upon and the needs, interests, attitudes, 
meanings, wishes, volitions, norms - in short, the valuations of 
individuals, singly or in the aggregate - could be known only 
from their actions. This led to the conclusion that action was 
the only empirically knowable aspect of value. (pp. 273-6) 
Type D values, in practice, equate "value" with "action". 
According to Adler, this equivalence was supported by, but not 
dependent on, the assumption that whatever a person did was what 
he wanted to do most under the given circumstances at the given 
moment. What he did not do he either positively wanted not done 
or did not want it done strongly enough to do it at the time and 
under conditions as they were. (p. 276) 
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4.3 An Approach by Milton Rokeach (1973) 
Belief is the fundamental building block in Rokeach's 
concept of values. According to him, a belief is a simple 
proposition, conscious or unconsicous, inferred from what a 
person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase "I 
believe that .... " 
More specifically, a belief represents the information one 
has about an object. The object may be a person, a family, a 
group of people, an organization, a community, a society, or a 
country. It may be a career, a sport, a game, a pet, a car, a 
pen, or an event. The object may also be something more 
abstract, including life, religion, or politics. To take a step 
further, a belief links an object to one or more attributes. For 
example, a person may think that a social worker is a Christian, 
that she is always kind-hearted, and that friendliness is an 
important attribute of a social worker. The object in the first 
two instances is the social worker, and in the third instance, 
the object is friendliness. The attributes the person links with 
the objects are a Christian, kind-hearted, and an important 
attribute of a social worker. 
Based on its content, three kinds of beliefs have been 
identified. The first kind of belief may be called a descriptive 
or existential belief. In this kind of belief, the information 
one has about an object may be true or false, correct or 
incorrect. Knowledge is a belief of this kind. As an 
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illustration, the belief that a social worker is a Christian can 
easily be proved as true or false, correct or incorrect. This 
belief is, therefore, a descriptive or existential belief. 
The second kind of belief may be called an evaluative 
belief. In this kind of belief, the object is evaluated and 
described as good or bad. The belief that the social worker is 
always kind-hearted is an example of an evaluative belief. The 
truth of this belief statement can hardly be proved. It is 
purely a matter of personal judgment. Most of what social 
workers have identified as values are beliefs of this kind. 
The third kind of belief may be called a prescriptive or 
exhortatory belief. In this kind of belief, a course of action, 
a mode of conduct, or a state of existence for an object is 
advocated. As an illustration, the belief that friendliness is 
an important attribute of a social worker is a prescriptive or 
exhortory belief. In this example, the truth of the belief 
statement is relatively unimportant. Moreover, friendliness is 
not only evaluated as important, its practice is also advocated. 
Values, in Rokeach's view, belong to this kind of beliefs. 
How is a belief formed? At the simplest level, a belief is 
formed on the basis of direct observation. As an example, 
through observation, a person may come to believe that the social 
worker he is meeting is a young woman, tall and slim. This is an 
example of a descriptive or existential belief. Since the 
validity of one's own sense is rarely questioned, descriptive 
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beliefs such as this one is, at least initially, held with 
maximal certainty. 
A belief is also formed on the basis of information received 
from outside sources. As an illustration, a person may read a 
book on social casework and come to belief that a social worker 
works only with individuals and families. Beliefs formed by 
accepting the information provided by an outside source may be 
referred to as informational beliefs. Although direct 
observation of an object-attribute relation will usually lead to 
the formation of a descriptive belief, outside information that 
links an object to an attribute may or may not lead to the 
formation of an information belief. Many factors determine the 
degree to which information provided by an outside source will be 
accepted. 
Many of our beliefs are formed neither on the basis of 
direct experience with the object of the belief nor by way of 
accepting information from outside sources. Instead, we often 
acquire beliefs by way of various inference processes. As an 
illustration, through interacting with a social worker, one may 
arrive at certain beliefs about such unobservable characteristics 
or dispositions as the social worker's integrity, temperament, 
and ability. Beliefs that go beyond directly observable events 
may be called inferential beliefs. 
Inferential beliefs are usually based on prior descriptive 
beliefs. Thus the descriptive belief formed on the basis of 
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observation that "the social worker always smiles" produces the 
inference that "the social worker is always friendly". It should 
be clear, however, that inferential beliefs need not be based on 
descriptive beliefs but may be formed on the basis of prior 
inferences. Thus the inferential belief that "the social worker 
is always friendly" may lead to yet another inference, that "the 
social worker is always helpful". It is worth noting that the 
distinction between descriptive and inferential beliefs is 
somewhat arbitrary. As a matter of fact, it is possible to view 
beliefs as representing a continuum from descriptive to 
inferential. At the descriptive end of the continuum, a person's 
beliefs are directly tied to the stimulus situation, and at the 
inferential end, beliefs are formed on the basis of these stimuli 
as well as residues of the person's past experiences; the 
continuum may be seen as involving minimal to maximal use of such 
experiential residues. 
In conclusion, on the basis of direct observation or 
information received from outside sources or by way of various 
inferential processes, a person learns or forms a number of 
beliefs about an object. In other words, he associates the 
object with various attributes. In like manner, he forms beliefs 
about himself, about other people, about institutions, 
behaviours, and events. 
What is a belief system? The total number of beliefs a 
grown-up person possesses is large. By the time one reaches 
adulthood, one has tens and possibly hundreds of beliefs 
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concerning what is or is not true and beautiful and good about 
the society in which one lives. It is inconceivable that these 
countless beliefs would be retained in an unorganized, chaotic 
state within one's mind. Rather, it must be assumed that one's 
beliefs become somehow organized into architectural systems 
having desirable and measurable structural properties which, in 
turn, have observable behavioural consequences. 
Based on this understanding, a belief system may be defined 
as having represented within it, in some organized psycholigical 
but not necessarily logical form, each and every one of a 
person's countless beliefs about physical and social reality. By 
definition, a person does not allow beliefs to exist outside the 
belief system. 
A belief system represents, therefore, the total universe of 
a person's beliefs about the physical world, the social world, 
and the self. The totality of a person's beliefs serves as the 
informational base that ultimately determines his values, norms, 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviours. 
Based on the way beliefs are formed and their place in the 
belief system, another method of distinguishing beliefs has been 
formulated. These beliefs are: 
1. Type A: Primitive beliefs, 100 percent consensus; 
2. Type B: Primitive beliefs, zero consenses; 
3. Type C: Nonprimitive, authority beliefs; 
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4. Type D: Nonprimitive, derived beliefs; and 
5. Type E: Primitive, inconsequential beliefs. 
According to Rokeach, the formation of one's belief system 
begins very early in one's life. Most central in one's belief 
system are primitive beliefs of either Type A or Type B. These 
beliefs are learned by direct encounter with the object of 
belief. In the case of Type A beliefs, they are reinforced by a 
unanimous social consensus among all of one's referent persons 
and groups. On the other hand, in the case of Type B beliefs, 
there are no referent persons or groups outside the self who 
could controvert such beliefs. Through adverse experiences, some 
primitive beliefs may be formed in which external support is 
abandoned altogether. Since the validity of one's observation is 
rarely questioned, both types beliefs are psychologically 
incontrovertile. Elaorating on this, Rokeach noted that: 
Type A beliefs are psychologically incontrovertible because 
they are rarely, if ever, experienced as subjects of 
controversy and therefore have an axiomatic, taken-for- 
granted character. It is as if the believer says to 
himself: "I believe, and everyone else who could know 
believes it too" .... 
(Type B] Beliefs that are not shared with others are 
... impervious to persuasion or argument by others. Even 
though such beliefs may sometimes become a subject of 
controversy, they are psychologically incontrovertible. In 
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this second kind of primitive belief, it is as if the 
believer says: "I belief, but no one else could know. It 
therefore does not matter what others believe. " 
Nonprimitive beliefs of Type C and Type D seem to serve the 
purpose of helping the person to round out his picture of the 
world, realistically and rationally to the extent possible, 
defensively and irrationally to the extent necessary. Type C 
beliefs are conceived to develop out of Type A beliefs and to be 
in a functional relationship with them. On the other hand, Type 
D beliefs are conceived to develop out of Type C beliefs because 
believing in the credibility of a particular authority implies an 
acceptance of other beliefs perceived to be emanate from such 
authority. According to Rokeach, by eliminating the same taken- 
for-granted character of primitive beliefs, one can learn to 
accept differences of opinion and controversy concerning one's 
beliefs. Thus, while important and generally resistant to 
change, Type C and Type D beliefs are, nevertheless, conjectured 
to be less important and easier to change than Type A and B 
beliefs. 
Type E beliefs seem to represent more or less arbitrary 
matters of taste. According to Rokeach, this type of beliefs are 
incontrovertible because they originate in direct experience with 
the object of belief but their maintenance does not necessarily 
require social consensus. This is consistent with the oft-heard 
cliche: "There is no arguing over matters of taste. " Like other 
beliefs, they may be intensely held. Matters of taste are, 
143 
nevertheless, considered to be inconsequential because they have 
few or no connections with other beliefs. If changed, they have 
few or no connections or consequences for maintaining other 
beliefs. 
In summary, a person's total belief system includes 
inconsequential beliefs, derived beliefs, pre-ideological beliefs 
about specific authority, and pre-ideological primitive beliefs, 
socially shared or unshared, about the nature of the physical 
world, society, and the self. All such beliefs are assumed to be 
formed and developed very early in the life of a child. They are 
undoubtedly learned in the context of interactions with parents. 
As the child grows older, he learns that there are certain 
beliefs that virtually all others believe, other beliefs that are 
true for him even though no one else believes them, other 
important beliefs about which men differ, and other beliefs that 
are arbitrary matters of taste. Taken together, the total belief 
system may be seen as an organization of beliefs varying in 
depth, formed as a result of living in nature and in society, 
designed to help a person maintain, insofar as possible, a sense 
of ego and group identity, stable and continuous over time - an 
identity that is a part of, and simultaneously apart from, a 
stable physical and social environment. 
How can one decide which ones of a person's countless 
beliefs are central or important and which one are less so? 
Obviously all these beliefs do not play an equally prominent role 
within a person's belief system; nor do they play an equally 
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prominent role in determining his behaviour. Rokeach begins by 
delineating three simple assumptions: (1) not all beliefs are 
equally important to the individual: beliefs vary along a central 
peripheral dimension; (2) the more central a belief, the more it 
will resist change; and (3) the more central the belief changed, 
the more widespread the repercussions in the rest of the belief 
system. 
Rokeach also defines importance solely in terms of 
connectedness: the more a given belief is functionally connected 
or in communication with other beliefs, the more implications and 
consequences it has for other beliefs and, therefore, the more 
central the belief. Moreover, he proposes the following four 
defining assumptions or criteria of connectedness: (1) 
existential versus nonexistential beliefs, (2) shared versus 
unshared beliefs about existence and self-identity, (3) derived 
versus underived beliefs, and (4) beliefs concerning and not 
concerning matters of taste. 
In summary, (1) beliefs directly concerning one's own 
existence and identity in the physical and social world are 
assumed to have more functional connections and consequences for 
other beliefs than those with less directly concern one's 
existence and identity; (2) beliefs that are shared with others 
are assumed to have more functional connections and consequences 
for other beliefs than those not shared with others; (3) derived 
beliefs are assumed to have fewer functional connections and 
consequences for other beliefs than the beliefs from which they 
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are derived; and (4) beliefs which represent more or less 
arbitrary matters of taste are assumed to have relatively fewer 
functional connections and consequences for other beliefs than 
beliefs which do not represent arbitrary matters of taste. 
In presenting his version of the nature of human values, 
Rokeach begins by asserting that any conception of the nature of 
human values, if it is to be scientifically fruitful, should 
satisfy the following criteria: 
1. it should be intuitively appealing yet capable of 
operatinal definition; 
2. it should clearly distinguish the value concept from 
other concepts with which it might be confused - such 
concepts as belief, attitude, intention, and behaviour - and 
yet it should be systematically related to such concepts; 
3. it should avoid circular terms that are themselves 
undefined, such terms as "ought", "should" or "conceptions 
of the desirable"; 
4. it should, moreover, represent a value-free approach to 
the study of human values; that is, an approach that would 
enable independent investigators to replicate one another's 
empirical findings and conclusions despite differences in 
values. 
146 
Based on these criteria, Rokeach proceeds to explain what it 
means to say that a person has a value or a value system. 
"A value, " according to Rokeach, "is an enduring belief 
that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is 
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode 
of conduct or end-state of existence. " 
"A value system, " he continues, "is an enduring organization 
of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states 
of existence along a continuum of relative importance. " 
According to the definition, a value is enduring. If values 
are completely stable, individual and social change would be 
impossible. On the other hand, if values are completely 
unstable, continuity of human personality and society would be 
impossible. Thus, any conception of human values, if it is to be 
fruitful, must be able to account for the enduring character of 
values as well as for their changing character. 
It is suggested that the enduring quality of values arises 
mainly from the fact that they are initially taught and learned 
in isolation from other values in an absolute, all-or-none 
manner. We are not taught that it is desirable, for example, to 
be just a little bit honest or cooperative, or to strive for just 
a little bit of freedom or comfort. Nor are we taught that such 
modes of conduct or. end-states of existence are sometimes 
desirable and sometimes not. It is the isolated and thus the 
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absolute learning of values that more or less guarantees their 
endurance and stability. 
Paradoxically, however, there is also a relative quality of 
values that must be made explicit if we are to come to grips with 
the problem of value change. "It is the rare and limiting case, " 
Robin Williams (1968) noted, "if and when a person's behaviour is 
guided over a considerable period of time by one and only one 
value". "More often, " he continued, "particular acts or 
sequences of acts are steered by multiple and changing clusters 
of values. " (p. 287) As a child matures, he is increasingly 
likely to encounter social situations in which several values 
rather than one value may come into competition with one another, 
requiring a weighing of one value against another -a decision as 
to which value is the more important. In this particular 
situation, is it better, for instance, to seek freedom or 
comfort, to act honestly or cooperatively? Gradually, through 
experience and a process of maturation, we all learn to integrate 
the isolated, absolute values we have been taught in this or that 
context into a hierarchically organized system, wherein each 
value is ordered in priority or importance relative to other 
values. Such a relative conception of values enables us to 
define change as a reordering of priorities and, at the same 
time, to see the total value system as relatively stable over 
time. It is stable enough to reflect the fact of sameness and 
continuity of a unique personality socialized within a given 
culture and society, yet unstable enough to permit rearrangements 
of value priorities as a result of changes in culture, society, 
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and personal experience. 
A value is a belief. Three types of beliefs have previously 
been distinguished: descriptive or existential beliefs, those 
capable of being true or false; evaluative beliefs, wherein the 
object of belief is judged to be good or bad; and prescriptive or 
proscriptive beliefs, wherein some means or end of action is 
judged to be desirable or undesirable. A value is a belief of 
the third kind -a prescriptive or proscriptive belief. 
A value refers to a mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence. When we say that a person has a value, we may have in 
mind either his beliefs concerning desirable modes of conduct or 
desirable end-states of existence. We will refer to these two 
kinds of values as instrumental and terminal values. This 
distinction between means- and ends-values has been recognized by 
some philosophers, anthropologists, and psychologists. But 
others have concentrated their attention more or less exclusively 
on one or the other kind of value. 
The distinction between the two kinds of values - 
instrumental and terminal - is an important one that we cannot 
afford to ignore either in our theoretical thinking or in our 
attempts to measure values. For one thing, the total number of 
terminal values is not necessarily the same as the total number 
of instrumental values. For another, there is a functional 
relationship between instrumental and terminal values that cannot 
be ignored. 
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Moreover, Rokeach distinguishes two kinds of terminal values 
or end-states of existence: personal and social. He says that: 
While there are no doubt many ways of classifying terminal 
values, one a priori classification that deserved to be 
singled out for special mentioning is that the terminal 
values may be self-centred or society-centred, intrapersonal 
or interpersonal in focus. Such end-states as salvation and 
peace of mind, for instance, are intrapersonal while world 
peace and brotherhood are interpersonal. (pp. 7-8) 
In other words, personal values are terminal values or end-states 
of existence that are self-centred while social values are 
terminal values or end-states of existence that are society- 
centred. 
He also distinguishes two kinds of instrumental values or 
modes of conduct: moral values and competence values. He says 
that: 
... moral values refer only to certain kind of instrumental 
values, to those that have an interpersonal focus which when 
violated arouse pangs of conscience or feelings of guilt for 
wrongdoing. Other instrumental values, those that may be 
called competence or self-actualization values, have a 
personal rather than interpersonal focus and do not seem to 
be especially concerned with morality. Their violation 
leads to feelings of shame about personal inadequacy rather 
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than feelings of guilt about wrongdoing. Thus, behaving 
honestly and responsibly leads one to feel that he is 
behaving morally, whereas behaving logically, intelligently 
or imaginatively leads one to feel that he is behaving 
competently. (p. 8) 
A value is a preference as well as a "conception of the 
preferable". A good deal has been made of the distinction 
between the "desirable" and the "merely desired". A value, as 
Kluckhohn defines it, is a "conception of the desirable", and not 
something "merely desired". This view of the nature of values 
suffers from the fact that it is extremely difficult to define 
"desirable". We are no better off and no further along talking 
about "conceptions of the desirable" than talking about values. 
More important, in Rokeach's view, is that a conception of the 
"desirable which influences the selection from available modes, 
means, and ends of action" turns out, upon closer analysis, to 
represent a definable preference for something to something else. 
The something is a specific mode of behaviour or end-state of 
existence; the something else is an opposite, converse, or 
contrary mode or end-state. Two mutually exclusive modes of 
behaviour or end-states are compared with one another - for 
example, responsible and irresponsible behaviour, or states of 
peace and war; one of the two is distinctly preferable to the 
other. Moreover, the person who prefers one believes that same 
one to be consensually preferred. A "conception of the 
desirable" thus seems to be nothing more than a special kind of 
preference -a preference for one mode of behaviour over an 
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opposite mode, or a preference for one end-state over an opposite 
end-state. Other kinds of preferences that do not implicate 
modes of behaviour or end-states of existence, for instance, 
preferences for certain kinds of foods, would not qualify as 
"conceptions of the desirable". 
There is also another sense in which a value represents a 
specific preference. A person prefers a particular mode or end- 
state not only when he compares it with its opposite but also 
when he compares it with other values within his value system. 
He prefers a particular mode or end-state to other mode or end- 
state that are lower down in his value hierarchy. 
A value is a conception of something that is personally or 
socially preferable. If a person's values represent his 
"conceptions of the desirable" the question arises desirable for 
whom? for himself? for others? When a person tells us about his 
values, it cannot be assumed that he necessarily intends them to 
apply equally to himself and to others. Consider, for example, 
the meaning of that familiar expression: "Children should be seen 
and not heard. " Translated into the language of values, this 
statement apparently means to the person asserting it: "I believe 
it is desirable for children but not for adults to behave in 
certain ways. " A person who informs us about his values may (or 
may not) intend to apply them differentially to young and old, 
men and women, blacks and whites, rich and poor, and so on. 
Indeed, one of the most interesting properties that values 
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seem to have is that they can be employed with extraordinary 
versatility in everyday life. They may be shared or not shared 
and thus employed as single or double (or even triple) standards. 
They may be intended to apply equally to oneself and to others, 
to oneself but not to others, to others but not to oneself, to 
oneself more than to others, or to others more than to oneself. 
We know very little indeed about the conditions under which 
values might be so diversely employed. We may speculate, for 
example, that competitive conditions will encourage the 
employment of values as double standards, whereas cooperation 
will encourage their employment as single standards. 
We encounter values at varying levels of the social system. 
We may encounter individual values, group values, and societal 
values. Professional values are one type of group values. 
According to Rokeach, if individual values are socially 
shared cognitive representations of personal needs and the means 
of satisfying them, then group values are socially shared 
cognitive representations of group goals and demands, and 
societal values are socially shared cognitive representations of 
societal goals and demands. 
In most societies overt value conflicts are relatively 
infrequent. This may be explained by the fact that most people 
and most groups, most of the time, accept the same generalized 
values, though they may arrange them differently, interpret them 
in different ways, and accept them with varying degrees of 
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intensity. 
However, the identical societal value is often given various 
interpretations by different groups, just as group values are 
given private interpretations by different individuals. This 
process of individualization sometimes makes it appear that 
professional groups hold professionally distinctive values when 
in fact they subscribe to the same societal values and 
individuals hold personally distinctive values when in fact they 
subscribe to the same group values. Talcott Parsons observes 
that "every subsystem has a value system of its own which is a 
differentiated and specialized version of the general value 
system, limited by the level and function of the subsystem in the 
whole". Problems and conflict arise when the value orientation 
of one level is inconsistent with that of the next higher level. 
For example, the youth culture, though different from the general 
adult culture, did not pose any problem so long as the values of 
teenagers were consistent with those of adult society. But when 
teens accepted and acted according to values which ran counter to 
those of the adult community, there was immediate concern about 
the generation gap, about juvenile delinquency, and about the 
crisis in child-parent relationships. 
Besides, individual behaviour is not always consistent with 
societal values, with group values, or even with a person's own 
personal values. Values act as screens against which behaviour 
preferences are filtered. Even though there is a tendency toward 
behaviour that is consistent with values held, an individual's 
154 
behaviour does not always follow his value orientations. People 
do "wrong" even when they know what is "right". Juvenile 
delinquency experts have noted that juvenile offenders are rarely 
ignorant of the societal values which proscribe delinquent 
behaviour. They most often admit that their behaviour is 
inconsistent even with their own values. Various explanations 
for these inconsistencies have been offered. Some have pointed 
to irresistible impulses and threads of infantilism as 
explanations. Others have suggested that lack of access to the 
means to achieve socially desirable goals is a cause for this 
inconsistency. Social workers tend to consider both internal 
(psychosocial) and external (environmental) factors in trying to 
understand people whose values and behaviours are inconsistent. 
But far more important than any discrepancy is the fact that, by 
and large, there is a consistency between values and behaviours. 
Even criminals and deviants behave most of the time in ways 
consistent with societal values. 
Differences in individual values and group values do not 
just happen but usually develop in response to different life 
experiences. Melvin Kohn's research showed how work requirements 
influence the values which guide parental child-rearing 
activities. Since middle-class jobs usually demands a great deal 
of self-direction, child-rearing patterns of middle-class parents 
generally are based on values which stress autonomy and self- 
direction. Working-class parents, on the other hand, follow more 
authoritarian child-rearing practices since their work experience 
is generally with job that demand strict adherence to rules and 
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instructions. 
4.4 Proposed Definitions 
A modified version of Rokeach's definitions can now be 
presented. It involves a shift in emphasis in the meaning of 
value. Instead of focusing on value as a belief, it is here 
defined as a property, i. e., an end-state of existence or a mode 
of conduct. 
A value is a mode of conduct or end-state of existence which 
is believed to be personally and socially more preferable 
than most modes of conduct or end-states of existence. 
A value system is an organization of modes of conduct and 
end-states of existence which is believed to be personally 
or socially preferable, along a continuum of relative 
preference. 
Based on this modified version, definitions for social work 
value and social work value system are presented as following: 
A social work value is a mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence which is believed to be professionally and 
socially more preferable than most modes of conduct or end- 
states of existence. 
A social work value system is an organization of modes of 
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conduct and end-states of existence which is believed to be 
professionally and socially preferable, along a continuum of 
relative preference. 
This modified version of Rokeach's definitions has several 
advantages over others and it also has important implications for 
social work practice. 
1. In formulating his definition of values, Rokeach postulated 
five assumptions: (1) the total number of values that a person 
possesses is relatively small; (2) all men everywhere possess the 
same values to different degrees; (3) values are organized into 
value systems; (4) the antecedents of human values can be traced 
to culture, society and its institutions, and personality; and 
(5) the consequences of human values will be manifested in 
virtually all phenomena that social scientists might consider 
worth investigating and understanding. (p. 3) 
Of these assumptions the first three are particularly 
relevant to this study. Each one of them has practical 
implications. Elaborating on the first assumption, Rokeach noted 
that "we estimate that the total number of terminal values that a 
grown person possesses is about a dozen and a half and that the 
total number of instrumental values is several times this number, 
perhaps five or six dozen .... " (p. 11). Should this assumption 
be accepted, the tasks of identifying these values one by one and 
measuring them would be considerably easier. 
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In relation to the second assumption, Rokeach noted that all 
men everywhere possessed the same values but to different degrees 
because they tended to accept the same generalized values even 
though they arranged them differently, interpreted them in 
different ways, and accepted them with varying degree of 
intensity. Should this assumption be accepted, then the task of 
comparing different groups of people would be considerably easier 
also. (p. 4) 
Finally, in relation to the third assumption, Rokeach noted 
that "after a value is learned it becomes integrated somehow into 
an organizd system of values wherein each value is ordered in 
priority with respect to other values". "Such a relative 
conception of values, " Rokeach continued, "enables us to define 
change as a reordering of priorities and, at the same time, to 
see the total value system as relatively stable over time" (p. 
11). Should this assumption be accepted, then the task of 
comparing long-term value changes would be feasible. 
2. The definition of value so formulated represents a value- 
free approach to the study of values. This is particularly 
important in the case of social work in Hong Kong. In itself, 
social work is already rooted in a wide variety of ideologies: 
moral, psychological, social, and political. The cultural 
heritage of social workers in Hong Kong complicates the issue. 
Fortunately, Rokeach's definition has already made allowance for 
such diversity. 
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3. The definition of value so formulated provides a link with 
value as it is discussed in the social work literature. 
Firstly, the use of values as beliefs which influences human 
choice is not unheard of in the social work literature. Ernest 
Greenwood (1958), for instance, noted that "the social values of 
a professional group are its basic and fundamental beliefs, the 
unquestioned premises upon which its very existence rests" (p. 
15). Along this line of thinking, Harriett M. Bartlett (1958) 
produced a number of beliefs and treated each as a social work 
value. There are many others beside her who adopted this line of 
thinking, including Werner W. Boehm (1959), Felix P. Biestek 
(1967), and Morton Teicher (1967). However, Rokeach's definition 
and the modified version of his definition, have at least two 
advantages over that of Greenwood's. In the case of Greenwood, 
the relationship between beliefs and values is only loosely 
defined whereas in the case of Rokeach, the relationship is more 
clearly specified. More specifically, Rokeach's definition 
specifies the link between values as end-states of existence and 
social work purposes, and between values as modes of conduct and 
social work ethics. 
Secondly, defining a value as a preference for something is 
not unfamiliar to social workers. In developing a scheme for 
organizing social work values, Charles S. Levy (1973) identified 
three levels of values, including: (1) values as preferred 
conception of people, (2) values as preferred outcomes for 
people, and (3) values as preferred instrumentalities for dealing 
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with people. (p. 38) 
Based on Rokeach's definition, a preferred conception of 
people is a belief of the second kind, a belief upon which values 
are selected and, hence, should not be considered as a value. On 
the other hand, a preferred outcome for people is, for Rokeach, 
the equivalent of a preferred end-state of existence whereas a 
preferred instrumentality for dealing with people is the 
equivalent of a preferred mode of conduct. Again, Rokeach's 
definition has an advantage over that of Levy's. By defining a 
value as a preference for one end-state of existence or mode of 
conduct over that of another, we discover a way to resolve many 
problems relating to the study of social work values. 
To begin with, since any preference for values is relative, 
one can have a preference for a number of values, each to a 
different degree. Hence, the selection of social work values 
from a wide variety of ideologies, even conflicting ideologies, 
poses no serious problem. What is needed is an extra effort to 
interpret and to justify the inclusion of each according to the 
ideology from which it is selected. What is also needed is an 
effort to determine the relationship between one value and 
another by ranking them in order of preference among the 
practitioners as a collectivity. In other words, what is more 
important for the profession is not to obtain a cluster of values 
but to formulate a value system. Rokeach's third assumption 
about the nature of human values has already made provision for 
this. 
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An important question may be raised at this point. Since 
social work values are, in fact, selected from a wide variety of 
ideologies, does it imply that the number of social work values 
is necessarily large? This is certainly not the case. Following 
Rokeach's first two assumptions about the nature of human values, 
it seems perfectly clear that the total number of values that 
social work possesses is relatively small since all ideologies 
tend to accept the same generalized values even though these 
ideologies arrange them differently, interpret them in different 
ways, and accept them with varying degrees of intensity. 
Thirdly, even though a number of valuable publications on 
ethical decision making are presently available (e. g., Reamer, 
1982, Rhodes, 1986, and Loewenberg and Dolgoff, 1988), none of 
these have come up with a satisfactory solution to discrepancies 
between one value system and another. What one can do with the 
proposed definition of a value system is, however, to highlight 
the discrepancies which exist between one value system and the 
other, e. g., between one's personal value system and professional 
value system. Becoming aware of the discrepancies is a step that 
should not be taken lightly. It is the very first step toward 
ethical decision making and is, therefore, one step closer to the 
possibility of arriving at a satisfactory solution. 
4. The definition of value so formulated clearly distinguishes 
the value concept from other concepts with which it might be 
confused and yet it is systematically related to such concepts. 
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Culture is often described as consisting of beliefs, values, 
norms, and attitudes. Based on the work of Milton Rokeach, 
culture may be described as a system of beliefs which is held by 
members of a group. In the case of social work, the content of 
this system of beliefs include (1) preferred conception of 
people, (2) preferred outcomes for people, and (3) preferred 
instrumentalities for dealing with people. 
According to our definition, a value is not a belief-but is 
a mode of conduct or an end-state of existence which is believed 
to be preferable. It is derived from our beliefs about the 
preferred conception of people, the preferred outcomes for 
people, and the preferred instrumentalities for dealing with 
people. Since it is something which is personally or socially 
preferred, it cannot be proved as true or false. 
Knowledge, on the other hand, belongs to the type of belief 
which Rokeach called descriptive or existential beliefs. It 
is 
at least potentially provable. It is used to explain and to 
conceptualize our conception of people, of the outcomes for 
people, and of the instrumentalities for dealing with people. 
According to Rokeach, values and social norms can be 
distinguished in three different ways: (1) a value may refer to a 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence whereas a social norm 
refers only to a mode of conduct; (2) a value transcends specific 
situations; in contrast, a social norm is a prescription or 
proscription to behave in a specific way in specific situation; 
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and (3) a value is more personal and internal, whereas a norm is 
consensual and external to the person. 
Finally, an attitude refers to an organization of several 
beliefs around a specific object or situation. 
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Chapter Five 
What is Action? 
5.1 Introduction 
Action is a philosophical as much as a sociological concept. 
In an introduction to his work, Alan R. White (1968) noted that: 
Philosophers sometimes use "do", "action", and "act" 
indifferently, but in ordinary language these are words of 
decreasing scope. Not everything one does, much less 
everything one is accountable for, is an action or an act. 
(P. 1) 
Do, so far as White is concerned, is much broader in scope 
than both action and act. It may be used as an auxiliary in, for 
example, "How do you define action? " It may also be used as a 
stand-in for other verbs in, for example, "If anyone wants to use 
do, action, and act indifferently, let him do so. " Both as an 
anxiliary and a stand-in for other verbs, do seems to have 
unlimited scope. (p. 1) 
Action is more restricted in usage than do. It is normally 
used to point to a contrast between a state of movement and a 
state of quiescence, i. e., between activity and inactivity. It 
is also used to indicate a contrast between the quiescent state 
of the thinker and the overt movements of the man of action. In 
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other words, action is used to distinguish itself from inaction. 
(pp. 1-2) 
Lastly, to act is to take action, to cause something to 
happen. (p. 2) In other words, an act is the taking of action. 
To distinguish between act and action, Anthony Giddens (1979) 
noted that action "does not refer to a series of discrete acts 
combined together, but to a continuous flow of conduct" (p. 55). 
Among sociologists, many assume that the concept of action 
is necessarily related to intention, i. e., it must refer to 
purposive behaviour. However, there are exceptions. 
Max Weber, for instance, distinguished four types of action, 
some rational or intentional and others affectual or traditional: 
(1) rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends; 
(2) rational orientation to an absolute value; (3) affectual 
orientation; and (4) traditional orientation. 
Action, in his opinion, is zweckrational or rationally 
oriented to a system of discrete individual ends when the end, 
the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken 
into account and weighted. This involves rational consideration 
of (1) alternative means to the end, (2) the relations of the end 
to other prospective results of employment of any given means, 
and (3) the relative importance of different possible ends. 
Professional action falls within this category. 
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In contrast, action is wertrational or rationally oriented 
to an absolute value when the goal is an end which is valued in 
itself, and not as a means to some other goal. In other words, 
there is no way of assessing the efficacy of the means in this 
type of action. All kinds of movements - political, religious, 
or social - involve action belonging to this category. 
Traditionally oriented action consists in doing what has 
been done in the past without considering alternatives. This 
type of action is often irrational because both means and goals 
are not carefully weighted by the actor. However, it lies very 
close to the borderline of meaningfully oriented action because 
it is very often guided by automatic reaction to habitual 
stimuli. The bulk of everyday action to which people have become 
habitually accustomed approaches this type. 
Finally, action is affectually oriented if it is governed 
largely by a need to express some emotion. At one extreme, 
affectual action is reflexive and to cry as a reaction to some 
loss is an example of this type. The action has no goal other 
than the expression of the emotion. At the other extreme, where 
some means are chosen, almost deliberately, to achieve some 
emotional state, affectual action comes close to the borderline 
of meaningfully oriented action. 
Similarly, Pareto distinguished two types of action: logical 
action and non-logical action. Logical action, according to 
Pareto, involves the use of empirical knowledge and valid 
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inference in choosing means to the attainment of ends. Even 
though economic conduct in a market economy, for instance, is 
close to this ideal, most others are remote from it. Thus most 
actions are non-logical. Elaborating on this Pareto explained 
that most actions were non-logical because sentiments, affects, 
and blind faith played a great part in determining the course of 
action and in inhibiting the use of empirically testable 
assumptions and logical calculations. 
On the other hand, Giddens (1976) noted that the most 
mundane forms of day-to-day conduct could quite properly be 
called intentional. He explained that "for action to be 
purposive, the actor does not have to be capable of formulating 
the knowledge he applies as an abstract proposition, nor does it 
have to be the case that such 'knowledge' is valid". He added 
that "it is mistaken to presume ... that only those types of act 
can be called purposive of which actors themselves tend to ask 
for explanations in their everyday lives". "If we are not 
inclined to ask about it, " he continued, "this is certainly not 
because it makes no sense to pose such a question, but because we 
already know, or assume that we know, what his purpose is". 
Talcott Parsons (1951) is particularly interested in one 
type of action - social action. So far as he is concerned, an 
action is social when one or more of the following conditions are 
fulfilled: 
1. the situation of the actor includes other actors whose 
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presence is taken into account when the action is performed; 
2. the situation is such that these others possess 
facilities, objects or characteristics which enable them in 
some way to influence the conduct of the actor; 
3. the actor shares with these others certain sets of 
expectations and, possibly certain values, beliefs and 
symbols. (pp. 3-30 and 47-158) 
These conditions are often present in the practice of social 
work in varying degrees and in varying proportions. In other 
words, social work practice often involves social action. 
5.2 Approaches to the Study of Action 
As it is mentioned in the introductory chapter, Graham 
Kinloch (1977) noted that, in sociology, paradigms of reality 
appeared to take one of three major forms: (1) the organic- 
structure-functional model, represented by the work of Durkheim 
and Parsons, (2) the conflict-radical model, represented by the 
work of Marx and Weber, and (3) the social-behaviourist-social- 
psychological model, represented by the work of Weber and Blumer. 
5.2.1 Emile Durkheim 
Durkheim is of the opinion that all human interactions give 
rise to expectations of patterns of conduct. As persons interact 
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with others they tend to develop common ways of perceiving, 
feeling, evaluating, and acting. These new patterns of behaviour 
lead to the emergence of expectations and constraints on how 
persons should or ought to behave. In other words, as a result 
of social interaction, there emerges a "collective consciousness" 
which in turn constrains those in interaction and obliges them to 
behave in particular ways. In saying this, he makes the 
assumption that for any group of people to live together co- 
operatively, they must have some basic common agreements on what 
their priorities are as a group, and on how they ought to behave 
to each other and arrange their relationships. This, ultimately, 
leads to the conclusion that all aspects of the social structure, 
including institutions, are founded upon the society's normative 
system. 
5.2.2 Talcott Parsons 
According to Parsons, social interaction occurs when any one 
actor (ego) needs or wishes to take account of the actions of 
another actor (alter). If the interaction between ego and alter 
is on a regular basis, then certain mutual expectations will 
emerge: each party will seek to predict what the other will do, 
and, at the same time, each will be obliged to adjust his conduct 
somewhat in order to meet with the other's expectations. In 
other words, ego will modify his expectations of alter's conduct 
in order to predict it successfully, while alter will modify his 
conduct in order to meet with ego's expectations. The pattern of 
mutual expectations which gradually emerges becomes a norm, or 
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set of norms, which both ego and alter accept as binding upon 
themselves and as defining the particular conditions of their 
interactions. The specific privileges, rights, duties, 
obligations and disabilities which are imposed upon each party 
to the interaction by their acceptance of norms define their 
roles in relation to one another. 
Moreover, Parsons argues that the emergence and acceptance 
of norms is not usually a mere ad hoc affairs in which each party 
minutely weighs the advantages and disadvantages of any 
particular set of norms. For, he insists, each party enjoys a 
number of secondary benefits from the relationship, or the 
circumstances of it, which motivates him to maintain it in its 
ongoing form. Firstly, each party develops a vested interest in 
the stability of the relationship as such: in other words, rather 
than shops about incessantly for the most advantageous 
arrangements, each party will settle for the relationship which 
exists, for it is at least predictable. Secondly, each party 
develops a desire or even a need to please the other and to 
obtain recognition from the other for meeting his expectations: 
in other words, each party tries to obtain some kind of 
gratification from the interaction process as such, and also 
seeks to provide this gratification for the other. Thus the 
process of interaction creates, nourishes, and sustains in each 
actor the need to continue to participate in the relationship. 
Interaction provides and sustains the motivation in each actor to 
adhere to the norms. . It also provides a mechanism of control for 
deterring or limiting deviation from the norms; for each 
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participant needs both reciprocation in kind as well as approval 
for conformity. 
The process of interaction between ego and alter can, 
according to Parsons, be used as a microcosm of social systems; 
for all such interaction contain the elements of which social 
systems consist. These elements are shared systems of belief, 
sentiment and values; and culturally standardized criteria of 
technical, aesthetic and moral evaluation. Thus, different 
elements in the system of values and other ideas in society are 
seen to be derived from the conditions of social action and 
interaction. 
Following Durkheim, Parsons also considers the value system 
of a society to be one of its essential characteristics. 
Parsons, however, elaborates on Durkheim's more general 
statements and incorporated into his own theoretical analysis 
consideration of the relationship between norms specific to a 
particular situation and the general value system of a society. 
He suggests that the social system can be seen as consisting of 
individual members of society who perform different activities, 
or play a variety of roles, within the general framework of the 
societal division of labour. From this activity there develops a 
a network of concrete, or "situation specific" norms which in 
practice regulate the performance of the roles and define the 
obligations and prohibitions, the "dos" and "don'ts", for each 
social activity. Thus the norms prescribe appropriate concrete 
behaviours. 
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5.2.3 Karl Marx 
Marx offers a theory of society which is based on his image 
of the basic nature of human beings. He believes that people are 
basically productive; that is, in order to survive people need to 
work in, and with, nature. In so doing they produce the food, 
clothing, tools, shelter, and other necessities that permit them 
to live. Their productivity is a perfectly natural way by which 
they express basic creative impulses. Furthermore, these 
impulses are expressed in concert with other people; in other 
words, people are inherently social. They need to work together 
in order to produce what they need to survive. 
Throughout history this natural process has been subverted, 
at first by the mean conditions of primitive society and later by 
a variety of structural arrangements erected by societies in the 
course of history. In various ways these structures interfer 
with the natural productive process. However, it is in 
capitalist society that this breakdown is most acute. 
His major aim is to analyze the relationship between life 
conditions (i. e., society's economic substructure) and "ideas" 
(i. e., society's normative superstructure) on an ongoing and 
changing basis through society's historical development. Such an 
interactive relationship is basic to his thought as he analyzes 
the corruption of "natural man" to "alienated man" through 
industrialization and. capitalist exploitation. The ideological 
aim behind his theorizing, then, is the retransformation of 
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society into a state in which "natural man" rather than 
"alienated man" would be resynthesized with his natural and 
social environments. 
As far as action is concerned, Marx uses a highly simplified 
model of what may be called instrumental rationalism; that is, he 
assumes that men have certain goals and that, if circumstances 
permit, they will use any means available in the pursuit of 
these. He tends to treat the social actor as a living calculator 
of tactics and strategies. He does this, not because of his 
contempt for man, but because he considers that the analysis of 
all or most social systems, particularly the analysis of 
capitalism, calls for this approach. Capitalism according to 
Marx, more than any other system, encourages instrumentality. 
(Cohen, 1968, p. 79) 
Marx does not deny that men have emotional needs, and that 
they have values. But he considers that the direction of 
emotional expression is, for social purposes, governed by the 
practical considerations of those who are in the position to 
influence social sentiments. And values are largely the 
expression of the same class whose interests are dominant in 
society. (Cohen, 1968, p. 80) 
5.2.4 Max Weber 
Weber defines sociology as a "science which attempts the 
interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to 
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arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects". 
Implicit in this definition is a number of key elements: the 
attempt to interpret or understand; a focus on social action; and 
the attempt to develop causal explanations of these phenomena. 
Weber is thus preoccupied with the scientific understanding of 
social behaviour as sociology's central concern. Accordingly, he 
focuses on the objective understanding of social values in 
historical context and attempts to assess their sociological 
impact on society. 
To Weber, action or conduct must be subjectively meaningful. 
Social action is meaningful to the actor when it assumes 
subjective meaning as well as taking "account of the behaviour of 
others and is thereby oriented". Moreover, to understand the 
conduct of others one must observe not only what they do but know 
what meaning they attach to their actions. (Cohen, 1968, p. 81) 
Social action is viewed as varying in its level of 
rationality. Thus Weber delineates four types of social action, 
varying from least to most rational: (a) traditionally oriented 
social action; (b) affectually oriented social action; (c) 
rational orientation toward an absolute value; and (d) rational 
orientation toward a system of individual ends. Such a typology, 
according to Weber, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, rather, 
it represents a continuum of types of social orientations ranging 
from cultures with low individualism and high traditional control 
to those with high individualism and low traditionalism. 
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He further elaborates this typology by delineating the kinds 
of legitimacy, relationships, associations, corporate groups, and 
control inherent within each orientation. Within the 
traditional, legitimacy is based on religious attitudes, 
solidarity relationships are communal, association is compulsory, 
corporate groups are political, and control is based on 
discipline. The affectual, on the other hand, is founded on 
affectual loyalty and is communal; in it, association is 
voluntary, corporate groups are revolutionary, and control is 
based on power. The rational orientation defined by absolute 
values is legitimized in terms of these values; in it, 
relationships are associative, ' association is compulsory, 
corporate groups are hierocratic, and control is based on 
discipline. Finally, the rational orientation based on 
individual ends is founded on self-interest, associative 
relationships, compulsory association, and political corporate 
groups; it is controlled on the basis of power. Thus different 
types of society or social actions are based on differing types 
of values or levels of rationality, i. e., the extent to which 
behaviour is defined by individual or group interests. 
The evolution of more rational forms of social action, 
according to Weber, stems from the process of competition, which 
results in the "selection of those of superior personal 
qualities". Such competition alternates between peaceful and 
violent types as well as between traditional and charismatic 
values; it is influenced by the kind of opportunity structure 
that is inherent in the society concerned. 
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Finally, Weber viewed rationality as resulting in a 
particular kind of bureaucratic type or structure in which social 
action is closely defined by an elaborate system of roles, norms, 
and sanctions. At this point in its evolution, society is highly 
controlled, organized, and impersonal (bureaucratic) in response 
to the need for economic efficiency with industrialization. 
To summarize, Weber was primarily concerned with 
understanding the meaning of social action; he attempted to 
delineate the relationship between types of social action and the 
kinds of social structures that are based on them as society in 
general moves from the traditional to the modern or rational in 
the wake of industrialization and the influence of the Protestant 
ethic. Society, reacting to the process of social selection 
through competition, was viewed as becoming more rational or 
bureaucratic as higher levels of industrialization increased the 
need for efficiency. In general, Weber was concerned with the 
relationship between individual values and the social structure. 
5.2.5 Herbert Blumer 
Blumer is concerned with "the interpretive process by means 
of which human beings, individually and collectively, act in 
human society". Such a model conceptualizes society as a system 
of interpretive processes governing behaviour. 
Originating largely with Weber, the central idea of a 
symbolic interactionist approach to action is that the 
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sociologist should proceed by seeking to "understand" those he 
studies. He should attempt to look upon the world in the same 
way that they do, should seek to appreciate how the world looks 
to them. He should, additionally, seek to grasp the ideas, 
beliefs, motives, and goals which move people to act. Knowing 
how things appear to people and what sorts of thoughts, impulses 
and wants those people have, the sociologist will be able to see 
that they act as they do because they are seeking to realize 
their ends and desires as best they can in the face of 
circumstances as they see them. This emphasis upon 
"understanding" the social factor has resulted in this approach 
being known as verstehende (or understanding) sociology. 
Symbolic interactionism views society as people interacting 
with one another. Sometimes interaction is predictable and 
routine, recreating familiar patterns of behaviour. At other 
times, people interact in unfamiliar settings, responding to 
changing circumstances - as, for example, when people face 
natural diasters. Whatever the context, the symbolic 
interactionist's image of society emphasizes social interaction. 
Human conduct is formed as people confront objects, events, 
or other people, interpret them in symbolic terms, and then 
decide upon a course of action. In this process, meaning is 
everything. People must interpret the meaning of others' acts in 
order to respond appropriately to them. At the same time, it is 
the very capacity to interpret that makes the human world so much 
more fluid and flexible than the worlds inhabited by other 
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animals. Because we respond to the world by interpreting the 
meanings of things rather than reacting immediately and directly, 
we can act more imaginatively and creatively. Our symbols give 
us the capacity to anticipate the future (although not 
necessarily accurately), to imagine alternative courses of 
action, and to escape some of the chains that bind other animals 
to immediate response to their environments. We are able to 
think, to contemplate the future, to imagine how others will 
respond to our actions, and to decide between one course of 
action and another. 
The influence of society upon the individual is solid and 
powerful, but it is by no means total or irresistible. Society 
shapes the human beings who are its members and whose actions 
keep it going, but this process of shaping, called socialization, 
is by no means perfect. It creates people with the capacity to 
choose otherwise - to rebel, to resist, to innovate. Each mind 
does not become a duplicate of every other mind, nor are the 
interests and goals of individuals defined completely by society. 
As we have pointed out, human needs are individual, but they are 
met through cooperative activity. The human capacity to choose 
among alternative courses of action means that sometimes people 
will choose acts that secure their own goals at the expense of 
other people. And, finally, symbols are themselves expansive and 
creative. Language gives human beings the capacity to say things 
that have never been said before and to invent new realities by 
inventing new symbols. Moreover, human beings do not respond 
automatically or habitually to symbols, but must interpret them 
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before conduct can occur. 
As a result, human beings have some degrees of freedom. 
Their relationships with one another are not mechanically 
governed by society, but depend upon choice and voluntary 
conduct. Human society continues to exist because human beings 
decide to act as they do. This is not to deny that group life 
has a powerful constraining influence on individuals. Language 
itself restricts the choices people can make, for they cannot do 
what they cannot conceive. And the unequal distribution of 
resources means that some people have the capacity to exact from 
others the behaviour they desire. Society constrains in this 
sense because people constrain one another. Even so, at bottom 
the perpetuation of human society and its influence over people 
rests upon the consciously construed acts of its members. 
In conclusion, each of these models throws light on society. 
Each has strengths and weaknesses, illuminating some aspects of 
social life while leaving others in relative darkness. Thus, the 
organic-structure-functional model calls attention to the 
connections among social institutions and emphasizes the ways in 
which society constrains individual actions. The conflict- 
radical model stresses that social institutions are not as benign 
as they may appear, that society seethes with self-interest, 
power, and conflict. And finally, the social-behaviourist- 
social-psychological model introduces the concept of meaning, 
emphasizing that human conduct, above all else, is meaningful - 
that where people cannot find or create meaning as they interact 
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with one another, they are paralyzed. 
But each of these models also has limitations. In focusing 
on society as a network of constraining institutions, adherents 
to the organic-structure-functional model can easily lose sight 
of the fact that these institutions continue to exist only 
because people act. By treating social facts as things, these 
sociologists may forget that society is an abstraction, not a 
material thing or an acting organism. By focsuing on power and 
conflict, on the other hand, adherents of the conflict-radical 
model are tempted to interpret everything in these terms, 
forgetting that people often engage in cooperative activity. 
Conflict is an important part of social life, but it is not 
everything. For their part, adherents to the social- 
behaviourist-social-psychological model always stress that people 
act on the basis of their interpretations of reality, often 
credit individuals with more freedom than they actually have, 
thus ignoring the many ways in which behaviour is shaped and 
limited by social forces. 
5.3 An Approach by Anthony Giddens (1979,1984) 
Giddens' main concern is that of connecting a notion of 
human action with structural explanation in social analysis. The 
making of such a connection, he argues, demands the following: "a 
theory of the human agent, or of the subject; an account of the 
conditions and consequences of action; and an interpretation of 
'structures' as somehow embroiled in both of those conditions and 
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consequences" (Giddens, 1979, p. 49). 
In his own words, "the theory of structuration begins from 
an absence: the lack of a theory of action in the social 
sciences" (1979, p. 2). Action and structure, in his view, 
"normally appear in both the sociological and philosophical 
literature as antinomies" (1979, p. 49). To get around this 
problem of antinomy, Giddens noted that: 
The basic domain of study of the social sciences is neither 
the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of 
any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered 
across space and time. (1984, p. 2) 
In other words, Giddens is of the opinion that neither the 
subject (i. e. the human agent) nor the object (i. e. the society 
or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy. 
Each is constituted in and through social practices. Thus 
Giddens regards social practices as the crucial mediating moment 
between the voluntaristic and deterministic types of theory: the 
dualism of the individual and society, or subject and object. In 
place of this dualism, as a single conceptual move, the theory of 
structuration substitutes the central notion of the duality of 
structure. 
By duality of structure, he means the essential 
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices. 
Human social activities, according to Giddens, like some self- 
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reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they 
are not brought into being by social actors but continually 
recreated by them via the very means whereby they express 
themselves as actors. In and through their activities agents 
reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible. 
What is meant by structure? As conceptualized in 
structuration theory, "structure" is defined as "rules and 
resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems" but having only a "virtual existence". In other words, 
structure, as rules and resources, is both medium and outcome of 
the reproduction of social practices. Rules and resources are 
drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but are 
thereby also reconstituted through such interaction. Structure 
enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agent and 
social practices, and "exists" in the generating moments of this 
constitution. (1979, pp. 4-5) It is thus the mode in which the 
relation between moment and totality expresses itself in social 
reproduction. The importance of this relation of moment and 
totality for social theory cannot be exaggerated, since it 
involves a dialectic of presence and absence which ties the most 
minor or trivival forms of social action to the structural 
properties of the overall society. (1979, p. 71) 
It is fundamental to understand that, when Giddens speaks of 
structure as rules or resources, Giddens does not imply that we 
can profitably study either rules or resources as aggregates of 
isolated precepts or capabilities. Rules can only be grasped in 
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the context of the historical development of social totalities, 
as recursively implicated in practices. The point is important 
in a twofold sense. (a) There is not a singular relation 
between "an activity" and "a rule", as is sometimes suggested or 
implied by appeal to statements like "the rule governing the 
Queen's move" in chess. Activities or practices are brought into 
being in the context of overlapping and connected sets of rules, 
given coherence by their involvement in the constitution of 
social systems in the movement of time. (b) Rules cannot be 
exhaustively described or analysed in terms of their own content, 
as prescriptions, prohibitions, etc.: precisely because, apart 
from those circumstances where a relevant lexicon exists, rules 
and practices only exist in conjunction with one another. (1979, 
p. 65) 
The connections between structure, system, and structuration 
need to be clarified. Social systems are systems of social 
interaction; as such they involve the situated activities of 
human subjects. Understood in its broadest sense, social system 
refers to reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, 
organized as regular social practices. In other words, it refers 
to "the patterning of social relations across time-space, 
understood as reproduced practices", "a relationship in which 
changes in one or more component parts initiate changes in other 
component pars, and these changes, in turn, produce changes in 
the parts in which the original changes occurred". The smallest 
type of social system is dyadic. 
183 
Structuration refers to "the structuring of social relations 
across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure". 
(1984, p. 376) It also refers to conditions governing the 
continuity or transformation of structures, and therefore the 
reproduction of systems. To study the structuration of a social 
system is to study the ways in which that system, via the 
application of generative rules and resources, and in the context 
of unintended outcomes, is produced and reproduced in 
interaction. (1979, pp. 65-6) 
The theory of structuration begins from the concepts of the 
production and reproduction of society. That is to say, social 
interaction is regarded as everywhere and in all circumstances a 
contingent accomplishment of actors and as a skilled production 
which is sustained under conditions of the reflexive 
rationalization of action. The purposive component of human 
action has no counterpart in nature, since the teleology of human 
conduct is carried on within the context of a reflexive awareness 
of reasons that is intimately and integrally interwoven with 
"moral responsibility" for activity. 
What is meant by action? As it is used by Giddens, action 
or agency does not refer to a series of discrete acts combined 
together, but to a continuous flow of conduct. In other words, 
action involves a "stream of actual or contemplated causal 
interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of 
events-in-the-world".. (1979, p. 55) 
184 
According to Giddens, "action" includes all human behaviour 
when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective 
meaning to it. Action in this sense may be either overt or 
purely inward or subjective; it may consist of positive 
intervention in a situation, or of deliberately refraining from 
such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the situation. 
Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective 
meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), 
it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course. 
Based on this understanding, an actor is that which causes 
something to happen. In other words, to attribute or ascribe an 
act or action to someone or somthing is to call him or it the 
actor or the cause of what is brought about. 
What is the nature of action or agency? It has frequently 
been supposed that human agency can be defined only in terms of 
intentions. That is to say, for an item of behaviour to count as 
action, whoever perpetrates it must intend to do so, or else the 
behaviour in question is just a reactive response. 
However, agency, as far as Giddens is concerned, refers not 
to the intentions people have in doing things but to their 
capability of doing those things in the first place. In other 
words, agency concerns events of which an individual is the 
perpetrator, in the sense that the agent could, at any phase in a 
given sequence of conduct, have acted otherwise: either 
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positively in terms of attempted intervention in the process of 
"events in the world", or negatively in terms of forbearance. 
(1979, pp. 55-6) Whatever happened would not have happened if 
that individual had not intervened. In this understanding, an 
individual is the author of many things he does not intend to do, 
and may not want to bring about, but none the less do. 
Conversely, there may be circumstances in which the individual 
intends to achieve something, and does achieve it, although not 
directly through his agency. Take the example of the spilled 
coffee. Supposing an individual, "A, were a malicious spirit and 
played a practical joke by placing the cup on a saucer at such an 
angle that, when picked up, it would be very likely to spill. 
Individual B picks up the coffee, and it duly spills over. It 
would be right to say that what A did brought the incident about, 
or at least contributed to its coming about. But A did not spill 
the coffee; B did. Individual B, who did not intend to spill the 
coffee, spilled the coffee; individual A, who did intend that the 
coffee should be spilled, did not spill it. (1984, p. 9) 
Capability must not be identified with the ability of agents 
to make "decisions". If it refers to circumstances in which 
individuals consciously confront a range of potential 
alternatives of conduct, making some choice among those 
alternatives, "decision-making" is no more than a sub-category of 
capability in general. Capability, the possibility of "doing 
otherwise", is generally exercised as a routine, tacit feature of 
everyday behaviour. . 
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Agency also refers to "knowledgeability". As a leading 
theorem of the theory of structuration, Giddens advanced the 
following: every social actor knows a great deal about the 
conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a 
member. Failure to acknowledge this, in his view, is a basic 
insufficiency of functionalism and structuralism alike; and it is 
as true of Parsons's "action frame of reference" as it is of 
other varieties of functionalist thought. 
"Knowledgeability", as far as Giddens is concerned is 
"everything which actors know (believe) about the circumstances 
of their action and that of others, drawn upon in the production 
and reproduction of that action, including tacit as well as 
discursively available knowledge" (1984, p. 375). 
It is a basic mistake to equate the knowledgeability of 
agents with what is known "consciously", where this means what 
can be "held in mind" in a conscious way. 
There are various modes in which such knowledge may figure 
in practical social conduct. In the stratification model, i. e., 
an interpretation of the human agent or actor, Giddens (1984) 
stresses three "layers" of cognition or motivation: discursive 
consciousness, practical consciousness, and the unconscious. 
(Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1 A Schematic Presentation of 
The Stratification Model of Consciousness 
discursive consciousness 
practical consciouness 
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unconscious motives/cognition 
Discursive consciousness, as far as Giddens is concerned, is 
"what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, 
about social conditions, including especially the conditions of 
their own action; awareness which has a discursive form" (p. 
374). The distinctive feature of human action, as compared with 
the conduct of the animals, rests with the "accountability" of 
human action. The notion of accountability is a highly important 
one. It means that the accounts which actors are able to offer 
of their conduct are drawn upon the same stocks of knowledge 
which are drawn upon in the very production and reproduction of 
their action. The "giving of accounts" - or "supplying of 
reasons" - for action refers to the discursive capabilities and 
inclinations of actions, and by no means exhausts the connections 
between "stocks of knowledge" and action. What actors are "able 
to say" about their activities is by no means all that they 
"know" about them. 
Practical consciousness, on the other hand, is defined as 
"what actors know (believe) about social conditions, including 
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especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express 
discursively" (p. 375). The knowledgeability involved in 
practical consciousness conforms generally to the Wittgensteinian 
notion of "knowing a rule" or "knowing how to go on". 
The differences between practical consciousness, as tacit 
stocks of knowledge which actors draw upon in the constitution of 
social activity, and "discursive consciousness", involving 
knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of 
discourse are important. All actors have some degree of 
discursive penetration of the social systems to whose 
constitution they contribute. (1979, p. 5) 
The study of day-to-day life is integral to analysis of the 
reproduction of institutionalized practices. 
Routine, psychologically linked to the minimizing of 
unconscious sources of anxiety, is the predominant form of day- 
to-day activity. 
The term "day-to-day" encapsulates exactly the routinized 
character which social life has as it stretches across time- 
space. The repetitiveness of activities which are undertaken in 
like manner day after day is the material grounding of the 
recursive nature of social life. 
Routinization is defined as "the habitual, taken-for-granted 
character of the vast bulk of the activities of day-to-day social 
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life; the prevalence of familiar styles and forms of conduct, 
both supporting and supported by a sense of ontological 
security. " (1984, p. 376) Routinization is vital to the 
psychological mechanisms whereby a sense of trust or ontological 
security is sustained in the daily activities of social life. 
Carried primarily in practical consciousness, routine derives a 
wedge between the potentially explosive content of the 
unconscious and the reflexive monitoring of action which agents 
display. (1984, xxiii) 
The notion of practical consciousness is fundamental to 
structuration theory. It is that characteristic of the human 
agent or subject to which structuralism has been particularly 
blind. Only in phenomenology and ethnomethodology, within 
sociological traditions, do we find detailed and subtle 
treatments of the nature of practical consciousness. Between 
discursive and practical consciousness there is no bar; there are 
only the differences between what can be said and what is 
characteristically simply done. However, there are barriers, 
centred principally upon repression, between discursive 
consciousness and the unconscious. 
While competent actors can nearly always report discursively 
about their intentions in, and reasons for, acting as they do, 
they cannot necessarily do so of their motives. Unconscious 
motivation is a significant feature of human conduct. 
There seems no reason to deny that knowledge exists on the 
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level of the unconscious. Indeed, a case can be made to the 
effect that the mobilization of unconscious desire normally 
involves unconscious cognitive elements. (p. 375) 
The knowledgeability of human agents, in given historical 
circumstances, is always bounded by the unacknowledged conditions 
of action on "one side", and its unintended consequences on the 
other. Figure 5.2 portrays a "stratification model" of action. 
Figure 5.2 A Schematic Presentation of 
The Stratification Model of Action 
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What Giddens calls a stratification model of the acting self 
involves treating the reflexive monitoring, rationalization and 
motivation of action as embedded sets of processes. 
The reflexive monitoring of action refers to "the purposive, 
or intentional, character of human behaviour, considered within 
the flow of activity. of the agent; action is not a string of 
discrete acts, involving an aggregate of intentions, but a 
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continuous process" (1984, p. 376). Note that "intentionality" 
is emphasized in this statement. Such intentionality is a 
routine feature of human conduct, and does not imply that actors 
have definite goals consciously held in mind during the course of 
their activities. When lay actors inquire about each other's 
intentions in respect of particular acts, they abstract from a 
continuing process of routine monitoring whereby they relate 
their activity to one another and to the object-world. The 
distinctive feature about the reflexive monitoring of human 
actors is the accountability of human action. 
The reflexive monitoring of activity is a chronic feature of 
everyday action and involves the conduct not just of the 
individual but also of others. That is to say, actors not only 
monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect 
others to do the same for their own; they also routinely monitor 
aspects, social and physical, of the contexts in which they move. 
The reflexive monitoring of behaviour operates against the 
background of the rationalization of action - by which Giddens 
means "the capability competent actors have of 'keeping in touch' 
with the grounds of what they do, as they do it, such that if 
asked by others, they can supply reasons for their activities" 
(1984, p. 376). In another context, Giddens said: 
By the rationalization of action, I mean that actors - also 
routinely and for the most part without fuss - maintain a 
continuing "theoretical understanding" of the grounds of 
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their activity. As I have mentioned, having such an 
understanding should not be equated with the discursive 
giving of reasons for particular items of conduct, nor even 
with the capability of specifying such reasons discursively. 
However, it is expected by competent agents of others - and 
is the main criterion of competence applied in day-to-day 
conduct - that actors will usually be able to explain most 
of what they do, if asked. 
The rationalization of action, as a chronic feature of daily 
conduct, is a normal characteristic of the behaviour of competent 
social agents, and is indeed the main basis upon which their 
"competence" is adjudged by others. This does not mean that 
reasons can be linked as directly with norms or conventions as 
some philosophers have claimed or implied. Reasons do not just 
include the citing of or the appeal to norms: to suppose that 
such is the case actually draws the philosophy of action back 
towards the Parsonian action frame of reference, since conduct 
then becomes driven by "internalized" normative imperatives. 
(1979, p. 57) 
The reasons actors supply discursively for their conduct in 
the course of practical queries, in the context of daily social 
life, stand in a relation of some tension to the rationalization 
of action as actually embodied within the stream of conduct of 
the agent. The least interesting or consequential aspect of this 
concerns the possibilities of deliberate dissimulation that 
exist: where an actor claims to have acted for reasons that he 
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was not in fact guided by. More important are the grey areas of 
practical consciousness that exist in the relation between the 
rationalization of action and actor's stocks of knowledge; and 
between the rationalization of action and the unconscious. The 
stocks of knowledge, in Schutz's terms, or what Giddens calls the 
mutual knowledge employed by actors in the production of social 
encounters, are not usually known to those actors in an 
explicitly codified form; the practical character of such 
knowledge conforms to the Wittgensteinian formulation of knowing 
a rule. The accounts actors are able to provide of their reasons 
are bounded, or subject to various degrees of possible 
articulation, in respect of tacitly employed mutual knowledge. 
The giving of reasons in day-to-day activity, which is closely 
associated with the moral accountability of action, is inevitably 
caught up in, and expressive of, the demands and the conflicts 
entailed within social encounters. But the articulation of 
accounts as reasons is also influenced by unconscious elements of 
motivation. This involves possibilities of rationalization in 
the Freudian sense, as the dislocating effects of the unconscious 
upon conscious processes of rational accounting. (1979, pp. 57- 
8) 
Reflexive monitoring and rationalization of action have to 
be distinguished from motivation. If reasons refer to the 
grounds of action, motives refer to the wants which prompt it. 
However, motivation is not as directly bound up with the 
continuity of action as are its reflexive monitoring or 
rationalization. Motivation refers to potential for action 
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rather than to the mode in which action is chronically carried 
on by the agent. Motives tend to have a direct purchase on 
action only in relatively unusual circumstances, situations which 
in some way break with the routine. For the most part motives 
supply overall plans or programmes within which a range of 
conduct is enacted. Much of our day-to-day conduct is not 
directly motivated. 
Motivational components of action, which Giddens takes to 
refer to the organization of an actor's wants, straddle conscious 
and unconscious aspects of cognition and emotion. The whole 
weight of psychoanalytic theory suggests that motivation has an 
internal hierarchy of its own. Giddens argues that a conception 
of the unconscious is essential to social theory, even if the 
resultant schema he develops departs in some ways from classical 
Freudian views. But the unconscious, of course, can only be 
explored in relation to the conscious: to the reflexive 
monitoring and rationalization of conduct, grounded in practical 
consciousness. (1979, p. 58) 
A theory of motivation is crucial because it supplies the 
conceptual links between the rationalization of action and the 
framework of convention as embodied in institutions. But a 
theory of motivation also has to relate to the unacknowledged 
conditions of action: in respect of unconscious motives, 
operating or "outside" the range of the self-understanding of the 
agent. The unconscious comprises only one set of such 
conditions, which have to be connected to those represented on 
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the other side of the diagram: the unintended consequences of 
action. (1979, p. 59) 
It is the specifically reflexive form of the 
knowledgeability of human agents that is most deeply involved 
in 
the recursive ordering of social practices. Continuity of 
practices presumes reflexivity, but reflexivity in turn is 
possible only because of the continuity of practices that makes 
them distinctively "the same" across space and time. 
"Reflexivity" hence should be understood not merely as "self- 
consciousness" but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow 
of social life. To be a human being is to be a purposive agent, 
who both has reasons for his or her activities and is able, if 
asked, to elaborate discursively upon those reasons (inclunding 
lying about them). But terms such as "purpose" or "intention", 
"reason", "motive" and so on have to be treated with caution, 
since their usage in the philosophical literature has very often 
been associated with a hermeneutical voluntarism, and because 
they extricate human action from the contextuality of time-space. 
Human action occurs as a duree, a continuous flow of conduct, as 
does cognition. Purposive action is not composed of an aggregate 
or series of separate intentions, reasons and motives. Thus it 
is useful to speak of reflexivity as grounded in the continuous 
monitoring of action which human beings display and expect others 
to display. The reflexive monitoring of action depends upon 
rationalization, understood here as a process rather than a state 
and as inherently involved in the competence of agents. An 
ontology of time-space as constitutive of social practices is 
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basic to the conception of structuration, which begins from 
temporality and thus, in one sense, "history". 
Let us now give more concrete form to the duality of 
structure in interaction, following on from what has been 
outlined above. The dimensions of the duality of structure are 
portrayed in Figure 5.3. Human actors are not only able to 
monitor their activities and those of others in the regularity of 
day-to-day conduct; they are also able to "monitor that 
monitoring" in discursive consciousness. 
Figure 5.3 A Schematic Presentation of the 
Dimensions of the Duality of Structure 
structure signification E'- -- jdomination(- --3i gitimation 
(modality) interpretative facility nm 
scheme 
interaction com%iunicationE --- -)pow'r ý- --- -ýsailction 
All processes of the structuration (production and 
reproduction) of systems of social interaction involve three 
elements: the communication of meaning, the exercise of power, 
and the evaluative judgement of conduct. The three terms on the 
top line refer to analytically distinguishable aspects of 
structure. Structure as signification involves semantic rules; 
as domination, unequally distributed resources; and as 
legitimation, moral or evaluative rules. Rules and resources are 
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properties of communities or collectivities rather than of 
actors. Hence the terms interpretative scheme, facility and norm 
are used to refer to the knowledge and capabilities which actors 
are able to call upon in the production of interaction. 
What Giddens calls here the "modalities" of structuration 
represent the central dimensions of the duality of structure in 
the constitution of interaction. (1979, p. 81) They serve to 
clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in 
interaction, relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to 
structural features. 
The modalities of structuration are drawn upon by actors in 
the production of interaction, but at the same time are the media 
of the reproduction of the structural components of systems of 
interaction. 
"Interpretative schemes" are the modes of typification 
incorporated within actors' stocks of knowledge, applied 
reflexively in the sustaining of communication. The stocks of 
knowledge which actors draw upon in the production and 
reproduction of interaction are the same as those whereby they 
are able to make accounts, offer reasons, etc. (1984, p. 29) 
The normative constitution of interaction may be treated as 
the actualization of rights and the enactment of obligations. 
(1979, p. 86) 
198 
The distinction between interpretative schemes, as 
concerning the communication of meaning, and norms, as concerning 
the sanctioning of conduct, can be clarified by considering 
Winch's discussion of rule-following in his Idea of a Social 
Science. According to Winch, "rule-following" conduct can be 
identified with "meaningful action". The criterion of behaviour 
which is rule-following is to be found in whether one can ask of 
that behaviour if there is a "right" and "wrong" way of doing it. 
Now this conflates two senses of rule-following or, rather, two 
aspects of rules that are implicated in the production of social 
practices; that relating to the constitution of meaning, and that 
relating to sanctions involved in social conduct. There are 
right and wrong ways of using words in a language, a matter which 
concerns those aspects of rules involved in the constitution of 
meaning; and there are right and wrong modes of conduct in 
respect of the normative sanctions implicated in interaction. 
Although it is important to separate them out conceptually, these 
two senses of right and wrong always intersect in the actual 
constitution of social practices. Thus "correct" language use is 
always sanctioned; while the relevance of sanctions to conduct 
other than speech is inevitably connected with the identification 
of that conduct on the plane of meaning. (1979, p. 82) 
Rules have two aspects to them, and it is essential to 
distinguish these conceptually. Rules relate on the one hand to 
the constitution of meaning, and on the other to the sanctioning 
of modes of social conduct. 
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It is not enough just to stress the need in social theory to 
relate the constitution and communication of meaning to normative 
sanctions; each of these has in turn to be linked to power 
transactions. This is so in the twofold sense indicated by the 
term duality of structure. Power is expressed in the 
capabilities of actors to make certain "accounts count" and to 
enact or resist sanctioning processes; but these capabilities 
draw upon modes of domination structured into social systems. 
(1979, p. 83) 
The idea of "accountability" in everday English gives cogent 
expression to the intersection of interpretative schemes and 
norms. To be "accountable for one's activities is both to 
explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative 
grounds whereby they may be "justified". Normative components of 
interaction always centre upon relations between the rights and 
obligations "expected" of those participating in a range of 
interaction contexts. Formal codes of conduct, as, for example, 
those enshrined in law, usually express some sort of claimed 
symmetry between the rights and obligations, the one being the 
justification of the other. But no such symmetry necessarily 
exists in practice, a phenomenon which it is important to 
emphasize, since both the "normative functionalism" of Parsons 
and the "structuralist Marxism" of Althusser exaggerates the 
degree to which normative obligations are "internalized" by 
members of societies. Neither standpoint incorporates a theory 
of action which recognizes human beings as knowledgeable agents, 
reflexively monitoring the flow of interaction with one another. 
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When social systems are conceived of primarily from the point of 
view of the "social object", the emphasis comes to be placed upon 
the pervasive influence of a normatively co-ordinated legitimate 
order as an overall determinant or "programmer" of social 
conduct. Such a perspective masks the fact that the normative 
elements of social systems are contingent claims which have to be 
sustained and "made to count" through effective mobilization of 
sanctions in the contexts of actual encounters. Normative 
sanctions express structural asymmetries of domination, and the 
relations of those nominally subject to them may be of various 
sorts other than expressions of the commitments those norms 
supposedly engender. (1984, p. 30) 
Among the many interpretations of power in social and 
political theory, two main perspectives appear. One is that 
power is best conceptualised as the capability of an actor to 
achieve his or her will, even at the expense of that of others 
who might resist him - the sort of definition employed by Weber 
among many other authors. The second is that power should be 
seen as a property of the collectivity: Parson's concept of 
power, for instance, belongs to this latter category. Giddens 
claims, however, that neither of these modes of conceiving power 
is appropriate in isolation; and that we should connect them 
together as features of the duality of structure. He treats 
power not as a state of affairs, but a capability, and resources 
as the "bases" or "vehicles" of power, comprising structures of 
domination, drawn upon by parties to interaction and reproduced 
through the duality of structure. Power is generated by definite 
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forms of domination in a parallel way to the involvement of rules 
with social practices: and, indeed, as an integral element or 
aspect of those practices. (Giddens, 1979, p. 69) 
Domination depends upon the mobilization of two 
distinguishable types of resources. Allocative resources refer 
to capabilities - or, more accurately, to forms of transformative 
capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material 
phenomena. Authoritative resources refer to types of 
transformative capacity generating command over persons or 
actors. 
What is the logical connection between action and power? 
Although the ramifications of the issue are complex, the basic 
relation involved can easily be pointed to. To be able to "act 
otherwise" means being able to intervene in the world, or to 
refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a 
specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be 
an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of 
daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of 
influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the 
capability of the individual to "make a difference" to a pre- 
existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases 
to be such if he or she loses the capability to "make a 
difference", that is, to exercise some sort of power. (1984, p. 
14) 
"Institutional analysis" refers to "social analysis which 
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places in suspension the skills and awareness of actors, treating 
institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources" 
(1984, p. 375). "Analysis of strategic conduct" refers to 
"social analysis which places in suspension institutions as 
socially reproduced, concentrated upon how actors reflexively 
monitor what they do: how actors draw upon rules and resources in 
the constitution of interaction" (1984, p. 373). 
5.4 Implications for Social Work 
After having defined profession, value, and action, we are 
now prepared to revise our definition of social work. 
Social work is a developing profession within the social 
welfare institution. In social work practice, the social 
worker draws upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system 
of values, to produce and reproduce practice principles 
which monitor his action in an effort to bring about 
effective changes either in the person, or in society, or in 
both. 
Several of the phrases mentioned in the definition need 
elaboration. Firstly, social work is a developing profession 
within the social welfare institution. What is a profession? 
What does it take to become a profession? By adopting a traits 
approach to the study of professions, the researcher argues that 
to become a full profession, social work has to acquire a status 
and, along with it, the power to deliver services and to control 
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its work in the field of social welfare. Moreover, social work 
has to have in possession (1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body 
of knowledge, (3) a code of ethics, and (4) a system of values. 
Secondly, in social work practice, the social worker draws 
upon a body of knowledge. So far as Giddens is concerned, action 
does not depend on the social worker's intentionality. it 
depends on his capability and knowledgeability. 
The social worker's intentionality refers to the intentions 
he has in actions. This is what is often referred to as 
purposive action. However, there are possibilities that one may 
do things one does not intend to do and may bring about changes 
one does not intend to bring about. Conversely, one may intend 
to achieve something but fails in his effort or one may achieve 
what he intends to achieve although not through his effort. Both 
of these situations are unavoidable. This may explain why 
Giddens insists that social interaction does not depend on one's 
intentions. But intentionality is crucial in professional 
action. In the theory of structuration, intentionality is a 
characteristic of action which is reflexively monitored. 
The social worker's capability refers to the fact that he 
could, at any phase in the process, have acted otherwise. One's 
ability to act otherwise is not unfamiliar to social work. In 
the case of social work, it is often referred to as one's ability 
to be self-determining. 
204 
The social worker's knowledgeability refers to everything he 
knows or believes about the persons who are involved in the 
interaction and the environment in which it takes place. In 
other words, his body of knowledge includes all categories of 
beliefs which Rokeach have identified: descriptive beliefs, 
evaluative beliefs, and presecriptive beliefs. It includes 
knowledge which he knows and is able to explain as well as 
knowledge which he knows but is unable to explain. In the case 
of social work, it includes knowledge obtained during training 
and in one's life experience. Furthermore, knowledge obtained 
during training includes theory, method, skills, values, code of 
ethics, resources, and purposes. 
It should be noted that the body of knowledge employed by 
the actor in the production of social interaction are not usually 
known to the actor in an explicitly codified form. The accounts 
the actor is able to provide of his reasons are bounded, or 
subject to various degrees of possible articulation, in respect 
of tacitly employed mutual knowledge. The giving of reasons of 
day-to-day activity, which is closely associated with the moral 
accountability of action, is inevitably caught up in, and 
expressive of, the demands and the conflicts entailed within 
social encounters. 
What is action? According to Giddens, action does not refer 
to a series of discrete acts combined together, but to a 
continuous flow of conduct. Moreover, action includes all forms 
of human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual 
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attaches a subjective meaning to it. Action in this sense may be 
either overt or purely inward or subjective; it may consist of 
positive intervention in a situation, or of deliberate refraining 
from such intervention, or passively acquiescing in the 
situation. Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the 
subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual, it 
takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented 
in its course. 
Thirdly, the practice of social work involves the production 
of rules and resources, i. e., practice principles, during the 
process. Based on the theory of structuration, all social 
interactions are affected by these three elements: (1) the 
communication of meaning, (2) the exercise of power, and (3) the 
evaluative judgment of conduct. These three elements, or 
modalities, are also known resepctively as (1) the interpretative 
scheme, (2) the facility, and (3) the norm. 
In the production and reproduction of social interaction, 
the social worker draws upon his body of knowledge, which 
includes all that he knows about the situation in which the 
social interaction is taking place, to produce rules and 
resources to regulate the production and reproduction of social 
interaction. Rules refer to (1) what is to be done and how it is 
to be done and (2) what justifies both of these. In other words, 
rules depend on knowledge which tells us what is to be done and 
how it is to be done and code of ethics which gives us the 
justification for our activities. Resources, on the other hand, 
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refer to facility or authority, including (1) command over 
persons and (2) command over resources. 
The social worker's ability to communicate the meaning of 
his action depends very much on his stocks of knowledge, 
including empirical knowledge as well as practice wisdom in the 
field of social work. The evaluative judgment of his conduct, on 
the other hand, depends very much on his capability in the 
actualization of rights and the enactment of obligations, i. e., 
to accomplish his task and to abide by the code of ethics issued 
by the profession. 
It is not enough just to stress the need in social work 
practice to relate the communication of meaning to normative 
sanctions; each of these has in turn to be linked to the exercise 
of power. Power is expressed in the capabilities of actors to 
make certain "accounts count" and to enact or resist sanctioning 
processes; but these capabilities draw upon modes of domination 
structured into social systems. 
To be accountable for one's activities is both to explicate 
the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby 
they may be justified. 
Domination depends upon the mobilization of two 
distinguishable types of resources. Allocative resources refer 
to capabilities - or, -more accurately, to forms of transformative 
capacity - generating command over objects, goods or material 
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phenomena. Authroitative resources refer to types of 
transformative capacity generating command over persons or 
actors. 
In the case of social work, allocative resources refer to 
the social worker's capability to mobilize the resources of his 
agency and that of the society to help the client in meeting his 
needs. Authoritative resources refer to the social worker's 
capability to mobilize the client, significant others in his 
life, and members of the society to help the client in tackling 
his problems. 
It is important to note that according to the theory of 
structuration, these rules and resources do not exist before the 
interaction. They are produced during the interaction and 
reproduced in the process. 
Fourthly, in social work practice, the production of rules 
and resources is screened by a system of values. This is not 
mentioned in the theory of structuration. However, what affects 
the choice of alternatives? It is this researcher's contention 
that it is the social worker's values. In social interaction, 
the social worker draws upon his stock of knowledge to formulate 
questions on what is to be done, how it is to be done, what human 
resources are to be drawn upon to make it happen, what material 
resources are to be drawn upon to make it happen. The social 
worker also draws upon his stock of knowledge to formulate 
possible solutions. The question this researcher has in mind is: 
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what enables the social worker to come up with a decision on 
which solution to choose? It is the researcher's contention that 
the social worker's value system screens through all these 
alternatives to help him to come to a decision. 
In this understanding, values as they are taught in training 
form part of the social worker's body of knowledge. They have no 
bearing on his action. However, when the social worker draws 
upon this stock of knowledge in the process of interaction to 
produce rules and resources, values are put into operation to 
help in the screening process. It is then and only then that 
values serves as a guide to action. They guide the social worker 
in the selection among alternatives. 
In our application of the theory of structuration, we 
restrict ourselves to an analysis of strategic conduct which 
refers to "social analysis which places in suspension 
institutions as socially reproduced, concentrated upon how actors 
reflexively monitor what they do: how actors draw upon rules and 
resources in the constitution of interaction". 
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Section Three 
Methodology and Findings 
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Chapter Six 
Research Methodology 
6.1 Introduction 
To reiterate, the study attempts to accomplish two tasks: 
(1) to identify a system of social work values which is conceived 
as preferable by social workers in Hong Kong, and (2) to explore 
the relationship between values and action in social work 
practice. 
The study is divided into three parts. The first two parts 
relate to the first objective and the third part relates to the 
second. In the first part of this study which involves an 
extensive literature search, a cluster of social work values is 
identified and the meaning of each value is briefly defined. In 
the second part of this study which involves a value survey, an 
attempt is made to transform this cluster of values into a value 
system. The last part involves a second survey. It explores the 
relationship between values and action. 
6.2 Identification of Values 
To identify social work values which are conceived as 
preferable, one has to distinguish between what are, and what 
should be included as social work values. In social work 
literature one often finds that the author begins by specifying a 
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value or a group of values and then makes an attempt to justify 
his inclusion of such value or values. In other words, the 
author specifies what social work values should be. Much less 
frequently, social workers also attempt to find out what social 
work values are through the use of empirical studies. 
This researcher finds the use of both methods helpful in the 
identification of social work values. To come up with a list of 
values which should be included as social work values, this 
researcher begins by tracing the development of the profession 
since its emergence in the mid-nineteenth century. Through this 
historical review, the researcher is able to identify four 
important dimensions in social work practice, including: 
1. the moral dimension, 
2. the organizational dimension, 
3. the psychological dimension, and 
4. the political dimension. 
In each dimension, one type of values seems to predominate: 
moral values in the moral dimension of social work, competence 
values in the organizational dimension, personal values in the 
psychological dimension, and social values in the political 
dimension. These four groups of values fit in tightly with the 
categorizations in our definition of values, thus providing us 
with an excellent framework upon which social work values can be 
identified. 
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The next step is to look for these values. In social work 
literature, social work values often appear as beliefs: beliefs 
about conceptions of people, preferred outcomes for people, and 
preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. Values 
which can satisfy the criteria specified in our definition are 
limited to a very small number, including, for instance, 
authenticity, empathy, and respect. Hence, to look for these 
values, the researcher has to conduct an extensive literature 
search the scope of which extends far beyond social work. For 
moral values, the researcher looks into the literature on 
Christian virtues as well as Confucian virtues since both 
Christianity and Confucianism have exerted great influence on 
social workers in Hong Kong. As far as competence values are 
concerned, the researcher turns to the literature on leadership 
and the professional bureaucrat. At a time when accountability 
is a major issue in social work, it is hard to ignore the 
qualities demanded of a leader or a professional-bureaucrat. For 
personal values, the researcher finds the humanistic psychology 
of Abraham Maslow extremely helpful. His work on the hierarchy 
of human needs is familiar to most social workers. Finally, for 
social values, the researcher re-examines the literature on 
ideologies of social welfare and social work. 
Through this extensive literature search, a total of twenty- 
four values is finally chosen. There are two major reasons for 
deciding on this number. The first major reason may be explained 
in terms of practicality. Rokeach (1973) came up with a total of 
thirty-six values in his study of values. To this researcher, 
213 
thirty-six is a large number. Even if the values are divided 
into two groups, there remains eighteen in each group. It may be 
manageable if all that is required of the respondents is to rank 
these values as in the Value Survey. However, there is more to 
be done in the Value-Action Relationship Survey. With twelve 
values in each group, there is already a need for twelve case 
situations. If the number in each group is increased to 
eighteen, the number of case situations will have to be increased 
to thirty. This will increase, to a significant extent, the 
amount of work that is required in data collection and analysis. 
The second major reason may be explained in terms of 
reliability. With as many as eighteen values in each group, our 
respondents will experience great difficulty in ranking them 
accurately. In the opinion of this researcher, twelve is a more 
acceptable number. After all, even with twelve values in each 
group, the time it takes to complete the questionnaire is about 
an hour. A questionnaire which requires a longer period to 
complete will probably discourage our respondents from completing 
it in the first place. This will have an ill effect on the 
response rate. 
After the values of social work have been identified, each 
is defined according to the category it has been chosen to 
represent. This, undoubtedly, will create some discomfort among 
the respondents. Yet this can hardly be avoided since many of 
these values can be interpreted in more than one way. 
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Based on the values so identified, two lists of values are 
produced, one on terminal values or end-states of existence, and 
the other on instrumental values or modes of conduct. Each of 
these lists consists of 12 values and they are arranged 
alphabetically. (See Appendix E) 
6.3 The Surveys 
In the chapter on values, it was concluded that Rokeach's 
approach to the study of values should be adopted for use in this 
study. In his view, the value of anything can be appraised. 
Appraisal is a type of ordering which is based on the 
magnitude of properties possessed by things. One can, for 
instance, order people on the basis of height, weight, strength, 
or speed. The main difference is that in an appraisal, the 
criterion for ordering is based on an evaluative property, not an 
evaluatively neutral one. A property can be evaluative or non- 
evaluative. It is evaluative if it is selected on the basis of a 
feature wanted in the person rather than simply found in him, 
whether wanted or not. Thus when we order ordinary people 
according to the speed at which they can run, speed is a non- 
evaluative property. But when we order runners in this way, 
speed becomes a wanted feature in the person and is, therefore, 
an evaluative property. The ordering of runners according to the 
speed they can run is an appraisal. The person who can run 
faster than another is a better runner. 
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There are two important types of appraisals: ranking and 
grading. Teachers, for example, appraise their students by 
ranking them, grading them, or both. 
In grading, the entries are ordered by reference to pre- 
existing places arranged in a hierarchy. These places may be 
named A, B, C, D, and E, for instance. Hence, at least 
conceptually, one can grade a single student. A student's grade 
establishes his place in a fixed hierarchy, not in one determined 
by the performances of his current competitors. 
Ranking, on the other hand, consists in assigning to each of 
a given set of students a place in a hierarchical list of places. 
These places may be named first, second, third, fourth, and 
onwards. As can be seen, each place has an identifiable position 
within the list. The assigning of a student to a place in the 
list is carried out on the basis of the greater or lesser extent 
to which the student can satisfy a given set of criteria. Each 
ranking is, therefore, a self-contained competition in which all 
the students are compared with one another in respect of that set 
of criteria, and a place is then assigned to each of the 
students. Since the competition is self-contained, the place 
assigned to a student in one competition carries no implication 
about how that student would fare in another competition using 
the same criteria but ranking different students. Each student 
can be ranked, i. e., assigned a place in the list, only as part 
of a complete allocation of places to all students. The position 
assigned to each depends on the position assigned to every other. 
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It makes no sense to rank a single student. If Smith ranked 
tenth in a course in 1988, nothing follows about what his rank 
would be in the same course and for the same work in 1989. But 
if he had aB grade in 1988, then he should also get aB grade 
for the same work in 1989. Moreover, if Jones had an A grade in 
that same course in 1989, then this implies that if Smith were in 
his class in 1989, Smith would be ranked below him. 
The measuring instrument used in this survey is a 
questionnaire (see Appendix E) which consists of two lists each 
of which contains twelve values. Each of these values is 
followed by a short statement describing the meaning of this 
value. 
The Value-Action Relationship Survey is an attempt to 
substantiate the claim that values serve as a guide to action in 
social work practice. To accomplish this task, a total of twelve 
case situations have been prepared. Since social workers in most 
situations will act almost routinely, without weighting their 
value preferences, these case situations have been carefully 
selected so that each is related to an issue which normally would 
arouse a conflict of values in the social worker. A number of 
publications on ethical dilemmas in social work practice have 
been referred to while formulating these case situations. (See, 
for example, Loewenberg and Dolgoff, 1988; Reamer, 1982; and 
Rhodes, 1986) 
The questionnaire for the two surveys begins with a letter 
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(Appendix B) and the rest is divided into three sections. In the 
letter, the purpose of the study is explained and respondents are 
requested to assist by completing the questionnaire. The first 
section of this questionnaire begins with a short introduction on 
how this section is to be completed. This is followed by a 
sample and twelve case situations. Each case situation is 
carefully worded in order to highlight the conflict of values. 
After the presentation of each case situation, the respondent is 
asked to respond to a short statement relating to the worker's 
action. The respondent is requested to respond by indicating his 
agreement or disagreement with the action specified in the 
statement. He is then asked to rank six given values in order of 
importance in helping him arrive at the decision. 
Twenty-four values have been identified: twelve end-states 
of existence and twelve modes of conduct. Each of these groups 
is further subdivided into four subgroups. When the subgroups of 
end-states of existence are combined in twos, we have a total of 
six combinations and, therefore, we need a total of six case 
situations, one for each of these combinations. Similarly, when 
the subgroups of modes of conduct are combined in twos, we have 
another six combinations and, therefore, another six case 
situations. This helps to explains our decision to have twelve 
values in each list and twelve case situations for the Value- 
Action Relationship Survey. 
It is important to point out that the division of social 
values, personal values, competence values, and moral values into 
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subgroups is only arbitrary. This is particularly so in the case 
of moral values which have been divided into moral virtues and 
moral principles. 
The second section of the questionnaire consists of two 
lists of values. The first includes twelve end-states of 
existence which are arranged alphabetically and each value is 
followed with a short definition. The second list includes 
twelve modes of conduct. Again, these values are arranged 
alphabetically and each value is followed with a short 
definition. Respondents are asked to rank values in each of 
these lists separately in order of preference, in the capacity of 
social workers. 
These two lists are placed after the twelve case situations 
purposely so that the rank ordering of values in case situations 
will not be affected by the rank ordering of values when case 
situations are not specified. 
Finally, in the last section of the questionnaire, 
respondents are asked to provide information about themselves. 
These personal particulars are identical with those requested of 
them in The Social Welfare Manpower Planning System: Report No. 1 
(1988). This is done on purpose because it allows for comparison 
and it is also felt that the respondents are more willing to 
comply with our request for these personal particulars. 
After completing the first draft of the questionnaire, a 
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pilot study was launched in November, 1988. Questionnaires were 
distributed to staff members of the Department of Social Work of 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Based on the returned 
questionnaires, minor amendments were made. The actual study was 
launched in February, 1989. 
The use of mailed questionnaire is chosen of ter having 
consulted the Social Welfare Department and the Hong Kong Social 
Workers' Association. 
6.4 The Population 
A major purpose of the research is to identify a system of 
values which is conceived to be preferable among social workers. 
Hence, it is appropriate that the research population covers all 
practitioners in the field of social work. 
Who are the social work practitioners? In a recent report 
published by the Joint Committee on Social Welfare Manpower 
Planning System Social Welfare Department of the Hong Kong 
Government and the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (1988), 
social work personnel who were engaged in posts, which required 
social work training, in the Social Welfare Department, in 
voluntary agencies, and in local social work training institutes 
were included as social work practitioners. These same criteria 
are used in this research. 
Based on the same report, it was found that the total number 
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of social welfare organizations in Hong Kong (as at 30th 
September, 1987) was 252 and the total number of social work 
practitioners was approximately 3,500. 
Among these social welfare organizations, 17 did not respond 
to the survey, but it was ascertained that they employed few 
social workers on their staff. Information obtained from the 
remaining 235 revealed that 94 of them had no social workers on 
their staff, 92 had a social work staff of 1 and 10,18 had a 
staff of 11 to 20,7 had a staff of 21 to 30, and the rest, 24 of 
them, *had a staff of more than 30. 
The following findings are based on information supplied by 
the respondents. 
Sex. Out of a total of 3,275 social workers, 1,908 (58.3%) were 
female. 
Age. 2,105 (64.3%) were found to be below the age of 35. 
Length of Service in Social Work. 1,234 (37.7%) were found to 
have worked for less than five years; 941 (28.7%) were found to 
have worked between five to ten years; 900 (27.5%) were found to 
have worked between ten to twenty years; and 200 (6.1%) were 
found to have worked for over twenty years. 
Highest Qualification. Attained. 1,361 (41.6%) were found to be 
degree-trained; 1,159 (35.4%) were found to be non-degree 
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trained; and 755 (23.0%) were found to be untrained. 
Rank of Position Occupied. 1,576 (48.1%) were found to be in the 
officer rank, i. e., the career ladder for graduate social 
workers; 1,585 (48.4%) were found to be in the rank of 
assistants, i. e., the career ladder for diploma holders; and 114 
(3.5%) were found to be involved in education and training. 
Nature of Job. The nature of job refers to the social worker's 
primary functions. Out of a total of 3,275 , 2,360 (72.1%) were 
found to be working in the frontline; 496 (15.1%) were in 
supervisory positions; 288 (8.8%) were in administrative 
positions; and 131 (4.0%) were in education and training. 
Area of Service. 966 (29.5%) were found to be involved in 
working with young people; 706 (21.6%) were found to be working 
with families; 334 (10.2%) were found to be working with 
offenders and drug abusers; 324 (9.9%) were found to be engaged 
in community development. The rest were found to be engaged in 
various types of work. 
6.5 The Sample 
Since the value surveys pertain to social work values, all 
members of the social work profession are included in the survey. 
To obtain a sampling frame, letters were sent to agencies asking 
them for the names of their social work staff. (See Appendix A) 
Most agencies complied with the request. Others who refused 
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chose to provide us with codes instead of names. More than 3,000 
names (or codes) were obtained out of a total of approximately 
3,500. 
With this sampling frame, sampling procedures proved to be 
simple. After assigning a number to each of the social workers, 
a sample of 360 was chosen with the help of random numbers 
obtained from the table of random numbers. Unfortunately, among 
these 360, only 195 completed and returned the questionnaire. 
This represents a response rate of slightly above 50 percent. 
The major reason for this low response rate is the high staff 
turnover rate among social workers in Hong Kong. In view of 
political uncertainty, a significant portion of our social 
workers are leaving each day either to Canada or to Australia. 
This not only results in social workers leaving the colony, but 
it also results in social workers changing jobs from one agency 
to another. Moreover, in view of the fact that a significant 
percentage of the social workers are known by codes only, the 
hope of locating who they are and where they are prove to be 
extremely difficult. A second reason for this low response rate 
is the tendency of social workers to shy away from research of 
this nature. It requires them to give a lot of thinking about 
their own values which they do not usually do under normal 
circumstances. 
Nevertheless, this sample of 195 is quite representative of 
the study population. A comparison of the population and the 
study sample revealed little significant difference between these 
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two groups. The only exception is the rank of position occupied 
which showed a difference significant at . 043 level. 
(Tables 6.1 
to 6.12) To facilitate comparison, many of the categories in the 
personal attributes are combined. Sex is divided into "Male" and 
"Female"; age, "35-" and "35+"; length of service, "10-" and 
"10+""; highest qualification attained, "Degree-trained" and "Non- 
degree or Untrained"; rank of position occupied, "Officer" and 
"Assistant"; nature of job, "Frontline" and "Supervisory"; and 
finally, area of service, "Rehabilitation", "Family", and 
"Community and Youth". (Figure 6.1) 
Figure 6.1 A Schematic Presentation of Breakdown of 
Personal Attributes 
Personal Attributes Categories 
Sex Male Female 
Age 35- 35+ 
Length of Service in 10- 10+ 
Social Welfare 
Highest Qualification Degree-trained Non-degree or 
Attained Untrained 
Rank of Position Officer Assistant 
Occupied 
Nature of Job Frontline Supervisory 
Area of Service Rehabilitation Family 
Community and Youth 
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Table 6.1 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Sex 
Population Sample 
No. % No. % 
Male 1,367 41.7 90 46.2 
Female 1,908 58.3 105 53.8 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
1,591 1 . 207 
Table 6.2 A Comparison of Population and Sample by Age 
Population Sample 
No. % No. % 
20-34 2,105 64.3 130 66.7 
35 & above 1,170 35.7 65 33.3 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
. 476 1 . 490 
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Table 6.3 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Length of Service 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
5 yrs or below 1,234 37.7 81 41.5 
5- 10 yrs 941 28.7 47 24.1 
10 - 15 yrs 554 16.9 35 17.9 
15 - 20 yrs 346 10.6 17 8.7 
over 20 yrs 200 6.1 14 7.2 
Other 1 0.5 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 99.9 
Table 6.4 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Length of Service (Combined Categories) 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 96 
Less than 10 yrs 2,175 66.4 128 66.0 
Over 10 yrs 1,100 33.6 66 34.0 
Total 3,275 100.0 194 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
. 015 1 . 901 
226 
Table 6.5 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Highest Qualification Attained 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
Degree-trained 1,361 41.6 86 44.1 
Non-degree- 1,159 35.4 80 41.0 
trained 
Untrained 755 23.0 26 13.3 
Other 3 1.5 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 99.9 
Table 6.6 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Highest Qualification Attained (Combined 
Categories) 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
Degree-trained 1,361 41.6 86 44.8 
Non-degree or 1,914 58.4 106 55.2 
Untrained 
Total 3,275 100.0 192 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
. 805 1 . 370 
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Table 6.7 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Rank of Position Occupied 
Population Sample 
No. No. 
SWO & above 368 11.2 22 11.3 
ASWO 1,208 36.9 76 39.0 
SSWA & SWA 1,585 48.4 86 44.1 
Lecturer & 114 3.5 10 5.1 
Field Instructor 
Other 1 0.5 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 100.0 
Table 6.8 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Rank of Position Occupied (Combined Categories) 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
ASWO & above 1,690 51.6 108 55.7 
SSWA & SWA 1,585 48.4 86 44.3 
Total 3,275 100.0 194 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
4.106 1 . 043 
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Table 6.9 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Nature of Job 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
Frontline 2,360 72.1 144 73.8 
Supervisory 496 15.1 25 12.8 
Administration 288 8.8 12 6.2 
Training 131 4.0 12 6.2 
Other 2 1.0 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 100.0 
Table 6.10 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Nature of Job (Combined Categories) 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
Frontline 2,360 72.1 144 74.6 
Supervisory 915 27.9 49 25.4 
Total 2,375 100.0 193 100.0 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
. 605 1 . 437 
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Table 6.11 A Comparison-of Population and Sample by 
Area of Service 
Population 
No. 96 
Sample 
No. 
Offenders/ 334 10.2 18 9.2 
drug abusers 
Family welfare 706 21.6 40 20.5 
Elderly 199 6.1 13 6.7 
Community 324 9.9 12 6.2 
development 
Young people 966 29.5 64 32.8 
Rehabilitation 245 7.5 13 6.7 
Medical social 168 5.1 11 5.6 
service 
Training 145 4.4 11 5.6 
Central 185 5.6 3 1.5 
administration 
Others 3 0.1 10 5.1 
Total 3,275 100.0 195 99.9 
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Table 6.12 A Comparison of Population and Sample by 
Area of Service (Combined Categories) 
Population Sample 
No. % No. 
Rehabilitation 778 26.4 44 25.7 
Family Service 874 29.7 51 29.8 
Community & 1,290 43.8 76 44.4 
Youth 
Total 2,942 99.9 171 99.9 
Chi-square D. F. Significance 
. 046 2 . 977 
6.6 Method of Data Analysis 
Since data obtained in these surveys are either nominal or 
ordinal, nonparametric statistical tests are used in most 
situations. 
In describing the population and the sample, frequency 
distribution and percentages are used, and in comparing these two 
groups, chi-square test is used. According to Sidney Siegel and 
N. John Castellan, Jr. (1988), the chi-square test assesses the 
degree of correspondence between the observed and expected 
observations in each category. From the null hypothesis we may 
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deduce what the expected frequencies are. The chi-square 
technique gives the probability that the observed frequencies 
could have been sampled from a population with the given expected 
values. (p. 45) 
In describing the rank ordering of values, this researcher 
begins with frequency distribution, mean, median, and mode for 
each of the twenty-four values. Following this, one is tempted 
to ask if the respondents are consistent in the way they ranked 
these values. To answer this query, the Kendall Coefficient of 
Concordance is used. According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), 
this measurement is particularly useful in studies of interjudge 
reliability. (p. 262) 
To compare if subgroups of the sample have the same pattern 
of rank ordering, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for two 
independent samples and the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of 
variance for k independent subgroups are used. 
When at least ordinal measurement has been achieved for the 
variables being studied, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test may be 
used to test whether two independent groups have been drawn from 
the same population. This is one of the most powerful of the 
nonparametric tests, and it is a very useful alternative to the 
parametric t test when the researcher wishes to avoid the t 
test's assumptions or when the measurement in the research is 
weaker than interval scaling. (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, pp. 
128-9) 
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The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks is 
an extremely useful test for deciding whether k independent 
samples are from different populations. Sample values almost 
invariably differ somewhat, and the question is whether the 
differences among the sample signify genuine population 
differences or whether they represent merely the kind of 
variations that are to be expected among random samples from the 
same population. The Kruskal-Wallis technique tests the null 
hypothesis that the k samples come from the same population or 
from identical population with the same median. (Siegel and 
Castellan, 1988, p. 206) 
How significantly different is the rank ordering of these 
values? To answer this question, values are compared in twos by 
the used of Sign test. 
According to Siegel and Castellan (1988), the sign test gets 
its name from the fact that it is based upon the direction of 
differences between two measures rather than quantitative 
measures as its data. It is particularly useful for research in 
which quantitative measurements is impossible or infeasible, but 
in which it is possible to determine, for each pair of 
observations, which is the "greater" (in some sense). (p. 80) 
Are the values related to one another in any way in the 
rankings? To answer this question, the Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient is used. 
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The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient is a measure 
of association between two variables which requires that both 
variables be measured in at least an ordinal scale so that the 
objects or individuals under study may be ranked in two ordered 
series. (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 235) 
In describing the ranking of values in the twelve cases, 
frequency distribution, mean, median, and mode are again used. 
The same is done for the sample as well as the subgroups. On top 
of this, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of variance are used to compare the ranking of 
the subgroups. Consistency within each of these groups is 
measured by the use of the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance. 
Finally, a comparison is made between the ranking of values 
in the Values Survey and the Value-Action Relationship Survey. 
This is to be done by the use of the t-test of means. 
6.7 Limitations of the Research 
The research has three limitations. First, the validity of 
the measuring instrument, i. e., the questionnaire, is not tested. 
Since this is an exploratory study in itself, the set of values 
so identified have not been subjected to validity test. However, 
an effort has been made to consult my colleagues on the 
appropriateness of including the values and the case situations. 
The pilot study has also shed some light on this. 
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Secondly, control groups have not been used. As an 
alternative, the study sample is divided into subgroups and 
findings between subgroups are compared to test for reliability. 
Finally, the response rate is low. As it is explained, the 
major reason for the low response is the political uncertainty in 
Hong Kong. Many social workers left the colony during the period 
of when the study was in progress. Another major reason for low 
response is the nature of the research itself. It seems to 
social workers that values are to be accepted, not challenged. 
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Chapter Seven 
Identification of Social Work Values 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify a cluster of 
values, twenty-four in all, which is conceived to be preferable 
for social workers in Hong Kong. As it is defined in Chapter 
Four, values are of two types: terminal values or end-states of 
existence, and instrumental values or modes of conduct. The 
former can be divided into social values and personal values. 
The latter, on the other hand, can be divided into moral values 
and competence values. 
To accomplish this purpose, three tasks need to be 
accomplished. The first involves a review of the historical 
development of social work. This helps to identify important 
diminsions in social work which, in turn, helps to provide a 
framework for the selection of values. The second task involves 
an extensive literature search, including an examination of 
values (or beliefs) and purposes of social work, characteristics 
of professional helpers and the professional relationship, and 
the professional code of ethics. This provides a pool of values 
from which one can select those which are conceived to be 
preferable for social workers. The final task involves an 
attempt to come up with brief explanatory statements for each of 
these values. 
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7.2 Dimensions of Social Work 
Although the development of social work seems to vary from 
one country to another, there are four dimensions which can 
be 
found in all countries. For the sake of convenience, the British 
experience is used as an illustration. These four dimensions 
are: (1) the moral dimension, (2) the organizational dimension, 
(3) the psychological dimension, and (4) the political dimension. 
7.2.1 The moral dimension 
Up until the Victorian era, destitutes were divided into two 
groups: the deserving and the undeserving. The first group, 
including the sick, the disabled, the widows, the orphans, and 
the thrifty old, was considered to be deserving because they 
suffered from what could be described as an Act of God. The 
second group, including offenders against the law, unmarried 
mothers, vagrants, the unemployed, and the old without savings, 
was considered to be undeserving because they suffered 
from what 
could be described as a defective moral will. The first group 
was deserving of charity and personal service. The second group 
was undeserving because kind treatment might lead to dependence 
and increase in its number. Care of the deserving was 
the 
responsibility of private charity whereas care of the undeserving 
was the responsibility of the State. It is from this group of 
private philanthropists, the work they did, and the principles 
they held, that we can identify influences which ultimately lead 
to the particular characteristics of social work we have today. 
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Private charity in the Victorian era may be represented by 
the work of the Charitable Organization Society in London. By 
organizing charitable relief according to certain well-defined 
principles, the Charity Organization Society hoped to introduce 
order into the chaos of charity organizations and to reduce the 
incidences of pauperism. By offering charity and personal 
service to the deserving, the same organization aimed at reducing 
unnecessary expenditure, and strengthening the moral will of the 
individual. In this view, true charity should make an effort to 
encourage independence, strengthen character, and preserve the 
family as the fundamental unit of society. It had a strong moral 
undertone. 
What could have been the ideological base of private charity 
in those days? Could it be attributed to the influence of the 
religious doctrine of John Calvin, more commonly known in social 
work literature as the Protestant Ethic? 
While most religions emphasized the importance of life in 
the next world, Calvinism made the individual focus his attention 
on life in this world. The starting point of its argument was 
the doctrine of predestination. 
The Calvinist admitted that God was both omnipotent and 
omniscient. God knew from the very beginning of the individual's 
life whether he would be saved. In other words, the individual's 
ultimate fate was predestined and there was nothing he could do 
in his lifetime to achieve salvation or to avert damnation. 
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Hence, unlike Roman Catholicism, the individual could not achieve 
salvation by doing good works and truly repenting his sins, and 
unlike Lutheranism, the individual could not avert damnation by 
faith alone. 
They avoided the despair of hopelessness, however, by 
arguing that the chosen one would lead a pure and fruitful life. 
If an individual prospered in his work, if he led a virtuous 
life, if he avoided worldly temptations, and if he practised his 
religion conscientiously, then it was very likely that he would 
be chosen. For, the Calvinists contended, why should God allow 
the unworthy to prosper? 
Influenced by the religious doctrine of John Calvin, private 
philanthropists in the Victorian era pledged to lead a virtuous 
life and made it their job to help the poor and the needy to 
learn this same way of life. Thus the success of private charity 
in those days depended largely on the personal qualities of the 
giver and not the receiver. This may help to explain why the 
personal qualities of the giver deserve special attention. These 
qualities represent values upon which private charity was 
administered in that era. Moreover, in line with our definition 
of values, they represent moral values in the framework we have 
developed. Furthermore, since private charity had the Protestant 
ethic as its ideological foundation, it seems logical to look for 
these personal qualities in the virtues of Christian living. In 
addition, since Hong. Kong is a Chinese society, it is also 
necessary to look for these qualities in the teachings of 
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Confucius. 
What are perceived as the virtues of Christian living? In 
one of his work, Ralph Ranieri (1983) came up with a list of 
ten 
basic virtues in Christian living, namely, simplicity, courage, 
humility, hope, loyalty, discipline, honesty, temperance, 
justice, and prudence. This list proves to be extremely helpful. 
In fact, half of them have been included as moral values. 
According to Ranieri, simplicity is oneness. "When an 
individual is simple, " he noted, "there is one reason for that 
person's existence, one motive for his or her actions, one goal 
toward which that person tends. " (p. 7) In the case of social 
work, this is equivalent to the service orientation -a 
commitment to serve in the interest of clients. 
To this same author, courage "is the ability to do the right 
thing when we are afraid or timid about doing it" (p. 13). 
Humility, on the other hand, is considered a virtue of strength 
rather than a virtue of weakness. "Humble persons, " he noted, 
"seek the truth about themselves and their world, and, because of 
their humility, they can accept what they find. " (p. 18) Both 
of these virtues are included by Alan Keith-Lucas (1972) in his 
book on Giving and Taking Help. 
In Ranieri's view hope is nothing more than the ability to 
look forward to something. (p. 24) "If we could develop the 
habit of thinking more positively, " he said, "we would increase 
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our sense of hope. " (p. 28) Loyalty, on the other hand, is a 
free choice. "A loyal person remains faithful to commitments, " 
he added, "even when things are more difficult than anticipated. " 
(p. 30) Moreover, discipline is referred to as the training to 
strengthen moral character. "Freedom, " he noted, "has limits and 
responsibilities attached to it. " (p. 37) "Only those who are 
disciplined, " he added, "will recognize the limits of their 
freedom and the responsibilities it requires of them. " (p. 37) 
Honesty, to Ranieri, means telling the truth as well as seeking 
the truth. (p. 43) "If we want to develop a sense of honesty, " 
he continued, "... we must start by being honest with ourselves. " 
(p. 46) 
Temperance is the equivalent of moderation. Elaborating on 
this, Ranieri noted that "when we enjoy something without 
overindulging or without giving it more time or importance than 
it truly deserves, then we are temperate. " (p. 49) Justice, on 
the other hand, is a demand that "all be treated with respect and 
concern" (p. 55). Finally, to be prudent is to have the ability 
"to use our reason in such a way that it enriches not only our 
own lives but the lives of others" (p. 60). 
What are considered as virtues among the Confucians? The 
most important virtues which Confucius preached must be 
benevolence, wisdom, and courage. (The Confucius Hall of Hong 
Kong, 1986) Confucius once said, "The way of the gentleman has 
three aspects of which I am incapable: with benevolence, there is 
no worry, with wisdom, there is no delusion, with courage, there 
241 
is no fear. " Undoubtedly, he was being modest when he said this. 
In another context, he explained that the way to cultivate the 
person was to be fond of learning so as to gain wisdom, to 
practice with vigour so as to achieve benevolence, and to possess 
the feeling of shame so as to have courage. Of the three, 
benevolence was considered to be the most important, and so it 
was said that the aim of wisdom is to know benevolence; and 
courage, to practice it. 
When asked to elaborate on the way to achieve benevolence, 
Confucius said, "Love your fellow men. " In other words, 
benevolence is another word for love. This idea of benevolence 
is not foreign to the Christians or the social workers. 
7.2.2 The organizational dimension 
There are two aspects of the organizational dimension: the 
bureaucratization of social work and the professionalization of 
social work. The bureaucratization of social work may be 
attributed to the expansion of state social welfare services 
which ultimately led to the formation of large social service 
departments in the mid-twentieth century. 
Soon after the end of the Second World War, Britain and 
other major industrialized countries of the West had already 
developed comprehensive systems of social security, public 
housing, free or subsidized education, health, and personal 
social services. Even though the nature and scope of existing 
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services and programmes differ considerably in these countries, 
some common themes are universal. Bill Jordan (1984), for 
instance, identified the following: 
1. social workers are involved in the business of helping 
poor people get sufficient benefits to live on, by 
advocating or negotiating for them; 
2. social workers are involved in issues about child 
neglect and abuse, and about juvenile delinquency and its 
appropriate treatment; 
3. social workers tend to be concerned with issues of child 
health, disability and handicap and the care of the elderly; 
and also with the welfare of patients in mental and general 
hospitals; 
4. social workers tend to be involved in the work of the 
criminal courts and the divorce courts; and with providing a 
welfare service in prisons; and 
5. social workers tend to be involved in the problems of 
relationships between the state and informal, neighbourhood 
and community organizations, and between the state and its 
citizens. (pp. 6-7) 
In other words, Jordan was of the opinion that: 
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Social work ... tends to be concerned with ... people who, 
for whatever reason, do not seem to "get by" on the standard 
ration of health care, education, housing provision or 
social security benefits which is available. Either they 
have special difficulties, or they reject what is offered, 
or they just do not "fit in" with the systems that are 
supposed to meet their needs. (p. 7) 
Based on this understanding, Jordan contended that: 
Social work can only be properly understood as a direct 
product of the social and economic structures of these 
nations .... [As] state emplyees in such societies, most 
social workers have clear legal duties to keep under control 
certain sections of the population which are seen as 
potentially subversive or threathening to the interests of 
the ruling class. (p. 7) 
Beginning in the 1950s and increasingly in the 1960s, social 
workers in state agencies, with legal powers and duties, began to 
grow in numbers, while their counterparts in voluntary 
organizations declined. As it was noted by Martin Davies (1985), 
The practice of social work takes place almost wholly as a 
result of either statutory legislation or policy decisions 
taken by politicians in central or local government. The 
functions of the social worker and the focus of his work are 
not self-selected, but are politically sanctioned and 
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authorized by the agency which employs him. To point that 
out may beg as many questions as it answers, but it does at 
least indicate the source of social work's legitimacy, and 
emphasizes that social workers are not, and can never be, a 
law unto themselves. (p. 10) 
By the mid-1960s there was strong pressure to reorganize the 
local authority services. Critics drew attention to poor co- 
ordination between the various departments, both in planning and 
in their dealings with particular cases. The Seebohm Committee 
was appointed for this particular purpose. It recommended the 
setting up of social services departments which were in 
actuality, an amalgamation of children's welfare, mental health, 
education welfare, child guidance and the home help services. 
Since the emergence of large social services departments, 
social welfare became increasingly a public responsibility and it 
began to take on more and more statutory functions. As a result 
of these developments, there was an outcry from the public for 
accountability. Increasingly, governmental units and private 
funding sources required that the effectiveness of service 
programmes be measured, and gradually, programmes which were 
found to be ineffective were being phased out. This demand for 
accountability highlights the importance of competence values in 
social work practice. However, this should not be taken to imply 
that moral values are no longer important. What it does imply is 
that competence values are at least as important as moral values 
and should, therefore, be included in the social work values 
245 
system. 
Coupled with the bureaucratization of social work is its 
march towards professionalization. As a result of the Seebohm 
reorganization, the number of professioal social workers in 
social services departments grew dramatically. This led to the 
formation of the British Association of Social Workers. More 
importantly, as Joan Cooper (1987) suggested, "they provide and 
guard the dominant ethic in these bureaucratic systems" (p. 59). 
"Without an ethical code, " she continued, "it would be dangerous 
for social workers to exercise the powers, vested in their 
agencies, which permit them to intervene in the delicate 
relationship between state and citizen" (p. 59). In this way, 
the professional association echoes the demand for 
accountability. 
What are considered as comptence values in social work 
practice? Since social work is accountable to sponsors as well 
as users, competence values should reflect sponsors' demand for 
efficiency as well as users' demand for quality service. This 
leads to the subdivision of competence values into institutional 
values and professional values. Whereas the former responds to 
sponsors' demand for efficiency, the latter responds to users' 
demand for quality service. 
7.2.3 The psychological dimension 
The influence of Sigmund Freud found its way into social 
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work in the early years of the twentieth century when people 
began to question the moral basis of social work. According to 
Bill Jordan (1984), 
Freud showed that the human heart was not an open book, and 
that people could not (even with goodwill and good faith) 
give an accurate account of the motives, still less the 
moral principles, which determined their actions. They 
were, in fact, driven by dark and irrational forces within 
them .... These instinctual drives ... were universal, and 
hence as much a part of the helper's psyche as that of the 
client. (pp. 42-3) 
Freud's work forced the early social workers to re-examine 
their views on the important principle of self-determination. 
The reason for this was carefully explained by the same author 
who noted that: 
For the Victorians, client self-determination was an 
absolute standard. People must be free to choose their own 
destinies, to make what they would of their lives by their 
own decisions. By the 1920s this principle had been 
considerably modified .... Self-determination 
became a 
psychological aim rather than an overriding principle. Work 
should be aimed at helping [to] "free" people from the 
irrational psychological forces or cultural blinkers that 
limited their capacities for true choice .... In the 
meantime, they should be to some extent protected from the 
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consequences of their decisions, and to some extent reminded 
of or forced to recognize their duties to others and to 
society. So the notion of client self-determination came to 
mean that clients should be allowed to make choices, but 
only ones they were deemed capable of making "sound" choices 
- sound by the standards of their social workers. (p. 49) 
This change of view called for the development of a new, 
clinical approach to social work. Most individuals who became 
social workers in the mid-twentieth century did so for religious 
or humanitarian reasons. Lacking the moral underpinnings of the 
Victorians, they found in the psychological approach a 
refurbished model of perfect friendship, "a kind, enabling, 
uncensorious rationale for their relationships, with seemingly 
exciting opportunities for liberating latent or crushed human 
potential" (p. 56). It was also "an approach which accorded 
readily with the socially conservative spirit of the 1950s" (p. 
56). 
This refurbished model of perfect friendship was, however, 
not found in Freudian psychology. It was found in the person- 
centred approach of Carl R. Rogers and the humanistic psychology 
of Abraham Maslow. Freudian psychology provided us with an 
understanding of human pathology and how individuals could be 
helped. Maslow (1987), however, researched into the growth 
potential of the most successful human beings and came up with a 
description of the healthy personality and a hierarchy of their 
basic needs. In other words, Maslow was not interested in how 
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one should behave. Instead, he was more interested in what one 
could achieve, if given the opportunity. Hence, his hierarchy of 
needs serves as a useful guide for the selection of personal end- 
states of existence, i. e., personal values. To summarize, these 
needs include: 
1. The physiological needs, i. e., basic goods, including 
those aspects of well-being which are the necessary 
preconditions of the performance of any and all actions 
(e. g., life, health, food shelter, mental equilibrium). 
2. The safety needs, i. e., security; stability; dependency; 
protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; need for 
structure, order, law, and limits; strength in the 
protector; and so on. 
3. The belongingness and love needs, i. e., giving and 
receiving affection. 
4. The esteem needs, i. e., a need or desire for a stable, 
firmly based, usually high evaluation of oneself, for self- 
respect or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others; the 
desire for strength, achievement, adequacy, mastery and 
competence, confidence in the face of the world, and 
independence and freedom; the desire for reputation or 
prestige, status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, 
attention, importance, dignity, or appreciation. 
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5. The self-actualization needs, i. e., the need or desire 
for self fulfilment, namely, the tendency to become what one 
is potentially. (pp. 15-23) 
7.2.4 The political dimension 
The influece of Karl Marx found its way into social work at 
about the same time as Freudian psycholoy. While Freud led one 
to question one's motive behind private charity, Marx led one to 
question the motive behind the benign society. In the words of 
Jordan (1984), 
Marx's work attacked the "social organism" model of society 
and the notion of harmonious economic progress. He revealed 
the hidden exploitation in capitalist relations of 
production, and showed how it required entrepreneurs to 
extract more and more unpaid labour from workers, to allow 
the accumulation of privately-owned means of production. 
The capitalist bourgeoisie and the industrial prolertariat 
were thus classes with irreconcilable interests, and 
economic development could only produce a society in which 
these conflicts became more and more apparent. (p. 43) 
One of the commonest complaints against contemporary social 
workers, as far as Jordan is concerned, is that they are too 
political. He elaborated his point by stating that "this 
complaint usually stems from social workers' efforts to draw 
attention to the plight of particular groups within their local 
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communities, or to the consequences of their agencies' policies" 
(p. 109). He added that "such actions offend people who think 
that social workers should be occupied in implementing policies 
without question - pacifying and socializing angry minorities, 
not stirring them to protest" (p. 109). In other words, "social 
workers should be seen to be officials who are outside or above 
politics, rather than protagonists in political conflict" (p. 
109). 
In total disagreement, Jordan contended that it was the duty 
of social workers to raise issues about the role of the state, 
and the relationships between officials and citizens because they 
formed part of the agenda of "every encounter with their clients, 
and every discussion with their employers" (p. 109). 
This actually happened in the early years of the 1970s. 
Many social workers were reluctant to be seen as caseworkers; 
they were reluctant to accept the responsibility of keeping the 
socially disadvantaged groups in their place, "ensuring that they 
do not come to expect or demand more than the state is willing to 
give them, or undermine the smooth functioning of economic and 
social life" (p. 7), or "contributing to the 'legitimation' 
(i. e., making more politically acceptable) of regimes which 
consolidate the power of the wealthy and systematically deny the. 
claims of the poor" (p. 8). They were keener on aspects of the 
job - welfare rights advocacy, provision of material resources 
and services - which-seemed to be encouraging their clients to 
push the system harder, to raise their expectations, and to 
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require change. They also criticized and protested about their 
own conditions of work, and the way the departments operated. 
They joined trade unions, and emphasized their common links with 
welfare workers in other public services, who occupied similar 
roles. In other words, they chose to redefine social work and 
its purpose from a socialist, rather than a capitalist 
perspective. 
The politicization of social work did not end with the 
emergence of the socialist alternative. Since the Conservatives 
returned to power in the 1979 election, we began to see the 
emergence of some groups who had an interest in maintaining the 
stance of detached professional neutrality. Martin Davies 
(1985), for instance, noted that: 
In so far as there are common elements in social work, they 
are best described by the general notion of maintenance: 
society maintaining itself in a relatively stable state by 
making provision for and managing people in positions of 
severe weakness, stress or vulnerability; and society 
maintaining its own members by virtue of social work's 
respect for the client, optimism for the future, and faith 
in the essential, or at least potential unity of society. 
(P. 4) 
His comment is based on the assumption that the practice of 
social work takes place almost wholly as a result of either 
statutory legislation or policy decisions taken by politicians in 
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central or local government. The functions of the social worker 
and the focus of his work are not self-selected, but are 
politically sanctioned and authorised by the agency which employs 
him. In other words, in view of the source of social work's 
legitimacy, social workers are not, and can never be, a law unto 
themselves. (p. 10) The caring, the couselling, the 
facilitating, the gatekeeping, the controlling, the preventive 
strategy all are designed to serve equally the interests of the 
state and the client. When those interests conflict, it becomes 
a matter for law and justice or politics. The social worker 
starts and ends with the assumption that synchronization and 
synthesis are possible - even in an imperfect world. 
Davies is certainly not alone in maintaining a conservative 
stance. Cooper (1987), for instance, noted that: 
Although social work has always articulated its perceptions 
of social need and been associated with social reform, it 
claims neither the knowledge nor the role to reform society 
politically or economically. To claim such a role would be 
impractical, diversionary and a desertion of the essential 
function of responding to people undergoing social stress. 
(p. 63) 
Patrick Minford (1987) was even more forceful when he 
contended that what really matters is the view of the typical 
British. In his words: 
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Ultimately they will decide what is done. What 
professionals, such as economists or social workers, have a 
duty to do is to advise their fellow nationals about the 
most efficient ways to achieve what they want. Such 
professional advisers should not let their preferences 
intrude; though they are of course free as citizens to try 
to persuade others to share their preferences, they should 
try to separate that activity from their activity as 
professional advisers. (p. 71) 
What could have been the ideological base of the political 
dimension in social work? Could it be attributed to the 
political ideologies of the Conservatives, the Liberals, and the 
Socialists? Central to the ideological differences is their 
conception of the outcome of society. In other words, they are 
concerned with social values, a subgroup within end-states of 
existence. 
7.3 Values in Social Work Literature 
Within the social work profession, Charles S. Levy (1973) is 
particularly noted for his work on the Value Base of Social Work. 
It is, therefore, appropriate to use this work as a starting 
point for discussion. In his view, social work values may be 
conceived along three basic dimensions which would account for 
the major value orientations which are - or ought to be - shared 
by all social workers and related by them to all elements of 
their professional practice. These are: (1) values as preferred 
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conceptions of people, (2) values as preferred outcomes for 
people, and (3) values as preferred instrumentalities for dealing 
with people. 
In introducing the first basic dimension, Levy noted that 
"social workers share - or ought to share -a common conception 
of man, a conception which orders their responses to people, 
their regard for people, and their concern for people". 
Relating to the second basic dimension, Levy is of the 
opinion that if values are to constitute a comprehensible and 
communicable base of social work, it has to be related to what is 
optimally or minimally envisaged for all men and women, not 
necessarily because it is demonstrably better or more effective 
for some particular purpose, but because it is "right" - that is, 
because it is something to which social workers must regard 
themselves as committed. Self-realization, self-actualization, 
the equalization of opportunities for all regardless of cultural 
or social impediments and constructions - all of these and other 
outcomes may be elaborated as ends which all social workers may 
be presumed to share. The positions of social workers should be 
quite predictable on the basis of these elaborated values - 
certainly in their professional capacities whether in relation to 
clients or in collective association with fellow social workers. 
Finally, the third basic dimension, according to Levy, deals 
with the way in which social workers would agree that people 
ought to be treated, either in practice or in general. This 
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value context is also likely to conflict with cultural and 
subcultural premises. Social workers, for example, are expected 
to treat people as equals and as autonomous even, at time, at the 
expense of a more practical alternative for the clients 
themselves - as in the choice between sustaining clients' 
dependence in order to attain a more practical outcome for them, 
and facilitating clients' independence though it may lead them 
down the primrose or some equivalent path. 
How clients and others are to be treated becomes, in this 
value context, not something that necessarily works better than 
other things, but rather something that social workers might 
concede to be "right" and hence an obligation or commitment of 
social workers. The concept of participatory democracy, for 
example, has generated considerable conflict among social workers 
as well as others. 
As it is expected, social workers believe that all people 
should be treated with respect and dignity, should have maximum 
opportunity to determine the direction of their lives, should be 
urged and helped to interact with other people to build a society 
responsive to the needs of everyone, and should be recognized as 
unique individuals rather than put into stereotypes because of 
some particular characteristic or life experience. Methods of 
social work practice reflect this. Many of these instrumental 
values are presented in the professional codes of ethics. 
As it is mentioned previously, preferred conceptions of 
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people are not considered as values in our definition of the 
term. They are merely beliefs upon which values are derived. On 
the other hand, preferred outcomes for people may be considered 
as the equivalent of terminal values and preferred 
instrumentalities for dealing with people may be considered as 
the equivalent of instrumental values. 
What are the preferred conceptions of man? In the opinion 
of this researcher, there are four conceptions of man which are 
conceived as preferable in social work practice. First of all, 
practically all social workers believe, as Levy does, in the 
inherent dignity and worth of the individual. The British 
Association of Social Workers (1977), for instance, included this 
in its code of ethics, saying that "basic to the profession of 
social work is the recognition of the value and dignity of every 
human being irrespective of origin, status, sex, age, belief or 
contribution to society". This belief is echoed by Dean H. 
Hepworth and Jo Ann Larsen (1986) when they noted that "all human 
beings have intrinsic worth, irrespective of their past or 
present behaviour, beliefs, lifestyle, race, or status in life. " 
As for Helen Northen (1982), she is of the opinion that social 
workers believe, first and foremost, in the inherent dignity and 
worth of the individual. In her own words, she stated that 
"people have worth and dignity simply because they are human 
beings" (p. 27). In other words, the acceptance of this belief 
is unconditional. 
Secondly, closely linked to this belief is the equally 
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important belief in the uniqueness of the individual. Charles 
Zastrow (1989), for instance, is of the opinion that the value to 
which the social work profession most frequently lays claim to is 
that of individualization. In his own words, he noted that: 
Every human being is unique in a variety of ways - value 
system, personality, goals in life, financial resources, 
emotional and physical strengths, personal concerns, past 
experiences, peer pressures, emotional reactions, self- 
identity, family relationships, and deviant behavioural 
patterns. 
What is meant by individualization? Felix P. Biestek (1961) 
explained that: 
Individualization is the recognition and understanding of 
each client's unique qualities and the differential use of 
principles and methods in assisting each toward a better 
adjustment. Individualization is based upon the right of 
human beings to be individuals and to be treated not just as 
a human being but as this human being with his personal 
differences. (p. 25) 
The practical implication of this belief is underscored by 
Hepworth and Larsen (1986). They noted that: 
To affirm the uniqueness of another person, social workers 
must not only be committed to the value just discussed but 
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must also enter the other person's world, endeavouring to 
understand how that person experiences life, including 
thoughts, feelings, world view, daily stresses, joys, hopes, 
longings, disappoinments, hurts, and all of the myriad facts 
of human experience. Only through attempting to walk in the 
shoes of another person can the social worker gain a full 
appreciation of the rich and complex individuality of that 
person. 
Thirdly, a belief in individual worth and dignity also leads 
social workers to believe that every individual has the capacity 
to grow and change and to develop solutions to his difficulties. 
Biestek (1967), for instance, noted that: 
Social workers believe that man has an innate thrust and an 
obligation toward the realization of his potentials. Each 
person is endowed by nature with potentialities and powers 
... in the physiological, intellectual, emotional, social, 
esthetic, and spiritual areas, and a drive toward change 
which can make life more fulfilling. In other words, each 
person has the capacity to grow and change and to see and 
develop solutions to his difficulties, as well as the right 
and capacity to exercise free choice responsibly. 
This belief is also supported by Martin Davies (1985) when 
he stated that: 
Most social workers would recognize and support Julian 
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Huxley's assertion (1961) that "existence can be improved, 
that vast untapped possibilities can be increasingly 
realised, that greater fulfilment can replace frustration"; 
they might disagree on the kinds of effort required of the 
social worker to activate the client's and society's 
potential, but a fundamental belief in the capacity of man 
to improve his own circumstances without necessarily doing 
so at the expense of others is central to the social 
worker's philosophy of practice. (p. 4) 
Finally, practically all social workers contribute to the 
belief that there is interdependence between individuals in this 
society and that they have social responsibility for one another. 
In emphasizing this, Northen (1982) noted that: 
People are not in complete control of their lives; neither 
are they simply the victims of external circumstances. They 
are neither dependent nor independent beings. Rather, they 
are interdependent one upon another for survival and for 
fulfillment of their needs. They interact with other people 
and with the social and political institutions of the 
society in which they live; they both influence and are 
influenced by others. Mutual responsibility supplants the 
concepts of rugged individualism. A person is and should be 
an interacting member of society, both giving to, and 
receiving benefits from, others to the extent of his 
capacities and the opportunities that are available to him. 
(p. 28) 
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What are the preferred outcomes for people? Based on the 
preferred conceptions of man outlined above, an essential 
attribute of a "good" society must be the realization of the full 
potential of each individual and the assumption of his social 
responsibility through active participation in society. In other 
words, each person has the right to self-fulfillment, deriving 
from his inherent capacity and thrust toward that goal. Each 
person also has the obligation, as a member of society to seek 
ways of self-fulfillment that contribute to the common good. 
Similarly, society has the obligation to facilitate the self- 
fulfillment of the individual and the right to enrichment through 
the contribution of its individual members. 
However, for the harmonious development of his potential 
every person requires socially provided and socially safeguarded 
opportunities for satisfying his basic needs in the physical, 
psychological, economic, cultural, esthetic, and spiritual 
realms. Therefore, to permit both self-realization and 
contribution to society by the individual, social organization 
must make available socially sanctioned and socially provided 
devices for needs satisfaction as wide in range, variety, and 
quality as the general welfare allows. 
In other words, people should have access to the resources 
they need to accomplish life tasks, alleviate distress, and 
realize their own aspirations and values. In addition, people 
should have equal opportunity to participate in the molding of 
society. This implies that society must provide resources and 
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services to help people meet their needs and to avoid such 
problems as hunger, inadequate education, discrimination, illness 
without care, and inadequate housing. 
How can social work make a contribution to making these 
preferred outcomes for people a reality? Opinions in relation to 
this question are divided among social workers. Clinical social 
work (1982), for instance, is concerned with the provision of a 
wide spectrum of services which has as its responsibility the 
promotion of opportunities for the enhancement of potentials and 
for the prevention of problems. It has a responsibility also for 
the remediation of difficulties and conflicts that have 
developed. Hence, direct services to individuals and families 
may be developmental, preventive, or remedial in nature. (p. 15) 
AlonI the same line of thinking, the overall objectives of 
social work are described by Hepworth and Larsen (1986) as 
following: 
1. to enhance the capacity of individuals, groups, or 
communities for social functioning and to improve the 
quality of life for everyone by working toward the 
enhancement of the social and physical environment .... 
2. to reduce client's fears and inhibitions or to help them 
gain interpersonal skills (resources) to reduce the mismatch 
between their clients' needs and environmental resources. 
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3. to promote social justice, for if resources and 
opportunities are to be available to all members of society, 
laws, governmental policies, and social programmes must 
assure equal access of citizens to resources and 
opportunities. 
Davies (1985) is, however, more pragmatic. In The Essential 
Social Worker, he commented that: 
Contemporary social work is not overwhelmingly concerned 
with treatment in a quasi-medical or psychotherapeutic 
sense. There is a strong emphasis on counselling and verbal 
support, but there is also a clear recognition of the 
responsibilities that society invests in the social worker 
to operate on its behalf in a preventive or restrictive 
fashion. A major task is to enable the citizen to retain 
his independence in the community for as long as possible, 
and to superintend his movement into or out of institutional 
care in a way that serves both the client's and the 
community's long-term interests. (p. 10) 
If Davies has limited the focus of social work attention, 
community social work has certainly broadened it. The Barclay 
Report (1982) begins with this comment: 
Too much is generally expected of social workers. We load 
upon them unrealistic expectations and we then complain when 
they do not live up to them. Social work is a relatively 
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young profession. It has grown rapidly as the flow of 
legislation has greatly increased the range and complexity 
of its work. In order to cope with demands which Parliament 
has imposed on social service authorities, large departments 
have grown up in which social workers find it difficult to 
come to terms with the complex pressures which surround 
them. There is confusion about the direction in which they 
are going and unease about what they should be doing and the 
way in which they are organized and deployed. When things 
go wrong the media have tended to blame them because it is 
assumed that their job is to care for people so as to 
prevent troubles arising. They operate uneasily on the 
frontier between what appears to be almost limitless needs 
on the one hand and an inadequate pool of resources to 
satisfy those needs on the other. (p. vii) 
To prevent this from happening, the Report contended that if 
social needs of citizens were to be met in the last years of the 
twentieth century, the personal social services must develop a 
close working partnership with citizens focusing more closely on 
the community and its strengths. In its view, a move towards 
community social work was the start of such a development. (p. 
198) 
To clarify its point, the Report added that: 
The individual or family with problems is and remains the 
primary concern of personal social services agencies and the 
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amelioration or prevention of individual or family problems 
is and remains the reason for their existence; but the focus 
will be upon individuals and families in the communities or 
social networks of which they are part. 
Thus for community social workers, a social problem is no 
longer located in an individual person, or individual social unit 
such as a family, but in the patterns of relationship which 
define the social situation of that individual. (p. 20) 
To justify its viewpoint, the Report contended that: 
Sharing social caring is a way both of promoting better care 
and more care in the community and of distributing the 
burden of caring for the disadvantaged more fairly. At 
present, as we have noted, it often falls most heavily upon 
close relatives. A partnership can also allow services to 
be provided in ways which contribute to the feelings of 
self-respect and well-being of those who receive them, as 
well as using scarce and expensive resources to their best 
effect. (pp. 202-3) 
Finally, Jeffry Galper (1980) comes up with a radically 
different approach. In his view, radical social work is social 
work that contributes to building a movement for the 
transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through the 
social services. This definition of radical social work takes 
into account the fact that radical social workers are both 
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radicals and social workers. Their political commitments are 
socialist and their specific occupational category is social 
worker. According to this definition those who practice radical 
social work are those who struggle for socialism from their 
position within the social services. They identify social work 
clearly within a concern for the development of a socialist 
movement, building toward the creation of a socialist society. 
What are the purposes of social work? Based on what we have 
discussed about the preferred conceptions of outcomes for people, 
we can identify the following purposes: 
1. to improve the quality of life for everyone by working 
toward the enhancement of the social and physical 
environment; 
2. to contribute to building a movement for the 
transformation to socialism by its efforts in and through 
the social services; 
3. to promote social justice by ensuring that resources and 
opportunities are available to all members of society; 
4. to enhance the capacity of individuals, groups, or 
communities for social functioning; 
5. to support and strengthen the informal networks, to care 
for the carers; 
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6. to reduce client's fears and inhibitions or to help them 
gain interpersonal skills (resources) to reduce the mismatch 
between their clients' needs and environmental resources; 
and 
7. to enable the client to retain his independence in the 
community for as long as possible, and to superintend his 
movement into or out of institutional care in a way that 
serves both the client's and the community's long-term 
interest. 
These purposes include a wide spectrum of services to 
safeguard the continuation of the existing system, to help 
develop a better system, and to enhance the capacity of 
individuals, groups, and communities for the satisfaction of 
their survival needs and growth needs. 
What are the preferred instrumentalities for dealing with 
people? In social work literature one can find these values 
embedded in the discussion of the characteristics of the helping 
person and the helping relationship. 
In The Casework Relationship, for instance, Felix P. Biestek 
(1957) noted that "there is a pattern of basic emotions and 
attitudes that are common, in varying degrees of intensity, to 
all people who need help, however temporarily, from others. " (p. 
14) Based on these basic emotions and attitudes, he came up with 
a list of seven principles of action or qualities of a good 
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relationship. These qualities are: (1) individualization, (2) 
purposeful expression of feelings, (3) controlled emotional 
involvement, (4) acceptance, (5) non-judgmental attitude, (6) 
client self-determination, and (7) confidentiality. (p. 17) 
These principles have been widely quoted in the social work 
literature ever since its first appearance. 
Another important source on the characteristics of a helping 
relationship comes from the work of Carl R. Rogers, Robert R. 
Carkhuff and his colleagues. Rogers has long postualted that 
there are three conditions that must be present in order for a 
climate to be growth-promoting: genuineness, unconditional 
positive regard, and empathic understanding. Moreover, this 
postualte has been confirmed at a later stage by Carkhuff and his 
colleagues. In their view, empathy, genuineness, and respect 
(i. e., unconditional positive regard) are among the critical 
ingredients of effective interpersonal relationship. 
The work of Alan Keith-Lucas (1972) on Giving and Taking 
Help is another important source. According to Keith-Lucas, the 
characteristics of a helping person include courage and humility. 
Finally, Davies (1985) is of the opinion that for all 
trainees and for the majority of serving social workers, there 
are basic essentials that have to be aspired to and achieved. 
They are: (1) warmth, (2) efficiency, (3) sensitivity, (4) 
persuasiveness, (5) empathy, (6) awareness, (7) knowledge, (8) 
practicality, and (9) genuineness. (p. 186) 
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After going through the characteristics of a helping person 
and of a helping relationship, what values can be obtained? 
The most important value in social work must be "respect for 
persons". Respect for person is basically a value highly 
regarded in Western Society as a whole and social work is not 
alone in considering it to be an overriding commitment. 
Elaborating on this, Northen (1982) noted that: 
A 
Each person should be accepted as he is and treated as a 
whole person in a process of development. He should be 
treated with respect, in spite of his likenesses or 
differences in relation to other individuals and population 
groups. He should have freedom to express himself without 
fear of negative sanctions. He should have the right to 
privacy; information given by or about him should be treated 
with confidence or given to others only with his informed 
consent. (pp. 27-8) 
Furthermore, she added that: 
Social justice is a person's due. Since all people are 
worthy, social justice is due each one. Everyone should 
have the right to civil liberties and equality of 
opportunity without discrimination because of race, 
ethnicity, social class, religion, age, or sex. A person 
should have access to resources that are essential to meet 
his basic needs, not only for survival, but also for the 
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development of his potential. He has a right to make his 
own decisions and to participate in making group decisions, 
within the limits imposed by his particular culture and 
status and with regard to the rights of others. (p. 28) 
However, she cautioned that: 
The right to self-determination is not absolute. It needs 
to be reinterpreted to encompass certain rights of families 
and other social networks which, in many cultures, take 
precedence over rights of individuals to make certain 
decisions .... There is a delicate balance between 
individual and group welfare. (p. 28) 
The ideal characteristics of a client-worker relationship, 
according to Northen, are accurate empathy, nonpossessive warmth 
or acceptance, and genuineness (pp. 97-8). Many other helping 
professionals with different theoretical orientations also agree 
about the importance of these qualities. Hepworth and Larsen 
(1986), for instance, noted that: 
As they perform their responsibilities, social workers 
should affirm the dignity and self-worth of those whom they 
serve. Universally accepted among the helping professions, 
this value embodies several related concepts, which have 
been variously denoted as unconditional positive regard 
(Rogers, 1957), nonpossessive warmth (Truax, 1963), 
acceptance (Biestek, 1957), nonjudgmental attitude (Biestek, 
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1957), and respect (Gazda, et. al., 1973; Hammond, et. al., 
1977). 
In other words, a number of values can be dervied from the 
value of respect, including acceptance, empathy, genuineness, and 
the nonjudgmental attitude. 
7.4 Values Selected for the Surveys 
The values of social work can now be listed. They are 
divided into the following groups: 
7.4.1 Social values 
The first group of values we have to discuss is social 
values, a subgroup within the end-states of existence. It refers 
to one's conception of a good society. It relates to the 
"social" purposes of social work. At the present stage of its 
development, with less than ten years before the lease expires in 
1997, Hong Kong is confronted with a choice between maintaining 
the status quo or moving towards a more democratic society. it 
is therefore essential to include values which reflect both of 
these positions: a more conservative, individualistic orientation 
and a more radical, collectivistic orientation. In the case of 
the first position, named conservative values, we have included 
freedom, peace, and progress. In the case of the second 
position, named socialist values, we have included democracy, 
equality, and fraternity. 
271 
The idea of democracy must have sunk deep in the mind of the 
people in Hong Kong since the massacre in Beijing on June 4, 
1989. In this study, democracy is used to represent democratic 
autonomy. Justification for democratic autonomy is based on the 
principle that individuals should be free and equal in the 
determination of the conditions of their own lives; that is, they 
should enjoy equal rights (and, accordingly, equal obligations) 
in the specification of the framework which generates and limits 
the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not 
deploy this framework to negate the rights of others. (Held, 
1981, p. 290) For the purpose of this study, democracy is 
defined as a sense of involvement, resulting from society's 
recognition of everyone's right to take part in the governing 
process which affects them. 
Equality is used in this study to represent circumstantial 
equality, i. e., equality of all the external circumstances under 
which human beings live and act and whatever factors impinge upon 
their conduct and their welfare. There are two types of 
circumstantial equality or inequality: equality or inequality of 
condition, and equality or inequality of opportunity. The 
equalities to which we are all entitled, by virtue of being 
human, are equalities of condition - of status, treatment, and 
opportunity. (Adler, 1981, pp. 155-173) For the purpose of this 
study, equality is defined as a sense of fairness, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to equal treatment and 
an equal share of societal resources. 
272 
Fraternity is the least defined of the socialist values. 
Accdording to Bernard Crick (1987), fraternity must involve, 
"firstly, common tasks and activities, and secondly an exultant 
recognition of diversity of character" (p. 100). Elaborating on 
this, he claims that fraternity is an attitude of mind and one 
associated with activity. It arises from people actually working 
together towards common ends. If we are to experience genuine 
fraternity we must take each other as we find each other. 
Fraternity must accept all people as they are. By all means seek 
to involve them in common tasks; and to influence them; but then 
seek neither to condemn their inadequacy, nor be jealous of their 
superiority, not avoid being influenced ourselves. Fraternity is 
here defined as a sense of brotherhood, resulting from society's 
commitment to promote mutual help and social responsibility. 
The idea of freedom is not new to social workers in Hong 
Kong. According to Isaiah Berlin (1958), two concepts of freedom 
or liberty can be identified: positive freedom and negative 
freedom. In his view, the negative sense of freedom is involved 
in the answer to the question "What is the area within which the 
subject -a person or group of persons - is or should be left to 
do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by 
other persons? " (pp. 121-122) On the other hand, the positive 
sense of freedom is involved in the answer to the question "What, 
or who, is the source of control or interference that can 
determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that? " (p. 122) 
In this study, none of these definitions will be used. Instead, 
the idea of circumstanial. freedom is adopted for use in this 
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study. According to Mortimer J. Adler (1958), there are three 
types of freedom: circumstantial freedom, acquired freedom, and 
natural freedom. (p. 107) Our circumstantial freedom consists 
in our being able, under favourable circumstances, to act as we 
wishes for our own individual good as we see it. Our acquired 
freedom consists in our being able, through acquired virtue or 
wisdom, to will or live as we ought in conformity to the moral 
law or an ideal befitting human nature. Our natural freedom 
consists in our being able, by a power inherent in human nature, 
to change our own character creatively by deciding for ourselves 
what we shall do or shall become. (p. 606) In another context, 
Adler (1981) produced another definition for circumstantial 
freedom, saying that our circumstantial freedom consists in our 
being able to do as we please - our ability to carry out in overt 
action the decisions we have reached, to do as we wish for our 
individual good as we see it, rightly or wrongly. (pp. 140-154) 
Based on this understanding, freedom is here defined as a sense 
of autonomy, resulting from society's recognition of everyone's 
right to live or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly. 
Stability and progress have been included as the 
preconditions for success in the Sino-British agreement. It is, 
therefore, pertinent to include both in this study. Peace can be 
defined negatively as the absence of war and the threat of war, 
and positively as the presence of a sense of social harmony. For 
the purpose of this study, peace is defined as a sense of social 
harmony, resulting from society's commitment to prevent war, to 
maintain order and stability, and to enforce law. Progress, on 
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the other hand, is defined as a sense of development, resulting 
from society's commitment to improve the quality of life of 
everyone in society. 
7.4.2 Personal values 
The importance of personal values may be attributed to the 
psychological dimension of social work. It relates to the 
"personal" purposes of social work. Since the beginning of 
social work training in Hong Kong, Freudian psychology and 
humanistic psychology form an essential component of the social 
work curriculum. Under such an influence, the importance of 
Maslow can hardly be underestimated. Besides, personal values 
are clearly related to the satisfaction of human needs. Thus, 
based on his work, two types of values have been selected: (1) 
survival values, including comfort, love, and security, and (2) 
self-actualizing values, including happiness, power, and pride. 
Comfort is an extension of the physiological needs which 
appear in the hierarchy of needs developed by Maslow. According 
to Maslow, physiological needs are the needs for food, water, 
air, sleep, and sex. Their satisfaction is essential for 
survival. (Schultz, 1977, p. 62) Charlotte Towle (1965), a 
prominent social work educator, noted the need to be well fed, 
properly clothed, and adequately housed as a basis for both 
physical and mental health. (p. 48) Much more recently, Frederic 
C. Reamer (1982) also noted that the possession of basic goods 
(for example, life, health, food, shelter, mental equilibrium) is 
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the necessary preconditions of the performance of any and all 
actions. (p. 71) For the purpose of this study, the term 
comfort is preferred and is defined as a feeling of satisfaction, 
deriving from one's possession of basic goods essential for 
quality living. 
Love is derived from Maslow's belonging and love needs. 
According to Maslow, "we may join a group or club, assuming its 
values and characteristics or wearing its uniform in order to 
feel a sense of belonging", and "we satisfy our love needs by 
establishing an intimate, caring relationship with another 
person, or with people in general". He added that "in these 
relationships it is just as important to give love as to receive 
it". (p. 63) Similarly, Towle noted "the child's security 
depends wholly on being loved and cared for by adults so that the 
wish to be cared for is the central issue of his life". (p. 50) 
For the purpose of this study, love is defined as a feeling of 
being accepted, deriving from one's ability to give affection to 
and receive affection from significant others in one's life. 
Security is derived from the safety needs which appeared in 
Maslow's hierarchy of human needs. According to Maslow, these 
include needs for security, stability, protection, order, and 
freedom from fear and anxiety. He believed that we all need some 
degree of routine and predictability and that uncertainty is 
difficult to tolerate. (Schultz, 1977, p. 62) These needs are 
also considered to be essential by Towle. She noted that "the 
most basic impulse is any organism is the impulse to survive", 
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and "the need to feel secure - that is, safe as an assurance of 
survival - is fundamental". (p. 49) As far as Reamer is 
concerned, security is one of the basic goods. (p. 71) For the 
purpose of this study, security is defined a feeling of inner 
harmony, deriving from the absence of fear of death and violence 
and undertainty of future. 
Happiness is derived from Maslow's need for self- 
actualization. According to Maslow, self-actualization is 
defined as the supreme development and use of all our abilities, 
the fulfillment of all our qualities and capacities. In other 
words, we have become what we have the potential to become. (p. 
64) For the purpose of this study, happiness is the term used to 
represent self-actualization. It is defined as a feeling of 
contentment, deriving from one's ability to obtain, or achieve, 
what one hopes to obtain, or achieve. 
Power and pride are derived from Maslow's esteem needs. 
Maslow distinguished two types of esteem needs: esteem derived 
from others and self-esteem. When we feel a sense of internal or 
self-esteem, we are confident and secure in ourselves; we feel 
worthy and adequate. When we lack self-esteem we feel inferior, 
discouraged, and helpless in dealing with life. In order to have 
a genuine sense of self-esteem, we must know ourselves well and 
be able to assess objectively our virtues and weaknesses. We 
cannot esteem ourselves if we do not know who and what we are. 
(pp. 63-64) For the. purpose of this study, power is the term 
used to represent self-esteem. It is defined as a feeling of 
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self in control, deriving from one's ability to mobilize one's 
own and society's resources to cope with one's problems. 
Esteem from others is primary; apparently it is difficult 
for us to think well of ourselves unless we are assured that 
others think well of us. Externally derived esteem can be based 
on reputation, admiration, status, fame, prestige, or social 
success, all characteristics of how others think of us and react 
to us. There are many ways of getting others to esteem us; we 
can display our wealth and importance through the kind of car we 
drive, the neighbourhood we live in, our style of dress, or in 
admirable and competent behaviour. (p. 63) For the purpose of 
this study, pride is the term used to represent this esteem from 
other. It is defined as a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving 
from society's and significant other's recognition of one's 
contribution to work, family, and society. 
7.4.3 Moral values 
The importance of moral values may be attributed to the 
moral dimension in social work. Even in Hong Kong, before the 
professionalization and bureaucratization of social work, the 
responsibility for service delivery falls upon the shoulder of 
dedicated persons whose devote their life to serving the people 
in need. What motivates them in the endeavour must be nothing 
other than their moral conscience which has its roots either in 
Christianity or in Confucian teachings. 
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It is extremely difficult to distiguish Christian values 
from Confucian values. Many of these values can be included in 
both categories. Instead, for the purpose of this study, moral 
values are divided into two groups: (1) moral virtues, including 
benevolence, courage, and prudence, (2) moral principles, 
including honesty, justice, and loyalty. 
Benevolence is defined as having a compassion for the 
suffering of others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, 
forgiving, and accepting. It is considered as equivalent to the 
concept of acceptance. According to Biestek (1961), 
Acceptance is a principle of action wherein the caseworker 
perceives and deals with the client as he really is, 
including his strengths and weaknesses, his congenial and 
uncongenial qualities, his positive and negative feelings, 
his constructive and destructive attitudes and behaviour, 
maintaining all the while a sense of the client's innate 
dignity and personal worth. (p. 72) 
As a client moves toward being able to accept his own 
experience, he also moves toward the acceptance of the experience 
of others. He values and appreciates both his own experience and 
that of others for what it is. To quote Maslow regarding his 
self-actualizing individuals: "One does not complain about water 
because it is wet, nor about rocks because they are hard .... As 
the child looks out upon the world with wide uncritical and 
innocent eyes, simply noting and observing what is the case, 
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without either arguing the matter or demanding that it be 
otherwise, so does the self-actualizing person look upon human 
nature both in himself and in others. " 
A benevolent person has a deep desire to increase people's 
freedom of choice and control over their own lives. A deep 
desire to increase the ability of people to choose for themselves 
and to control their own lives is an absolutely essential quality 
of a helping person. Effective helping relationships simply 
cannot be created and sustained without this desire. Basically, 
the desire is a commitment to oneself rather than to others 
because it must be our desire, be related to us, and be a 
commitment to ourselves. It is this commitment that gives one 
the courage to know oneself and the willingness to risk oneself 
in the service of others. 
Courage is defined as a readiness to take a stand on 
controversies. It requires one to take risks, to withstand 
criticism and to endure danger or hardship. According to Alan 
Keith-Lucas (1972), the social worker needs the courage to 
confront clients with the reality of their problems, to risk 
failure in pursuing his objectives, to cope with unpredictable 
situations, and to face criticism and blame for one's actions. 
It takes great courage - not the courage of the unaware and 
insensitive but the courage of the person who is thoroughly aware 
yet does what one knows needs to be done - to take risks with 
oneself and others that social work relationships inevitably 
demand. Workers must be willing to assume the risks of failing 
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to help, of becoming involved in difficult, emotionally charged 
situations that they do not know how to handle, of having their 
confortable world and ways of operating upset, of being blamed 
and abused, of being constantly involved in the unpredictable, 
and perhaps of being physically threatened. "It is only the 
person who can be afraid and not be afraid of this fear who is in 
a position to help. " (Keith-Lucas, 1972, p. 100) 
Prudence is here defined as a disposition to act cautiously. 
It requires one to be broadminded and to exercise judgment based 
on knowledge and consultation. Prudence can be discussed in 
relation to the nonjudgmental attitude. According to Biestek 
(1961), 
The nonjudgmental attitude is a. quality of the casework 
relationship; it is based on a conviction that the casework 
function excludes assigning guilt or innocence, or degree of 
client responsibility for causation of the problems or 
needs, but does include making evaluative judgments about 
the attitudes, standards, or actions of the client; the 
attitude, which involves both thought and feeling elements, 
is transmitted to the client. (p. 90) 
Honesty is here defined as a commitment to truthfulness in 
dealing with others. It requires one to seek and tell the truth. 
According to Ranieri, if we want to develop a sense of honesty, 
we must start by being honest with ourselves. This value can be 
discussed in relation to truth-telling and promise-keeping, and 
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the concept of confidentiality. 
Justice is here defined as a disposition to act with 
fairness. It requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 
right and what is wrong. According to Ranieri (1983), justice 
demanded that all be treated with respect and concern. In order 
to live a life of justice, we must first develop an awareness of 
the rights of others. This means that we will have to keep an 
open mind. There are many people who suffer in our society, and 
it is easy to fall into the trap of passing judgment on them. 
But as social workers we are supposed to be concerned about 
providing all people with their rights, and not be making 
judgments. Working for justice requires a certain amount of 
humility. There is so much to do in this world in terms of 
justice that we can actually try to do too much. We cannot do 
everything, and we have to admit that. We will be more effective 
if we attempt a task that we can handle, instead of trying to go 
off into a hundred different directions all at once and wearing 
ourselves out as a result. Justice can be discussed in relation 
to the problem of ethical dilemmas. 
According to Josiah Royce (1924), loyalty refers to "the 
willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a 
cause" (pp. 16-17). In addition, he added that: 
A man is loyal when, first, he has some cause to which he is 
loyal; when, secondly, he willingly and thoroughly devotes 
himself to this cause; and when, thirdly, he xpresses his 
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devotion in some sustained and practical way, by acting 
steadily in the service of his cause. (p. 17) 
Even though the definition of loyalty is written in 1924, it 
is still helpful for the purpose of this study. In the case of 
social work, we require our practitioners to retain the service 
orientation which has remained with us, and with other helping 
professions, for almost a century. Loyalty is thus defined 
in 
this study as a commitment to serve in the interest of others. 
It requires one to remain faithful to one's promises. 
7.4.4 Competence values 
The importance of competence values may be attributed to the 
rapid expansion and bureaucratization of social work in Hong Kong 
since the early nineteen-seventies. This makes it possible for 
social work to shift its focus from remedial services to services 
which are preventive and developmental in nature. This implies 
that the recipients of social services are no longer restricted 
to low-income families. For services such as family counselling, 
family life education, and school social work, the recipients 
often come from average income families. Since the need for many 
of these services are not as pressing as it used to be, the 
public begins to question the effectiveness of such services and 
the necessity of fnding them on a long-term basis. In response 
to this demand for accountability, the social work profession has 
no alternative but to increase its competence to satisfy the 
demand of funding bodies and recipients of services. 
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Competence values may be subdivided into two categories: 
professional values and institutional values. There seems to be 
general consensus so far as professional competence is concerned. 
As for values representing institutional competence, they are 
rarely mentioned in the social work literature. Davies (1985) is 
perhaps one of the few who has included efficiency, 
persuasiveness, and practicality as essential attributes of a 
social worker. (p. 186) However, in a close examination of the 
Barclay Report (1982), it is discovered that institutional 
competence can be organized around the concept of partnership. 
The meaning of partnership will be discussed later in relation to 
the term cooperation. For the time being, it is sufficient to 
point out that in this study, ambition, cooperation, and 
leadership has been included to represent values in this group. 
Briefly stated, ambition relates to a quest for successful 
completion of a case; cooperation is linked to the effective 
functioning of a team formed within an organization or by members 
of different organizations; leadership refers to one's ability to 
influence other's behaviour towards the attainment of a goal. 
Authenticity is here defined as an absence of pretence. It 
requires one to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one's 
self and consistent in one's thought and action. It has often 
been discussed in relation to many other concepts, including 
congruence, genuineness, self-awareness, self-confidence, self- 
knowledge, self-love, and self- respect. What it really means to 
be authentic is to be sensitive to one's own internal workings, 
to be involved with oneself and one's needs, thoughts, 
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commitments, and values, yet to be able to stand back enough from 
oneself to question the meaning of what is going on. This 
implies that the helping person must take a helping attitude 
toward oneself as well as toward others. There are other 
qualities associated with the ones already mentioned. Self-love 
and love of others, self-respect and respect for others, self- 
confidence and confidence in others, acceptance of self and 
acceptance of others, faith in self and faith in others develop 
together or not at all. So the capacity to observe self probably 
requires the ability to care deeply about oneself and one's 
goals, to respect and to believe in oneself, and yet to be able 
to stand back and observe oneself as as important piece of 
complex activity of helping. 
Rogers explains this clearly. He noted that: 
"To be that self which one truly is" implies that the 
individual moves toward living in an open, friendly, close 
relationship to his own experience. This does not occur 
easily. Maslow, in his study of what he calls self- 
actualizing people, has noted this same characteristic. 
Speaking of these people, he says, "Their ease of 
penetration to reality, their closer approach to an animal- 
like or child-like acceptance and spontaneity imply a 
superior awareness of their own impulses, their own desires, 
opinions, and subjective reactions in general. This greater 
openness to what-goes on within is associated with a similar 
openness to experiences of external reality. Maslow might 
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be speaking of client I have known when he says, "self- 
actualized people have a wonderful capacity to appreciate 
again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of 
life with awe, pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however, 
stale these experiences may be for other people. 
Empathy is here defined as a capacity to perceive and 
communicate, accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
clients and the meaning of those feelings. 
Our method of sharing ourselves completely with others are 
awkward and imperfect even when we are committed to that sharing. 
For troubled people the ability to share themselves and their 
situation is incredibly more difficult because of all their 
feelings about their problems and about themselves as people with 
problems, and because of the threat of the unknown in the helping 
process. Therefore, the worker who would help needs a capacity 
for feeling and sensing - for knowing in internal ways - the 
inner state of others without specific clues. This quality 
probably depends on one's ability to observe even small movements 
and changes in others and to make almost instantaneous inferences 
from them, to put oneself into the feeling and thinking of 
others, and to avoid stereotypes. It is probably closely related 
to one's capacity to be open to the new and to one's readiness 
for change. 
Respect is here. defined as a willingness to recognize 
other's right to self-determination, confidentiality and privacy, 
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and ability to be rule-following. 
Respect for persons is an expression of value at a high 
level of abstraction, but within social work it is best regarded 
as an attempt to sum up the more specific attitudes and 
principles which social workers hold. Stated more fully the 
principle is: "Persons ought to be respected as ends. " The 
questions therefore arises as to what it is about a person that 
demands respect, and what is the nature of the respect which is 
demanded. It could be argued that there are two human capacities 
which above all others demand respect because they are of the 
very essence of human personality - the capacities to be self- 
determining, or to be able to choose and carry out one's chosen 
actions, and to be able to formulate and follow rules or general 
social norms. 
In other words, the attitude of respect is that which it is 
morally appropriate to adopt towards persons conceived as self- 
determining and rule-following beings. To respect a person as a 
self-determining being is to assist him in the pursuit of the 
actions and policies which he desires to implement, or to try to 
remove the impediments, social, personal, or economic, to the 
realization of his aspirations. To respect a person as a rule- 
following being involves a more complex social awareness. It 
involves, first of all, the awareness that someone else may hold 
values or standards which differ from one's own, and that while 
it may be morally acceptable to use rational argument to try to 
get him to change his mind on these, it is morally wrong, an 
287 
affront to his dignity as a person, to try to undermine his 
beliefs by non-rational means, such as the exercise of power, 
ridicule or the like. Secondly, to resepct a person as a rule- 
following being involves showing an awareness that certain rules 
or values apply to all alike, social workers and clients, and 
that however much a social worker may sympathise with a client's 
problems or wish to aid him in certain purposes, he morally 
cannot do so at the expense of the social norms which apply to 
all. To sum up, we can say that respect is an attitude the 
ingredients of which are active sympathy with another person's 
aims and also awareness of his and of those of society at large, 
and that this attitude is morally appropriate if we regard 
persons as essentially self-determining and rule-following 
beings. 
Social workers believe that clients have the right to 
express their own opinions and to act upon them, as long as by so 
doing clients do not infringe upon the rights of others. There 
are four points that should be made in operationalizing the 
principle of client self-determination. 
First, self-determination implies that clients should be 
made aware that there are alternatives for resolving the personal 
or social problems they face. Self-determination involves having 
clients make decisions; that is, making a choice selected from 
several courses of action. If there is only one course of 
action, there is no choice and therefore clients would not have 
the right of self-determination. 
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Second, self-determination means that the client, not the 
worker, is the chief problem solver. Workers need to recognize 
that it is the client who owns the problem, and therefore has the 
chief responsibility to resolve the problem. 
Third, self-determination does not prohibit or restrict 
social workers from offering an opinion or making a suggestion. 
In fact, social workers have an obligation to share their 
viewpoints with clients. 
Fourth, client self-determination is possible and should be 
encouraged even in areas where the social worker has the 
additional function to protect society. 
Another way in which social workers convey respect and 
affirm the worth of clients is by preserving the confidentiality 
of private information disclosed by the client during the course 
of the helping process. Confidentiality is the implicit or 
explicit agreement between a professional and a client to 
maintain the private nature of information about the client. An 
absolute implementation of this principle means that disclosures 
made to the professional will not be shared with anyone else, 
except when authroized by the client in writing or required by 
law. Confidentiality is vital to the helping process for 
practical, ethical, and legal resaons, and practitioners must 
therefore be knowledgeable about the various facets of this 
critical value. (p. 67) 
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According to Alan C. Kerckhoff (1974), the term ambition 
refers to "one's willingness to work to achieve goals" (p. 4). 
Moreover, he added that "ambition involves more than a wish for a 
desirable goal; it requires that the individual believe he has a 
reasonable prospect of attaining it" (p. 5). Although some goals 
may be highly desirable in the eyes of others, for the purpose of 
this study, the goal of the social worker is to be competent in 
service devlivery, thus enabling him to be effective in helping, 
to advance in knowledge, and to gain promotion. With these goals 
in mind, ambition is here defined as a commitment to work, to be 
productive, and to advance in knowledge and position. It 
requires dedication and hard work. 
Cooperation is defined as a willingness to work as a member 
of the team and to pursuit the team's goals. It requires one to 
be rule-following. 
The term cooperation is closely related to partnership. In 
the Barclay Report (1982), it was stated that community social 
work depends upon an attitude of mind in all social workers which 
regards members of the public as partners in the provision of 
care. Members of the Working Party believe that clients, 
relations, neighbours and volunteers become partners with the 
social worker in developing and providing social care networks. 
Partnership is a key element in community social work. The 
identification of needs, resources, methods, priorities and a 
plan of action will all come through these reciprocal 
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relationships. This partnership goes beyond consultation to 
shared decision making based on a recognition of who can offer 
what to the resolution of social problems. Accountability and 
responsibility for work also needs to be shared within these 
relationships. 
According to John P. Kotter (1988), the term "leadership" is 
used in two basic ways in everyday conversation: 
1. to refer to the process of moving a group (or groups) of 
people in some direction through (mostly) noncoercive means, 
and 
2. to refer to people who are in roles where leadership 
(the first definition) is expected. (p. 16) 
In normal conversation, the second definition is most 
common. In this study, however, the word is used in the first 
sense, as a process (not a group of people). More particularly, 
leadership is here defined as an ability to solicit support from 
others. It requires one to be persuasive and to be able to 
exercise one's power and authority when necessary. 
Leadership has always been, and probably always will be, an 
important factor in human affairs. But recently the need for 
leadership in social work has grown considerably more than most 
people realize. Two fundamental shifts in the social welfare 
sector are responsible: (1) the increasing complexity of social 
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Welfare, and (2) the demand for accountability. 
It is important to point out that the division of values 
into subgroups is only arbitrary. Many values can be included in 
more than one categories. Besides, one or more of the subgroups 
may not be relevent in the local context. Social values, for 
instance, can be divided into conservative values, socialist 
values, and liberal values. However, for the purpose of this 
study, it seems helpful to begin with two groups, thus leaving 
out liberal values as a subgroup. In conclusion, values which 
have been selected to represent social work values are listed as 
following (Figure 7.1): 
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Figure 7.1 A Schematic Presentation of Social Work Values 
End-States of Existence Modes of Conduct 
Social Values Personal Values Moral Values Competence Values 
Socialist Survival Moral Professional 
Values Values Virtues Values 
Democracy Comfort Benevolence Authenticity 
Equality Love Courage Empathy 
Fraternity Security Prudence Respect 
Conservative Self-Actualizing Moral Institutional 
Values Values Principles Values 
Freedom Happiness 
Peace Power 
Progress Pride 
Honesty Ambition 
Justice Cooperation 
Loyalty Leadership 
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Chapter Eight 
The Value Survey 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, findings of the Value Survey are reported 
and analyzed. The purpose of this first survey is to organize 
social work values which have been identified in the previous 
chapter into a social work value system. 
Through the use of mailed questionnaires, respondents to 
this survey were provided with two lists each consisting of 
twelve values and were asked to rank values in each of these 
lists separately according to their own preference, in the 
capacity of social workers. More specifically, the instruction 
was to put "1" next to the value which was considered as first in 
preference. "2" next to the value which was second in preference, 
"3" next to the value which was third in preference, and continue 
with this process until all twelve had been ranked. 
The report is divided into two sections one relating to end- 
states of existence and the other relating to modes of conduct. 
In each section, the report begins with a description of the 
degree of preference of each of the end-states of existence and 
modes of conduct. Ranks between one and four are described as 
"highly preferable"; ranks between five and eight, "moderately 
preferable"; and ranks between nine and twelve, "least 
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preferable". To facilitate comparison, ranks have been treated 
as if they belong to an interval scale. This allows the 
researcher to compile a "mean ranking" for each value by 
computing an arithmetic mean for the ranks each received from the 
respondents and to assign to each value a "composite rank" by 
arranging the values in order of magnitude of their m ean 
rankings. 
To determine the reliability of this method of rank 
ordering, the study sample is divided into subgroups according to 
selected personal attributes, namely, sex, age, length of service 
in social welfare, highest qualification attained, rank of 
position occupied, nature of job, and area of service. For easy 
comparison, sex is divided into "Male" and "Female"; age, "35-" 
and "35+"; length of service, "10-" and "10+"; highest 
qualification attained, "Degree-trained" and "Non-degree or 
Untrained"; rank of position occupied, "Officer" and "Assistant"; 
nature of job, "Frontline" and "Supervisory"; and area of 
service, "Rehabilitation", "Family", and "Community and Youth". 
Moreover, to determine if difference in the rank ordering of 
values between subgroups is statistically significant, the t-test 
and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are employed in case if the 
attribute is divided into two sub-groups. In the case of area of 
service where it is divided into three subgroups, the analysis of 
variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Analysis of Variance are 
used. Moreover, since results of the t-test and the analysis of 
variance are found to be similar to those of the Wilcoxon-Mann- 
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Whitney test and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Analysis of Variance, 
the t-test and the analysis of variance will not be reported. 
Furthermore, to determine, for each pair of values, which 
one is more preferable, i. e., which one has a higher ranking, the 
Sign Test is employed and, to determine if this pattern of rank 
ordering is consistent among the respondents, the Kendall 
Coefficient of Concordance (W) is employed. Finally, to measure 
the association between each pair of values, the Spearman Rank- 
order Correlation Coefficient (r/s) is employed and, to discover 
if certain values cluster together to form factors, factor 
analysis is performed. 
8.2 Rank Ordering of End-States of Existence 
Findings of the Value Survey indicate that the rank ordering 
of terminal values or end-states of existence, in descending 
order of preference, is as followng: EQUALITY, LOVE, FREEDOM, 
DEMOCRACY, PEACE, PROGRESS, HAPPINESS, SECURITY, PRIDE, 
FRATERNITY, COMFORT, and POWER. 
To examine this order of preference more carefully, we begin 
by looking at the frequency distribution. In Table 8.1, values 
have been arranged in columns and ranks, in rows. Both of them 
have also been arranged in descending order of preference. 
Frequency in this context refers to the number of respondents who 
has assigned a particular rank to a particular value. There are, 
for instance, 56 respondents who considered equality as first in 
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preference. In addition, another 33 respondents considered this 
same value as second in preference. There is, however, only one 
respondent who considered equality as last in preference and none 
who considered it as second last in preference. 
Table 8.1 Frequency Distribution of End-States of 
Existence According to Ranks (N = 195) 
RANK EQU LOV FRE DEM PEA PRO HAP SEC PRI FRA COM POW 
1 56 50 18 16 7 11 6 11 7 3 10 0 
2 33 28 22 31 17 11 14 12 8 8 5 6 
3 21 19 31 30 14 8 15 15 11 12 8 11 
4 23 20 26 22 10 19 16 10 15 12 10 12 
5 13 12 24 17 19 18 19 11 21 13 15 13 
6 14 19 10 18 19 14 12 16 21 34 8 10 
7 16 13 25 10 17 16 11 26 12 17 19 13 
8 8 10 11 13 25 22 21 16 19 14 22 14 
9 5 11 9 11 18 23 28 19 17 20 16 18 
10 5 11 12 9 13 29 19 23 13 18 21 22 
11 0 1 4 14 21 15 24 14 24 21 27 30 
12 1 1 3 4 15 9 10 22 27 23 34 46 
Raw data have always been confusing. There is nothing much 
we can get by reading through them. We can probably see, with 
some clarity, that there are large numbers in the upper left hand 
corner as well as the lower right hand corner of the table. We 
can also see small numbers in the lower left hand corner as well 
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as the upper right hand corner. To make these numbers more 
revealing, we turn to Table 8.2. In this table, all frequencies 
in Table 8.1 have been converted to the nearest tens. 
Approximately, 10 in this table represents 5 percent of the 
respondents; 20,10 percent; 30,15 percent; 40,20 percent; 50, 
25 percents; and, finally, 60,30 percent. 
Table 8.2 Frequency Distribution of End-States of 
Existence (Corrected to the Nearest Tens) 
According to Ranks (N = 195) 
RANK EQU LOV FRE DEM PEA PRO HAP SEC PRI FRA COM POW 
1 60 50 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 0 
2 30 30 20 30 20 10 10 10 10 10 0 10 
3 20 20 30 30 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
4 20 20 30 20 10 20 20 10 10 10 10 10 
5 10 10 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 10 10 10 
6 10 20 10 20 20 10 10 20 20 30 10 10 
7 20 10 20 10 20 20 10 30 10 20 20 10 
8 10 10 10 10 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 10 
9 0 10 10 10 20 20 30 20 20 20 20 20 
10 0 10 10 10 10 30 20 20 10 20 20 20 
11 0 0 0 10 20 10 20 10 20 20 30 30 
12 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 20 30 20 30 50 
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In Table 8.2 we can see a pattern emerging. There is strong 
agreement among the respondents in their strong preference for 
equality, love, freedom, and democracy, and their low preference 
for pride, fraternity, comfort, and power. In the case of 
equality, for instance, almost 30 percent of the respondents 
considered it as first in preference, and another 15 percent 
considered it as second in preference. However, very few of the 
respondents considered it as low in preference. On the other 
hand, in the case of power, approximately 25 percent of the 
respondents considered it as last in preference, and another 15 
percent considered it as second last in preference, but none 
considered it as first in preference. 
To examine this frequency distribution more closely, we turn 
to Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 which provide summaries of the 
frequency distribution in terms of mean rankings, median 
rankings, modes, and degrees of preference. 
In this survey, democracy, equality, and fraternity have 
been chosen to represent socialist values. How are these values 
ranked in the Value Survey? Findings indicate that equality 
ranks first, democracy ranks fourth, and fraternity ranks tenth 
in the survey. Among the respondents, 68.2 percent considered 
equality as "highly preferable". Another 26.2 percent considered 
it to be "moderately preferable", and a meagre 5.6 percent 
considered it to be "least preferable". This produces a mean 
ranking of 3.6. In the case democracy, 50.8 percent of the 
respondents considered it as "highly preferable", 29.7 percent 
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considered it to be "moderately preferable", and 19.5 percent 
considered it as "least preferable". This results in a mean 
ranking of 5.2. Finally, in the case of fraternity, 17.9 percent 
of the respondents considered it as "highly preferable", 40.0 
percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 42.0 
percent considered it as "least preferable". This produces a 
mean ranking of 7.5. 
Table 8.3 Composite Rank, Mean Ranking, Median Ranking, and 
Mode of End-States of Existence (N = 195) 
Value Rank Mean Median Mode 
EQUALITY 1 3.636 3.0 1.0 
LOVE 2 4.205 4.0 1.0 
FREEDOM 3 5.041 5.0 3.0 
DEMOCRACY 4 5.200 4.0 2.0 
PEACE 5 6.944 7.0 8.0 
PROGRESS 6 7.000 8.0 10.0 
HAPPINESS 7 7.082 8.0 9.0 
SECURITY 8 7.179 7.0 7.0 
PRIDE 9 7.456 8.0 12.0 
FRATERNITY 10 7.538 7.0 6.0 
COMFORT 11 8.077 9.0 12.0 
POWER 12 8.641 10.0 12.0 
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Table 8.4 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and Composite 
Rank of End-States of Existence (N = 195) 
Highly Moderately Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Ranks 1-4) (Ranks 5-8) (Ranks 9-12) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
EQUALITY 68.2 26.2 5.6 3.6 1 
LOVE 60.0 27.7 12.3 4.2 2 
FREEDOM 49.7 35.9 14.4 5.0 3 
DEMOCRACY 50.8 29.7 19.5 5.2 4 
PEACE 24.6 41.0 34.4 6.9 5 
PROGRESS 25.1 35.9 39.0 7.0 6 
HAPPINESS 26.2 32.3 41.5 7.1 7 
SECURITY 24.6 35.4 40.0 7.2 8 
PRIDE 21.0 37.4 41.5 7.5 9 
FRATERNITY 17.9 40.0 42.0 7.5 10 
COMFORT 16.9 32.8 50.3 8.1 11 
POWER 14.9 25.6 59.5 8.6 12 
How are the conservative values ranked in the Value Survey? 
Findings indicate that freedom, peace, and progress rank third, 
fifth, and sixth respectively. In actual figures, almost half of 
the respondents (49.7 percent) considered freedom as "highly 
preferable", another one-third (35.9 percent) considered it as 
"moderately preferable", thus leaving those who considered it as 
"least preferable" to stand at 14.4 percent. This produces a 
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mean ranking of 5.0. For peace, it seems important to note that 
only 7 respondents considered this value as first in preference. 
This may help to explain why the number of respondents who 
considered it as "highly preferable" was limited to no more than 
24.6 percent. On the other hand, those who considered it to be 
"moderately preferable" and "least preferable" turned out to be 
41.0 percent and 34.4 percent respectively. This results in a 
mean ranking of 6.9, very much lower than that of freedom. The 
rank ordering of progress is found to be similar to that of 
peace. A total of 25.1 percent of the respondents considered 
this value as "highly preferable", 35.9 percent considered it as 
"moderately preferable", and 39.0 percent considered it as "least 
preferable". This produces a mean ranking of 7.0, slightly 
behind that of peace. 
What about the survival values? How are they ranked in the 
Value Survey? Findings indicate that love occupies the second, 
security the eighth, and comfort the eleventh position on the 
list of end-states of existence. Among the respondents, 60 
percent considered love as "highly preferable", 27.7 percent 
considered it as "moderately preferable", and 12.3 percent 
considered it as "least preferable". This produces a mean 
ranking of 4.2. In the case of security, the number of 
respondents who considered this value as "highly preferable" was 
reduced to slightly less than one-quarter (24.6 percent). On the 
other hand, the number of respondents who considered it as 
"moderately preferable" and "least preferable" increased to 35.4 
percent and 40.0 percent respectively. This results in a mean 
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ranking of 7.2. Finally, in the case of comfort, it may be of 
interest to point out that as many as 10 respondents considered 
this value as first in preference. However, among all the 
respondents, only 6.9 percent considered it as "highly 
preferable". Not unexpectedly, the number of respondents who 
considered it as "moderately preferable" and "least preferable" 
turned out to be much higher, 32.8 percent, and 50.3 percent 
respectively. This produces a mean ranking of 8.1. 
The last subgroup of terminal values is known as the self- 
actualizing values. Findings reveal that happiness occupies the 
seventh, pride the nineth, and power the last position on the 
list. For happiness, it may be of interest to note that only 6 
respondents considered this value as first in preference. Among 
the respondents, about one-quarter (26.2 percent) considered it 
as "highly preferable", another one-third (32.3 percent) 
considered it as "moderately preferble", and the remaining 41.5 
percent considered it as "least preferable". This results in a 
mean ranking of 7.1. For pride, about one-fifth of the 
respondents (21.0 percent) considered it as "highly preferable", 
37.4 percent considered it as "moderately preferable", and 41.5 
percent considered it as "least preferable". The mean ranking 
for this value is 7.5. Finally, in the case of power, only a 
small percentage (14.9 percent) of the respondents considered it 
as "highly preferable", another 25.6 percent considered it as 
"moderately preferable", but well over half (59.5 percent) 
considered it as "least preferable". Its mean ranking is 8.6. 
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How do these subgroups compare with one another in terms of 
mean rankings? To answer this question, we have to do some 
simple arithmetic. We average the mean rankings of values in 
each subgroup to obtain a "mean of mean rankings". In the case 
of socialist values, it turns out to be 5.4. As for conservative 
values, it is 6.3. Similarly, the "mean of mean rankings" for 
survival values is 6.5 and for self-actualizing values, it is 
7.7. In other words, as a group, social values are conceived to 
be more preferable than personal values. Besides, socialist 
values are conceived to be most preferable while self-actualizing 
values are conceived to be least preferable. (Table 8.5) 
Table 8.5 A Compilation of Mean Rankings of 
Subgroups in End-States of Existence 
Socialist Conservative Survival Self- 
Actualizing 
Values Values Values Values 
DEM 5.2 FRE 5.0 COM 8.1 HAP 7.1 
EQU 3.6 PEA 6.9 LOV 4.2 POW 8.6 
FRA 7.5 PRO 7.0 SEC 7.2 PRI 7.5 
SUM 16.3 SUM 18.9 SUM 19.5 SUM 23.2 
MEAN 5.4 MEAN 6.3 MEAN 6.5 MEANS 7.7 
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To shed some light on the reliability of the rank ordering 
of values, the study sample is divided into subgroups according 
to selected personal attributes. When subgroups of each 
attribute are subject to the t-test of means and the Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney test of ranks in the case of two subgroups, or 
subject to the analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) in the case of three subgroups, the 
results are statistically insignificant in most of the cases. 
(Table 8.6) 
As far as end-states of existence are concerned, social 
workers of the opposite sex are similar in the way they rank the 
values. Difference in the rank ordering of values between "Male" 
and "Female" is found to be statistically insignificant for most 
values. The only exception is pride where the difference is 
small and is statistically significant at . 048 level only. 
Further analyses reveal that "Female" showed a slightly stronger 
preference for pride than "Male". 
Age is an entirely different matter. Difference in the rank 
ordering of values for "35-" and "35+" can be observed in three 
terminal values: freedom, peace, and fraternity. However, 
difference in the case of freedom is relatively small and is 
statistically signifcant at . 049 level only. Difference in the 
rank ordering of values is much greater for peace and fraternity. 
They are found to be statistically significant at . 030 and . 024 
level respectively. 
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Table 8.6 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks and Kruskal- 
Wallis 1-Way ANOVA of End-States of Existence 
According to Breakdown of Personal Attributes++ 
Sex Age Length Highest Rank Nature Area 
of Quali. of of of 
Service Attained Position Job Service+ 
EQUALITY * * * * * * * 
LOVE * * * . 041 . 038 
FREEDOM * . 049 * * * * * 
DEMOCRACY * * * . 017 . 016 * . 002 
PEACE * . 030 . 009 * * 
PROGRESS * * * * * * . 008 
HAPPINESS * * * * * * . 048 
SECURITY * * * * * * * 
PRIDE . 048 * * * * * * 
FRATERNITY * . 024 . 022 
COMFORT * * * * * * * 
POWER * * * * * * * 
Notes: + In the case of area of service, three subgroups are 
involved. Hence, the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA is 
used. In all other cases, two subgroups are 
involved. Hence, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of 
Ranks is used. 
++ When the level of significance is < or = . 05, the 
actual significance level is reported. However, 
when it is > . 05 it is represented by *. 
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As it is expected, subgroups divided according to length of 
service shows a remarkably similar pattern. Difference in the 
rank ordering of values for "10-" and "10+" can be observed in 
peace and fraternity. They are found to be statistically 
significant at . 009 and . 022 level respectively. 
Further analyses indicate that the "35-" and "10-" groups 
showed a stronger preference for fraternity whereas the "35+" and 
"10+" groups showed a stronger preference for freedom and peace. 
In terms of highest qualification attained, difference in 
the rank ordering of values can be observed in love and 
democracy. They are statistically significant at . 041 and . 017 
level respectively. 
Again, there is remarkable resemblance between highest 
qualification attained and rank of position occupied. Difference 
in the rank ordering of values can again be observed in love and 
democracy. They are found to be significant at . 038 and . 016 
level respectively. 
In addition, further analyses reveal that the "Degree- 
trained" and "Officer" groups showed a stronger preference for 
love whereas the "Non-degree or Untrained" and "Assistant" groups 
showed a stronger preference for democracy. 
As for the nature of job, no significant difference in the 
rank ordering of values can be detected in all values. Quite the 
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contrary, in the case of area of service, differences are 
statistically significant at . 002 level for democracy, . 008 level 
for progress, and . 048 for happiness. Social workers in 
"Rehabilitation" and "Community and Youth" showed a stronger 
preference for democracy than their counterparts in "Family"; the 
reverse is found to be true for happiness. Finally, social 
workers in "Family" and "Community and Youth" showed a stronger 
preference for progress than their counterparts in 
"Rehabilitation". 
Looking at Table 8.6 from another angle, we discover that- 
the pattern of rank ordering is highly consistent for comfort, 
equality, power, and security. Differences in the rank ordering 
of these values are found to be statistically insignificant when 
the study sample is divided according to each of the personal 
attributes. 
As for freedom, happiness, and pride, the pattern of rank 
ordering can also be considered as highly consistent. 
Differences in the rank ordering of values are found to be no 
more than marginally significant in statistical terms. However, 
the pattern of rank ordering is somewhat inconsistent for 
democracy and fraternity, love, peace and progress. 
How do values compare with one another in terms of their 
rank ordering? When pairs of values are treated with the Sign 
Test, it becomes clear that the end-states of existence can be 
divided into three subgroups in terms of rank ordering. (Table 
308 
8.7) 
EQU 
LOV 
FRE 
DEM 
PEA 
PRO 
HAP 
SEC 
PRI 
FRA 
COM 
POW 
Table 8.7 Significance of Sign Test for 
End-States of Existence 
EQU LOV FRE DEM PEA PRO HAP SEC PRI FRA COM POW 
*+++ + + + + + + + 
*++ + + + + + + + 
*+ + + + + + + + 
+ + + + + + + + 
* * * * * + + 
* + * * + + 
* * * + + 
* * + + 
* * + 
* + 
Note: + Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
To begin with, equality, love, freedom, and democracy 
clearly belong to one group. Findings indicate that these end- 
states of existence are significantly different from all other 
end-states of existence. Within the group, however, equality is 
not significantly different from love but is significantly 
different from freedom and democracy. Similarly, love is not 
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different from equality above it or freedom below it, but is 
different from democracy. In a similar pattern, freedom is not 
different from love above it or democracy below it, but is 
different from equality. Finally, democracy is not different 
from freedom but is different from both equality and love. In 
other words, end-state of existences within the group are not 
always different from one another, but are always different from 
end-states of existence which are not included in this group. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group of 
values? Firstly, values in this group come from three subgroups: 
democracy and equality from socialist values, freedom from 
conservative values; and love from survival values. None of 
these values is from self-actualizing values. Secondly, values 
in this group are conceived as highly preferable by the 
respondents. Their mean rankings range from 3.6 to 5.2; their 
median rankings range from 3 to 5; and their modes range 1 to 3. 
Thirdly, even though equality and love are clearly more 
preferable than freedom and democracy, it is almost impossible to 
distinguish equality from love, or freedom from democracy in 
terms of their degree of preference. 
The second group includes peace, progress, happiness, 
security, pride, and faternity. With very few exceptions, no 
significant difference can be observed between one end-state of 
existence and another within the same group but significant 
difference can be observed between values in this group and 
values not belonging to this group. One exception relates to 
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progress and security. Both of these values are within this 
group but difference between them are statistically significant. 
Besides, differences between pride and comfort as well as 
fraternity and comfort are not statistically significant. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group? 
Firstly, values in this group come from all four subgroups: 
fraternity from socialist values; peace and progress from 
conservative values; security from survival values; and 
happiness and pride from self-actualizing values. Secondly, 
values in this group are conceived to be moderately preferable by 
the respondents. Their mean rankings have a small range, from 
6.9 to 7.5; their median rankings range from 7 to 8; and their 
modes range from 6 to 12. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to 
distinguish one value from another in this group in terms of 
degree of preference. 
The third group includes comfort and power. However, the 
place of comfort is somewhat unclear. Even though comfort is 
significantly different from peace and progress, happiness and 
security, it is not significantly different from pride and 
fraternity in the second group. Besides, it is also different 
from power. 
What are some of the characteristics of values in this 
group? Firstly, values in this group come from two subgroups: 
comfort from survival values and power from self-actualizing 
values. Both of these belong to personal values. Secondly, both 
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are conceived as least preferable by the respondents. Their mean 
rankings range from 8.0 to 8.6; their median rankings range from 
9 to 10; and both have a mode of 12. 
To determine interrater reliability, the Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance (W) is employed. In the case of end-states of 
existence, the degree of concordance among the respondents is 
highly significant. (Table 8.8) In other words, the respondents 
are highly consistent in the way they ranked the end-states of 
existence. 
Table 8.8 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) of 
End-States of Existence 
No. of Cases W Chi-square D. F. Significance 
195 . 193 413.987 11 . 000 
How do the values asociate with one another as a subgroup? 
And how do the subgroups associate with one another? To answer 
these questions, the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient 
is employed. (Table 8.9) In the case of socialist values, 
findings indicate that equality is positively associated with 
both democracy and fraternity but democracy is not associated 
with fraternity. In the case of conservative values, the only 
significant correlation is between freedom and progress. These 
two values are negatively associated. No meaningful association 
can be detected among survival values. Quite the contrary, all 
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self-actualizing values are significantly associated with one 
another. 
Table 8.9 Significance of Spearman Correlation Coefficient 
for End-States of Existence 
DEM EQU FRA FRE PEA PRO COM LOV SEC HAP POW PRI 
DEM + *+* *-- - - - - 
EQU ++* *-- - - * * 
FRA ** *-- - - * - 
FRE * --- - * * - 
PEA *-* * * - - 
PRO -- * - * - 
COM * * + - 
LOV * + * * 
SEC * - * 
HAP - - 
POW + 
PRI 
Note: + Correlation is positive and significant at 
< . 05 level. 
- Correlation is ngative and significant at 
< . 05 level. 
* Differnece is not significant at < . 05 level. 
313 
Between subgroups, socialist values are negatively 
associated with survival values in all combinations, and with 
self-actualizing values in most combinations. However, other 
than freedom which is found to be positively associated, 
socialist values are not significantly associated with 
conservative values. Similarly, conservative values are 
negatively associated with survival values and self-actualizing 
values in most combinations. As for the association between 
survival values and self-actualizing values, results are mixed. 
Happiness is positively associated with love and comfort while 
power is negatively associated with security and comfort. Other 
combinations are not found to be significantly associated. 
To determine if the end-states of existence group together 
in clusters, they are subject to factor analysis. (Table 8.10) 
Findings indicate that the end-states of existence group 
into three clusters. In the first cluster, love, comfort, and 
happiness are negatively associated with fraternity and progress. 
In the second cluster, democracy, equality and freedom are 
negatively correlated with security. Finally, in the third 
cluster, pride and power are negatively associated with peace. 
On the whole, social values are found to be positively associated 
with one another but negatively associated with personal values. 
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Table 8.10 Factor Analysis of End-States of Existence 
Values Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
DEMOCRACY . 63792 
EQUALITY . 64460 
FRATERNITY . 47428 
FREEDOM . 62775 
PEACE 
PROGRESS . 59083 
LOVE -. 48378 
SECURITY -. 54103 
COMFORT -. 58253 
HAPPINESS -. 75637 
. 66477 
PRIDE -. 65026 
POWER -. 75299 
In concluding this section, it may be of interest to note 
that social values occupy five of the six top positions on the 
list, leaving the second position to love which is a personal 
value. In other words, social workers have much stronger 
preference for social values than for personal values. As it is 
expected, the most preferred values for social workers in Hong 
Kong include democracy, equality, and freedom. These three 
values form a closely knitted cluster with security. This 
reflects, on the one hand, the concern of our social workers for 
the coming of 1997 when Hong Kong is scheduled to return to 
China. On the other hand, this reflects that social workers in 
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Hong Kong are neither conservatives nor socialists. It may be 
more appropriate to say that they are liberals in the sense that 
they would like to see the creation of a society which allows 
more democracy, equality, and freedom. However, there seems to 
be a smaller group of more conservative social workers who prefer 
peace and progress. Even though these values are found to be 
less preferable than the important trio, their influence can 
hardly be underestimated. In fact, they occupy the fifth and the 
sixth positions on the list. Somewhat surprisingly, with the 
exception of love, personal values are not considered as highly 
preferable. Does this imply that social workers see the creation 
of a "better" society as a prequisite for personal survival and 
personal growth? This relates to the purpose of social work and 
will be taken up again in the final chapter. 
8.3 Rank Ordering of the Modes of Conduct 
Findings of the Value Survey indicate that the rank ordering 
of instrumental values or modes of conduct, in descending order 
of preference, is as followng: RESPECT, JUSTICE, EMPATHY, 
HONESTY, AUTHENTICITY, PRUDENCE, LOYALTY, BENEVOLENCE, COURAGE, 
COOPERATION, LEADERSHIP, and AMBITION. 
To examine this order of preference more carefully, we 
follow the same procedure as we did in the rank ordering of end- 
states of existence. In Table 8.11, we have a description of the 
frequency distribution of the end-states of existence according 
to ranks. To makeI these frequencies more revealing, they have 
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been converted to the nearest tens in Table 8.12. In Table 8.13, 
a summary of this frequency distribution is presented in terms of 
mean rankings, median rankings, and modes. In addition, a 
summary of the frequency distribution is also presented in terms 
of degrees of preference in Table 8.14. 
Table 8.11 Frequency Distribution of Modes of Conduct 
According to Ranks (N = 195) 
RANK RES JUS EMP HON AUT PRU LOY BEN COU COO LEA AMB 
1 35 44 43 17 17 5 5 12 4 3 2 8 
2 35 30 33 19 16 17 14 14 7 4 5 1 
3 32 23 33 20 24 15 18 12 8 4 4 2 
4 29 18 20 24 16 21 17 14 16 10 6 4 
5 18 25 12 16 12 25 17 23 18 14 8 7 
6 15 16 7 18 32 22 16 9 23 15 10 11 
7 13 16 8 20 19 19 15 16 25 16 10 18 
8 6 7 7 22 13 29 25 15 28 23 14 6 
9 5 6 11 14 16 10 22 21 20 32 24 15 
10 4 6 8 8 12 8 17 20 21 38 28 25 
11 0 3 8 13 14 13 19 13 18 24 41 29 
12 3 1 5 4 4 11 10 26 7 12 43 69 
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Table 8.12 Frequency Distribution of Modes of Conduct 
(Corrected to the Nearest Tens) 
According to Ranks (N = 195) 
RANK RES JUS EMP HON AUT PRU LOY BEN COU COO LEA AMB 
1 30 40 40 20 20 0 0 10 0 0 0 10 
2 30 30 30 20 20 20 10 10 10 0 0 0 
3 30 20 30 20 20 10 20 10 10 0 0 0 
4 30 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 10 10 0 
5 20 20 10 20 10 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 
6 10 20 10 20 30 20 20 10 20 10 10 10 
7 10 20 10 20 20 20 10 20 20 20 10 20 
8 10 10 10 20 10 30 20 10 30 20 10 10 
9 0 10 10 10 20 10 20 20 20 30 20 10 
10 0 10 10 10 10 10 20 20 20 40 30 20 
11 0 0 10 10 10 10 20 10 20 20 40 30 
12 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 30 10 10 40 70 
How are the moral virtues ranked in the Value Survey? 
Findings indicate that prudence occupies the sixth, benevolence 
the eighth, and courage the nineth position on the list. 
It may be of interest to note that even though prudence was 
conceived to be the most preferred of the moral virtues, the 
position it occupies is relatively low. In actual figures, no 
more than one-third of the respondents (29.7 percent) considered 
this value as "highly preferable", but almost half (48.7 percent) 
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considered it as "moderately preferable", thus leaving those who 
considered it as "least preferable" to stand at 21.5 percent. 
This produces a mean ranking of 6.3. 
Table 8.13 Composite Rank, Mean Ranking, Median Ranking, 
and Mode of Modes of Conduct (N = 195) 
Value Rank Mean Median Mode 
RESPECT 1 3.882 3.0 1.0 
JUSTICE 2 4.067 4.0 1.0 
EMPATHY 3 4.251 3.0 1.0 
HONESTY 4 5.703 6.0 4.0 
AUTHENTICITY 5 5.846 6.0 6.0 
PRUDENCE 6 6.333 6.0 8.0 
LOYALTY 7 6.862 7.0 8.0 
BENEVOLENCE 8 7.062 7.0 12.0 
COURAGE 9 7.205 7.0 8.0 
COOPERATION 10 8.179 9.0 10.0 
LEADERSHIP 11 9.195 10.0 12.0 
AMBITION 12 9.431 11.0 12.0 
In the case of benevolence, the number of respondents who 
considered it as "highly preferable" was reduced to a little over 
one-quarter (26.7 percent). Moreover, those who considered it as 
"moderately preferable" were also reduced to 32.3 percent. On 
the other hand, those who considered it as "least preferable" 
were increased to as-much as 41.0 percent. This results in a 
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mean ranking of 7.1, much lower than that of prudence. 
Table 8.14 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and Composite 
Rank of Modes of Conduct (N = 195) 
Highly 
Preferable 
(Ranks 1-4) 
(in %) 
Moderately 
Preferable 
(Ranks 5-8) 
(in %) 
Least 
Preferable 
(Ranks 9-12) 
(in %) 
Mean Rank 
RESPECT 67.2 26.7 6.1 3.9 1 
JUSTICE 59.0 32.8 8.2 4.1 2 
EMPATHY 66.2 17.4 16.4 4.3 3 
HONESTY 41.0 39.0 20.0 5.7 4 
AUTHENTICITY 37.4 39.0 23.6 5.8 5 
PRUDENCE 29.7 48.7 21.5 6.3 6 
LOYALTY 27.7 37.4 34.9 6.9 7 
BENEVOLENCE 26.7 32.3 41.0 7.1 8 
COURAGE 17.9 48.2 33.8 7.2 9 
COOPERATION 10.8 34.9 54.4 8.2 10 
LEADERSHIP 8.7 21.5 69.7 9.2 11 
AMBITION 7.7 2.15 70.8 9.4 12 
Finally, among the respondents, 17.9 percent considered 
courage as highly preferable, 48.2 percent considered it as 
moderately preferable, and 33.8 percent considered it as least 
preferable. Its mean ranking is 7.2, very close to that of 
benevolence. 
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How are the moral principles ranked in this Value Survey? 
Findings indicate that they are considered to be much more 
preferable than moral virtues: justice is second, honesty is 
fourth, and loyalty is seventh on the list. In actual figures, 
almost three-fifths of the respondents (59.0 percent) considered 
justice as "highly preferable". In addition, another one-third 
(32.8 percent) considered it as "moderately preferable". This 
leaves the number of respondents who considered it as "least 
preferable" to stand at 8.2 percent. This produces a mean 
ranking of 4.1, much higher than any of the moral virtues. In 
the case of honesty, a little over two-fifths of the respondents 
(41.0 percent) considered it as "highly preferable". The number 
of respondents who considered it as "moderately preferable" was 
almost the same, 39.0 percent. This implied that the number of 
respondents who considered it as "least preferable" was limited 
to 20.0 percent. It has a mean ranking of 5.7. Finally, about 
one-quarter of the respondents (27.7 percent) considered loyalty 
as "highly preferable", 37.4 percent considered it as "moderately 
preferable", and 34.9 percent considered it as "least 
preferable". This resultes in a mean ranking of 6.9, far below 
that of honesty and justice. 
We can turn now to the institutional values. Values 
included in this subgroup are ambition, cooperation, and 
leadership. They occupy the last three positions on the list. 
Only about one-tenth (10.8 percent) of the respondents considered 
cooperation as "highly preferable", about one-third (34.9 
percent) considered -it as "moderately preferble", and the 
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remaining 54.4 percent considered it as "least preferable". This 
produces a mean ranking of 8.2. As for leadership, less than 
one-tenth (8.7 percent) considered this value as "highly 
preferable", slightly over one-fifth (21.5 percent) considered it 
as "moderately preferable", and well over two-thirds (69.7 
percent) considered it as "least preferable". This results in a 
mean ranking of 9.2. Finally, only a small percentage (7.7 
percent) of the respondents considered ambition as "highly 
preferable". Another 21.5 percent considered it as "moderately 
preferable", but, again, well over two-thirds (70.8 percent) 
considered it as "least preferable". It has a mean ranking of 
9.4. 
The last subgroup is the professional values, including 
respect, empathy, and authenticity. They appear first, third, 
and fifth on the list of modes of conduct. Among the 
respondents, over two-thirds (67.2 percent) considered respect as 
"highly preferable", 26.7 percent considered it as "moderately 
preferable", and a meagre 6.1 percent considered it as "least 
preferable". This results in a mean ranking of 3.9. As for 
empathy, the number of respondents who considered this value as 
"highly preferable" was approximately the same (66.2 percent). 
Besides, the number of respondents who considered it as 
"moderately preferable" and "least preferable" was 17.4 percent 
and 16.4 percent respectively. This produces a mean ranking of 
4.3. Finally, the number of respondents who considered 
authenticity as "highly preferable", "moderately preferable", and 
"least preferable" turned out to be 37.4 percent, 39.0 percent, 
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and 23.6 percent respectively. This results in a mean ranking of 
5.8. 
How do these subgroups compared with one another in terms of 
the mean of mean rankings? In the case of moral virtues, it 
turns out to be 6.9. As for moral principles, it is 5.6. 
Similarly, the mean of mean rankings for institutional values is 
8.9 and for professional values, 4.7. In other words, moral 
values tend to be moderately preferred whereas preference for 
competence values tends to be more extreme. On the one hand, 
professional values are considered as most preferrable, yet, on 
the other hand, institutional values are considered as least 
preferable. (Table 8.15) 
Table 8.15 A Compilation of Mean of Mean Rankings of 
Subgroups in Modes of Conduct 
Moral 
Virtues 
Moral 
Principles 
Institutional 
Values 
Professional 
Values 
BEN 7.1 HON 5.7 AMB 9.4 AUT 5.8 
COU 7.2 JUS 4.1 COO 8.2 EMP 4.3 
PRU 6.3 LOY 6.9 LEA 9.2 RES 3.9 
SUM 20.6 SUM 16.7 SUM 26.8 SUM 14.0 
MEAN 6.9 MEAN 5.6 MEAN 8.9 MEANS 4.7 
To shed some light on the reliability of the ranking of 
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values, the study sample is divided into subgroups according to 
certain personal attributes. When subgroups of each attribute 
are treated with the t-test of means and the Wilcoxon-Mann- 
Whitney test of ranks in the case of two subgroups, or treated 
with the analysis of variance and the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA 
in the case of three subgroups, the results are found to be 
statistically significant in many of the cases. (Table 8.16) 
As far as modes of conduct are concerned, social workers of 
the opposite sex do exhibit significant difference in the way 
they rank justice, empathy, prudence, courage, and leadership. 
Further analyses reveal that "Male" showed a stronger preference 
for justice while "Female" showed a stronger preference for 
empathy, prudence, and courage. 
In the case of age, difference in the rank ordering of 
values between "35-" and "35+° can be observed in empathy, 
prudence, and leadership. 
As is expected, subgroups divided according to length of 
service shows a remarkably similar pattern. Difference in the 
rank ordering of values between "10-" and "10+" can again be 
observed in empathy, prudence, leadership, and ambition. 
However, in the case of ambition, difference is small and is 
significant at . 048 level only. 
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Table 8.16 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of Ranks and Kruskal- 
Wallis 1-Way ANOVA of Modes of Conduct According 
to Breakdown of Personal Attributes++ 
Sex Age Length Highest Rank Nature Area 
of Quali. of of of 
Service Attained Position Job Service+ 
RESPECT * * * . 005 
JUSTICE . 003 * * * * * * 
EMPATHY . 001 . 002 . 020 . 042 
HONESTY * * * * . 014 . 029 . 035 
AUTHENTICITY * * * * * * 
PRUDENCE . 017 . 013 . 005 * * . 006 . 018 
LOYALTY 
BENEVOLENCE * * * * * * 
COURAGE . 032 * * * * * 
COOPERATION 
LEADERSHIP . 023 . 000 . 000 
AMBITION * * . 048 
Notes: + In the case of area of service, three subgroups are 
involved. Hence, the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way ANOVA is 
used. In all other cases, two subgroups are 
involved. Hence, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test of 
Ranks is used. 
++ When the level of significance is < or = . 05, the 
actual significance level is reported. However, 
when it is > . 05 it is represented by *. 
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Briefly, findings indicate that the "35-" and "10-" groups 
showed a stronger preference for empathy and prudence whereas the 
"35+" and "10+" groups found leadership and ambition more 
preferable. 
In terms of highest qualification attained, difference in 
the rank ordering of values can be observed in respect and 
empathy. Findings indicate that "Degree-trained" found empathy 
more preferable than "Non-degree or Untrained" whereas the 
reverse was found to be the case for respect. 
Surprisingly, there is little resemblance between highest 
qualification attained and rank of position occupied. In the 
case of rank of position occupied, difference can only be 
detected in honesty. Moreover, findings reveal that "Officer" 
has a stronger preference for honesty than "Assistant". 
As for the nature of job, significant difference in the rank 
ordering of values can be detected in honesty and prudence. 
Further analyses reveal that "Frontline" showed a stronger 
preference for prudence whereas "Supervisory" showed a stronger 
preference for honesty. 
Significant difference in the rank ordering of values in 
relation to honesty and prudence can also be detected in the case 
of area of service. Findings reveal that social workers in 
"Rehabilitation" found honesty more preferable than their 
counterparts in "Family" and in "Community and Youth" whereas the 
326 
reverse was found to be the case for prudence. 
Looking at Table 8.16 from another angle, we discovered that 
the pattern of rank ordering is highly consistent in the case of 
benevolence, loyalty, authenticity, and cooperation. Differences 
in the rank ordering of values are statistically insignificant 
when the study sample are divided according to each of the 
personal attributes. 
In the case of ambition, the pattern of rank ordering can 
also be described as highly consistent. Difference in the rank 
ordering of values when the respondents are divided according to 
length of service is no more than marginally significant in 
statistical terms. 
On the contrary, the pattern of rank ordering is somewhat 
inconsistent in the case of courage, justice, and respect and 
highly inconsistent in the case prudence, honesty, empathy, and 
leadership. 
How do the values compare with one another in terms of their 
rank ordering? When pairs of values are treated with the Sign 
Test it becomes clear that the modes of conduct can be divided 
into four subgroups into terms of rank ordering. (Table 8.17) 
To begin with, respect, justice, and empathy clearly belong to 
one group. Findings indicate that these modes of conduct are 
significantly different from all other modes of conduct. Within 
the group, however, no significant difference can be found. 
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Table 8.17 Significance of Sign Test for Modes of Conduct 
RES JUS EMP HON AUT PRU LOY BEN COU COO LEA AMB 
RES **++ + + + + + + + 
JUS *++ + + + + + + + 
EMP ++ + + + + + + + 
HON * * + + + + + + 
AUT * + + + + + + 
PRU * + + + + + 
LOY * * + + + 
BEN * + + + 
COU + + + 
COO + + 
LEA + 
AMB 
Note: + Diffeerence is significant at < . 05 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group of 
values? Firstly, values in this group come from two subgroups: 
justice from moral principles and empathy and respect from 
professional values. None of these values is from either moral 
virtues or institutional values. Secondly, values in this group 
are conceived to be highly preferable by the respondents. Their 
mean rankings range from 3.9 to 4.3; their mean rankings range 
from 3 to 4; and all of them have a mode of 1. Thirdly, it is 
almost impossible to distinguish one from the other in terms of 
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their degree of preferance. 
Similarly, honesty, authenticity, and prudence clearly 
belong to another group. With the exception of prudence which is 
not significantly different from loyalty, this group shows the 
same pattern as that of the previous group. Findings reveal that 
these modes of conduct are significantly different from all other 
modes of conduct. Again, within the group, no significant 
difference can be found. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group of 
values? Firstly, values in this group come from three subgroups: 
prudence from moral virtues; honesty from moral principles; and 
authenticity is the last of the professional values. So far, 
none of the values are from institutional values. Secondly, 
values in this group are conceived as moderately preferable by 
the respondents. Their mean rankings range from 5.7 to 6.3; the 
median rankings of all of these values are 6; and their modes 
range from 4 to 8. Thirdly, it is almost impossible to 
distinguish one from the other in terms of their degree of 
preference. 
Loyalty, benevolence, and courage form the third group which 
dem8nstrates exactly the same pattern as that of the second 
group. As is mentioned, loyalty provides the only exception. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group of 
values? Firstly, all values in this group come from moral 
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values: benevolence and courage from moral virtues, and loyalty 
from moral principles. Secondly, values in this group can also 
be described as moderately preferable. Their mean rankings range 
from 6.9 to 7.2; the median rankings of all of these values are 
7; and their modes range from 8 to 12. Thirdly, it is again 
almost impossible to distinguish one from the other in terms of 
their degree of preference. 
Finally, findings indicate that each of the remaining modes 
of conduct, namely, cooperation, leadership, and ambition, are 
statistically different from all other modes of conduct. Even 
though we consider them as a group, each may also be considered 
as a group in itself. 
What are some of the characteristics of this group of 
values? Firstly, all values in this group belong to the same 
subgroup of values: institutional values. Secondly, values in 
this group are conceived as least preferable by the respondents. 
Their mean rankings range from 8.2 to 9.4; their median rankings 
range from 9 to 11; and their modes range from 10 to 12. 
Thirdly, cooperation is conceived to be more preferable than both 
leadership and ambition, but it is almost impossible to 
distinguish leadership from ambition in terms of their degree of 
preference. 
To determine interrater reliability, the Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance (W) is employed. In the case of modes of conduct, 
the degree of concordance among the respondents is highly 
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significant. (Table 8.18) In other words, the respondents are 
highly consistent in the way they ranked the modes of conduct. 
Table 8.18 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) of 
Modes of Conduct 
No. of Cases W Chi-square D. F. Significance 
195 . 270 578.061 11 . 000 
How do these values asociate with one another other as a 
subgroup? And how do the subgroups associate with one another? 
To answer these questions, the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation 
Coefficient has been employed. (Table 8.19) For moral virtues, 
benevolence is found to be negatively associated with both 
courage and prudence, but courage and prudence are not associated 
with each other. In the case of moral principles, the only 
meaningful association is found between honesty and justice. The 
two are positively associated. No meaningful association can be 
detected either among institutional values or professional 
values. 
Between the subgroups, meaningful association can be 
detected between moral principles and professional values. The 
two groups are negatively associated in most combinations. 
Meaningful association can also be detected between professional 
values and institutional values; moral virtues and institutional 
values; and moral virtues and moral principles. In all cases, 
the groups are found to be negatively associated. No other 
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association can be detected. 
8.19 Significance of Spearman Correlation Coefficient for 
Modes of Conduct 
BEN COU PRU HON JUS LOY AUT EMP RES AMB COO LEA 
BEN - -*--*+ * - * - 
COU 
PRU 
HON +*-- * - 
JUS *-- - 
LOY -- * * * - 
AUT * * * * - 
EMP * - - - 
RES * * - 
AMB * * 
COO * 
LEA 
Note: + Correlation is positive and significant at 
< . 05 level. 
- Correlation is ngative and significant at 
< . 05 level. 
* Differnece is not significant at < . 05 level. 
In an attempt to determine if certain values do group 
together to form clusters, the modes of conduct are subject to 
factor analysis. Findings indicate that three clusters can be 
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isolated. (Table 8.20) Included in the first cluster are five 
values. Benevolence, empathy and respect are found to be 
negatively associated with ambition and leadership. In the 
second cluster of four values, honesty, justice, and loyalty are 
found to be negatively correlated with authenticity. Finally, in 
the third cluster of three values, courage and prudence are found 
to be negatively associated with cooperation. On the whole, 
social values are positively associated with one another but 
negatively associated with personal values. 
Table 8.20 Factor Analysis of Modes of Conduct 
Values Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
BENEVOLENCE -. 61413 
COURAGE 
PRUDENCE 
HONESTY 
LOYALTY 
JUSTICE 
AUTHENTICITY 
EMPATHY -. 60720 
RESPECT -. 28212 
. 71892 
. 50715 
. 57013 
-. 58200 
-. 41880 
-. 70700 
AMBITION . 52649 
COOPERATION 
. 68246 
LEADERSHIP . 70882 
In concluding this section, it may be of interest to note 
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that the first six positions on the list are occupied by one 
moral virtues, two moral principles, and three professional 
values. Somewhat unhappily, institutional values have received 
little attention. They occupy the last three positions. This 
will undoubtedly have effect on the profession's attempt to 
become accountable. On the other hand, just as it is expected, 
the three most preferred values in social work: authenticity, 
empathy, and respect, stand out very clearly. Together they 
represent the corner stones of the profession. Almost equally as 
important are the moral principles which guide human behaviour. 
However, benevolence is somewhat disappointing. Where is our 
feeling of compassion for the sufferings of our clients? This 
relates to the profession's code of ethics and we will return to 
this in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Nine 
The Value-Action Relationship Survey 
9.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this second survey is to examine the 
relationship between values and action. Respondents to the 
survey were given twelve case situations. Following the 
presentation of each case situation, respondents were asked to 
respond to a short statement and to rank a group of values 
according to their preference, in the capacity of social workers. 
The instruction was to indicate agreement or disagreement with 
the action specified in the statement and to put 1 next to the 
value which was conceived to be the most important one, 2 next to 
the value which was conceived to be second in importance, and 3 
next to the value which was conceived to be third in importance 
in guiding them to their decisions. Remaining values should not 
be numbered. 
In coding, it was discovered that there were five different 
patterns in the way respondents completed this section of 
the 
questionnaire. 
1. Instructions were closely followed and the first three 
values were numbered 1,2, and 3. When this happened, each 
of the remaining values received a rank of 5 which was, in 
effect, the average of 4,5, and 6. 
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2. Instructions were only partly followed and the first two 
values were numbered 1 and 2. When this happened, each of 
the remaining values received a rank of 4.5, which was, in 
effect, the average of 3,4,5, and 6. 
3. Instructions were only partly followed and the first 
value was numbered 1. When this happened, each of the 
remaining values received a rank of 4, which was, in effect, 
the average of 2,3,4,5, and 6. 
4. Instructions were only partly followed and all the 
values were numbered, from 1 to 6. When this happened, the 
first three, from 1 to 3, were retained, and the last three, 
from 4 to 6, received a rank of 5. 
5. Instructions were not followed and none of the values 
was numbered. When this happened, the case was considered 
invalid and was, therefore, discarded. 
This chapter describes the case situations individually. It 
describes the first case situation in great detail and, for the 
remaining case situations, the findings are summarized. In each 
case situation, the report begins with a description of the 
degree of preference of values when the case situation is, and is 
not specified. (See, for example, Table 9.1.1 and 9.1.2) It 
follows with a comparison of their mean rankings and composite 
rank orderings in these two situations. (See, for example, Table 
9.1.1,9.1.2 and 9.1.3) The assumption is that if values guide 
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action, there is little change in their mean rankings and 
composite rank orderings even after the case situation is 
specified. Theoretically, mean rankings may range from a high of 
1.0 to a low of 5.0, with an average of 3.5. 
Mean rankings of values before the case situation is 
specified are obtained by undergoing the following procedures: 
1. Values which appear in the case situation are extracted 
from the list of values in the Value Survey, 
2. Ranks which have been assigned to these values in the 
Value Survey are rearranged in order of magnitude, and 
3. Ranks of 1,2,3, and 5 are reassigned to these values 
according to the rearranged order. 
In the Value Survey, one respondent, for instance, assigned 
to ambition, cooperation, leadership, authenticity, empathy, and 
respect ranks of 11,7,12,5,4, and 2 respectively. After 
going through these procedures, reassigned ranks for these values 
become 5,5,5,3,2, and 1 respectively. This new set of 
rankings can now be used for analysis and comparison. 
In each case situation, the report ends with a comparison of 
the mean rankings of those who agreed and those who disagreed 
with the statement. (See, for example, Table 9.1.4) 
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This chapter also describes the case situations as a 
totality. It begins with a description of mean rankings of 
values before and when case situations are specified. (See, for 
example, Table 9.6.5 and 9.6.6) It follows with a comparison of 
their mean rankings in these two situations. (See, for example, 
Table 9.6.7) 
Also included in this chapter is a description of the 
correlation between composite rank orderings of values when the 
case situation is, and is not specified. (See, for example, 
Table 9.6.8) 
Finally, the report includes a brief description of inter- 
rater reliability in each of these case situations. (See, for 
example, Table 9.6.9) 
9.2 Rank Ordering of Modes of Conduct in Case Situations 
9.2.1 Case Situation No. 1 
The scenario: You supervise a unit of eight social workers. 
Annie is by far the most experienced and the most capable one 
among them. In appreciation of her work, you have recently 
submitted a strong recommendation to the administration to 
support her bid for promotion. 
Last week Annie was out all week on sick leave. She 
returned to work earlier this week bringing with her a note from 
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her doctor confirming her illness. In the meantime your cousin 
had been on a trip to Malaysia all of last week. When you had 
dinner with her yesterday, she told you all about the trip and 
showed you the photos of the interesting people she had met on 
the trip. Annie was among them. 
When you confronted Annie this morning, she readily admitted 
her fault, apologized for her dishonesty, and promised that she 
would not repeat the same mistake ever again. 
The statement: In view of Annie's excellent performance in the 
past, you forgive her for her dishonesty and take no further 
action. 
The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; honesty, justice, 
and loyalty. 
The issue: This is clearly a case where the moral principle of 
honesty is being violated. However, does it imply that the 
social worker who has violated this important principle must be 
deprived of her prospect for promotion in spite of her excellent 
performance in the past? To highlight this important issue, the 
researcher purposely come up with the statement mentioned above. 
The intention is to find out whether there is any value in this 
group which is conceived to be more preferable than honesty. Can 
it be benevolence? courage? justice? loyalty? or prudence? 
Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
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specified, justice is by far the most preferred value in this 
group. This conclusion is supported by the fact that more than 
one-third of the respondents (35.6 percent) considered this value 
as "most preferable". Moreover, about four-fifths of the 
respondents (79.4 percent) included this value in the category 
labelled "highly preferable" (i. e., ranks 1 to 3). This results 
in a mean ranking of 2.4. (Table 9.1.1) 
Table 9.1.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 1 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
BEN 17.5 41.2 58.8 3.7 4 
COU 7.7 32.0 68.0 4.1 6 
PRU 11.3 49.0 51.0 3.6 3 
HON 20.1 59.8 40.2 3.2 2 
JUS 35.6 79.4 20.6 2.4 1 
LOY 7.7 38.7 61.3 3.9 5 
Second on the list is honesty which has a mean ranking of 
3.2. Even so, about one-fifth of the respondents (20.1 percent) 
included this value as "most preferable" and almost three-fifths 
(59.8 percent) included it as "highly preferable". 
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The four remaining values are close to one another. 
Prudence is third with a mean ranking of 3.6, benevolence is 
fourth with a mean ranking of 3.7, loyalty is fifth with a mean 
ranking of 3,9, and courage comes last with a mean ranking of 
4.1. Among the respondents, 41.2 percent included benevolence, 
32.0 percent included courage, 49.0 percent included prudence, 
and 38.7 percent included loyalty as "highly preferable". 
When the case situation is specified, honesty replaces 
justice to become the most preferred value in the group. In 
actual figures, 41.8 percent of the respondents considered 
honesty as "most preferable" and 83.0 percent included it in the 
category of "highly preferable". These represent a sharp 
increase in its degree of preference and give it a mean ranking 
of 2.3. In other words, about two-fifths of the respondents feel 
that since Annie has violated the important principle of honesty, 
she should be deprived of the opportunity for promotion. (Table 
9.1.2) 
Moreover, findings indicate that justice is almost as 
important as honesty in this case situation. Even though only 
32.0 percent of the respondents selected justice as the most 
preferred value, as much as 82.0 percent included it as "highly 
preferable". These give justice a mean ranking of 2.4, just 
below that of honesty. In other words, about one-third of the 
respondents feel that one's decision should not be based on 
honesty, it should be based on what is right and proper to do. 
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Table 9.1.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in 
Case No. 1 When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
Mean Rank 
BEN 9.3 18.6 81.4 4.4 6 
COU 4.6 23.7 76.3 4.3 5 
PRU 6.7 33.0 67.0 4.1 4 
HON 41.8 83.0 17.0 2.3 1 
JUS 32.0 82.0 18.0 2.4 2 
LOY 5.7 57.2 42.8 3.5 3 
Third on the list is loyalty. Among the respondents, only 
5.7 percent considered this value as "most preferable", but as 
much as 57.2 percent included it as "highly preferable". These 
produces a mean ranking of 3.5, very much lower than both honesty 
and justice. 
In the case of moral virtues, they occupy the last three 
places on the list. Among the respondents, 9.3 percent selected 
benevolence, but only 4.6 percent selected courage, and 6.7 
percent selected prudence as the most preferred value in helping 
them come to their decisions. Moreover, 18.6 percent included 
benevolence, 23.7 percent included courage, and 33.0 percent 
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included prudence in the category of "highly preferable". In 
comparison, prudence is fourth with a mean ranking of 4.1, 
courage is fifth with a mean ranking of 4.3, and benevolence is 
last with a mean ranking of 4.4. Their mean rankings are low and 
very close to one another. 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
What observations can be made from the degree of preference of 
values in this case situation? One, with the exception of 
justice, differences in the mean rankings of values when the case 
situation is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically 
significant for all other values. Moreover, without any 
exception, there are changes in the composite rank orderings of 
values. 
As it is expected, difference in mean ranking is most 
significant in the case of honesty. When the case situation is 
not specified, the mean ranking of this value is 3.2. However, 
when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 
2.3. This produces a positive difference of 0.9. Besides, as a 
result of this improvement, its composite rank moves up from the 
second to occupy the first position on the list. (Table 9.1.3) 
Quite the contrary, difference in mean ranking is found to 
be statistically insignificant in the case of justice. In both 
situations, justice has a mean ranking of 2.4. Its composite 
rank slips, however, from the first to the second position when 
the case situation is specified. 
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Table 9.1.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 1 
Mean of ist Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
BEN 3.732 4.410 -. 678 + 
COU 4.103 4.343 -. 240 ++ 
PRU 3.608 4.064 -. 456 + 
HON 3.201 2.253 . 948 + 
JUS 2.438 2.387 . 051 
LOY 3.912 3.544 . 368 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Changes in mean rankings and composite rank orderings can 
also be observed in other values. When the case situation is not 
specified, loyalty is fifth with a mean ranking of 3.9. However, 
when the case situation is specified, it ranks third with a mean 
ranking of 3.5. There is a positive difference of 0.4. 
Similarly, when the case situation is not specified, 
prudence is third with a mean ranking of 3.6, benevolence is 
fourth with a mean ranking of 3.7, and courage is sixth with a 
mean ranking of 4.1. However, when the case situation is 
specified, prudence is fourth with a mean ranking of 4.1, courage 
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is fifth with a mean ranking of 4.3, and benevolence is sixth 
with a mean rankings of 4.4. This indicates a negative 
difference of 0.7 for benevolence, 0.2 for courage, and 0.5 for 
prudence. 
It may be of interest to note that, in this case situation, 
positive differences can be observed in all moral principles and 
negative differences can be observed in all moral virtues. 
Two, changes in mean rankings and composite rank orderings 
of values seem to be a result of greater preference given to 
honesty when the case situation is specified. This is expected 
because this case situation highlights the importance of this 
moral principle. However, the importance of justice has not been 
underrated. In the first place, its mean ranking remains more or 
less the same before and when the situation is specified. 
Besides, even though its composite rank slips from the first to 
the second position when the case situation is specified, 
difference in mean rankings between honesty and justice is only 
minimal. 
Among the respondents, 41 agreed but 153 disagreed with the 
short statement following the presentation of the case situation. 
With the exception of loyalty, differences in mean rankings 
between these two groups of respondents are found to be 
significant for all other values. (Table 9.1.4) 
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Table 9.1.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement in Case No. 1 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
BEN 2.707 4.866 -2.159 + 
COU 3.707 4.513 -0.806 + 
PRU 3.439 4.232 -0.793 + 
HON 3.390 1.948 1.442 + 
JUS 4.122 1.922 2.200 + 
LOY 3.634 3.520 0.114 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
For those who agreed to forgive Annie for her dishonesty and 
take no further action, the most preferred value is benevolence. 
It has a mean ranking of 4.4 for all respondents but for those 
who agreed, its mean ranking turns out to be 2.7. On the other 
hand, among the respondents who disagreed with the statement, the 
two most preferred values are honesty and justice. Honesty has a 
mean ranking of 2.3 for all respondents and 1.9 for those who 
agreed. Similarly, justice has a mean ranking of 2.4 for all 
respondents and 1.9 again for those who agreed. 
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9.2.2 Case Situation No. 2 
The scenario: Beth, a client of yours, is an eight-year-old girl, 
the youngest of four children in the family. She has been a 
resident in a home for the mentally retarded for the last three 
years. According to the assessment she is trainable. 
Both of Beth's parents are employed. They visit her about 
once a month. For the past year she has also spent one weekend a 
month at home. Her home visits have been successful. Both Beth 
and her family look forward to these monthly visits. 
Beth is now ready to return to her family. She is excited 
about the idea. In a meeting with Beth's parents you explain to 
them about the home's recommendation and inform them about 
community resources which can be obtained in the neighbourhood 
where they live. However, Beth's parents refuse to consider the 
recommendation. They are happy with the present arrangement and 
they feel that it would be too much of a strain on the family if 
Beth is to live at home again. 
The statement: In view of the parents' objection, you postpone 
the plan for Beth's discharge. 
The values: Ambition, cooperation, and leadership; authenticity, 
empathy, and respect. 
The issue: This is clearly a case when professional values come 
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into conflict with institutional values. As social workers we 
are obliged to serve in the interest of our clients and in the 
interest of the institution. But whose interest comes first? 
Besides, how much does the recommendation of the treatment team 
count? Is it our duty to implement the recommendation of the 
treatment team in which we participate as a member? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, empathy and respect are found 
to be "highly preferable". (Tables 9.2.1 and 9.2.2) 
Table 9.2.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 2 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most 
Preferable 
(Rank 1) 
(in 96) 
Highly 
Preferable 
(Ranks 1- 3) 
(in %) 
Least 
Preferable 
(Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) 
Mean Rank 
AMB 4.2 18.8 81.2 4.5 6 
COO 4.7 26.6 73.4 4.3 4 
LEA 3.6 20.8 79.2 4.5 5 
AUT 14.6 66.1 33.9 3.2 3 
EMP 37.5 80.2 19.8 2.4 2 
RES 35.4 87.5 12.5 2.2 1 
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Table 9.2.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in 
Case No. 2 When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most 
Preferable 
(Rank 1) 
(in %) 
Highly 
Preferable 
(Ranks 1- 3) 
(in %) 
Least 
Preferable 
(Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) 
Mean Rank 
AMB 3.6 12.0 88.0 4.6 6 
COO 13.5 51.6 48.4 3.6 3 
LEA 3.1 23.4 76.6 4.4 5 
AUT 13.5 48.4 51.6 3.6 4 
EMP 38.5 85.9 14.1 2.2 1 
RES 27.6 76.0 24.0 2.6 2 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
Differences in the mean ranking of values when the case situation 
is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically 
significant for authenticity, cooperation and respect. Not 
unexpectedly, the value which emerges from a position of relative 
insignificance to a position of relative importance is 
cooperation. Findings indicate that when the case situation is 
not specified, it ranks fourth with a mean ranking of 4.3. 
However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks third 
with a mean ranking of 3.6. This produces a difference of 0.75. 
(Table 9.2.3) 
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In the case of respect, it ranks first with a mean ranking 
of 2.2 when the case situation is not specified. However, when 
the case situation is specified, its composite rank slips from 
the first to the second position and its mean ranking becomes 
2.6. A negative difference of 0.4 can be observed. As for 
authenticity, a negative difference of 0.4 is again observed when 
the case situation is specified. At the same time, its composite 
rank slips from the third to the fourth position. 
Table 9.2.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 2 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
AMB 4.479 4.643 -. 164 
coo 4.313 3.555 . 758 + 
LEA 4.464 4.352 . 112 
AUT 3.208 3.635 -. 427 + 
EMP 2.359 2.211 . 148 
RES 2.177 2.604 -. 427 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Among the respondents, 120 agreed but 72 disagreed with the 
short statement following the presentation of the case situation. 
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With the exception of cooperation, differences in the mean 
ranking of values between these two groups of respondents are 
significant for all other values. Difference is most significant 
in the case of respect. Among those who agreed to postpone the 
plan for Beth's discharge, the mean ranking for respect is 2.2. 
On the other hand, among those who disagreed, the mean ranking 
for respect is reduced to 3.2. A negative difference of 1.0 is 
noted. The same applies to empathy. A difference of 0.8 is 
noted when mean rankings of these two groups are compared. 
(Table 9.2.4) 
Table 9.2.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement in Case No. 2 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AMB 4.788 4.403 0.385 + 
COO 3.546 3.570 -0.024 
LEA 4.563 4.000 0.563 + 
AUT 3.967 3.083 0.884 + 
EMP 1.913 2.708 -0.795 + 
RES 2.225 3.236 -1.011 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.3 Case Situation No. 3 
The scenario: Calvin, a sixteen-year-old student, has a spinal 
problem as a result of an injury suffered about a year ago. He 
has been receiving constant and painful treatments since the day 
he was injured. 
Recently Calvin confided to you, a medical social worker at 
the hospital in which he is receiving treatment, that he had 
decided to commit suicide. The reason he wants to put an end to 
his life is that his widowed father wants to remarry and he feels 
that he is in the way. Besides, he feels that the pain is 
becoming more and more intolerable. 
Calvin does not want anyone, not even his father, to know 
about his decision. He asked you for help in finding a foolproof 
way to end his life. 
The statement: In view of Calvin's medical condition, you comply 
with his request. 
The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; authenticity, 
empathy, and respect. 
The issue: This is obviously a case when professional values come 
into serious conflict with moral virtues. As social workers we 
are obliged to understand the pains and sufferings our clients 
are going through in their lives and to respect their decisions 
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when it comes to how their lives are to be lived. Yet, we are 
also obliged to protect our clients in case of danger and to act 
rationally and cautiously in their best interest. What action, 
in this case, is in the best interest of Calvin? 
Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
specified, both empathy and respect are considered as "most 
preferable". However, the composite rank ordering of values 
changes dramatically when the case situation is specified. 
Prudence and courage become the most preferred values. (Tables 
9.3.1 and 9.3.2) 
Table 9.3.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking and 
Composite Rank Orderin g of Values in Case No. 3 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AUT 12.4 46.9 53.1 3.7 3 
EMP 32.5 74.7 25.3 2.6 2 
RES 29.9 78.4 21.6 2.6 1 
BEN 9.8 32.5 67.5 4.0 5 
cou 5.2 25.8 74.2 4.3 6 
PRU 10.3 41.8 58.2 3.8 4 
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Table 9.3.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in 
Case No. 3 When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in 96) (in %) 
Mean Rank 
AUT 12.4 43.8 56.2 3.7 4 
EMP 17.5 58.8 41.2 3.3 3 
RES 2.6 23.7 76.3 4.4 6 
BEN 5.6 29.4 70.6 4.2 5 
COU 26.8 62.9 37.1 3.0 2 
PRU 35.1 79.9 20.1 2.4 1 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
With the exception of authenticity and benevolence, difference in 
the mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not 
specified, are found to be statistically significant for all 
other values. Moreover, such differences are found to be 
exceptionally high for courage, prudence, and respect. (Table 
9.3.3) 
When the case situation is not spcified, respect ranks first 
with a mean ranking of 2.6. However, when the case situation is 
specified, it ranks sixth with a mean ranking of 4.4. A 
difference of 1.8 can be recorded. The reverse is found to be 
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true for courage and prudence. When the case situation is not 
specified, prudence ranks fourth with a mean ranking of 3.8 and 
courage ranks sixth with a mean ranking of 4.3. However, when 
the case situation is specified, prudence becomes first with a 
mean ranking of 2.4. A difference of 1.4 is noted. Similarly, 
courage becomes second with a mean ranking of 3.0. This results 
in a difference of 1.3. Does this imply that when the question 
of life is at stake, we, as social workers, would turn 
paternalistic and begin to take away our clients' right to self- 
determination? 
Table 9.3.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 3 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
AUT 3.665 3.745 -. 080 
EMP 2.613 3.286 -. 673 + 
RES 2.572 4.389 -1.817 + 
BEN 4.046 4.198 -. 152 
coU 4.304 3.010 1.294 + 
PRU 3.804 2.371 1.433 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
355 
The general feeling of the respondents is that Calvin's 
suicidal attempt should not be supported. Among the respondents, 
only 3 agreed to comply with Calvin's request. This may help to 
explain why differences in mean rankings are found to be 
statistically insignificant for all values, excepting respect. 
(Table 9.3.4) 
Table 9.3.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement in Case No. 3 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AUT 5.000 3.725 1.275 
EMP 3.000 3.291 -0.291 
RES 1.667 4.432 -2.765 + 
BEN 3.667 4.207 -0.540 
coU 4.333 2.990 1.343 
PRU 3.333 2.356 0.977 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.4 Case Sitution No. 4 
The scenario: After marrying for eight years, Mrs. Chan divorced 
Mr. Chan and obtained custody of their child, May. However, six 
months after the divorce, Mrs. Chan was informed that her husband 
had remarried and was planning to appeal to court for the child's 
custody. Disturbed by the information Mrs. Chan approached a 
family service agency and requested for counseling service. 
In a series of four weekly interviews Mrs. Chan brought up a 
number of issues, including her reaction to the divorce, her 
feeling of loneliness and her fear of loosing May. She was 
especially concerned about her inability to cope with her 
daughter's temper tantrums. She also talked about various ways 
of handling her frustrations, including the use of physical 
restraint. 
This morning, you received a phone call from a social worker 
at the Social Welfare Department. She mentioned that she was 
preparing a report on the Chans for the custodial hearing. She 
requested for information about your interviews with Mrs. Chan. 
In her view, Mrs. Chan was incapable of raising May properly. 
The statement: In view of Mrs. Chan's present condition you 
refuse to release information about your interviews with her. 
The values: Benevolence, courage, and prudence; ambition, 
cooperation, and leadership. 
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The issue: We have here a case when moral values come into 
conflict with competence values. In social work, we place a 
strong emphasis on collaboration with other helping professions. 
Should we, therefore, share our information about Mrs. Chan with 
our colleague in the hope that a realistic plan can be worked out 
for the child? Or, %should we' keep the information to ourselves 
in order to protect the interest of Mrs. Chan? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, prudence is by far the most 
preferred value in this group. (Tables 9.4.1 and 9.4.2) 
Table 9.4.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 4 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AMB 5.7 25.0 75.0 4.3 6 
COO 11.5 47.9 52.1 3.6 4 
LEA 7.3 26.6 73.4 4.2 5 
BEN 26.0 59.9 40.1 3.1 2 
COU 15.6 64.1 35.9 3.1 3 
PRU 33.9 76.6 23.4 2.6 1 
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Table 9.4.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in 
Case No. 4 When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AMB 4.2 16.7 83.3 4.5 6 
COO 24.0 58.9 41.1 3.1 2 
LEA 3.6 20.3 79.7 4.4 5 
BEN 11.5 45.8 51.2 3.7 4 
cou 7.3 57.8 42.2 3.4 3 
PRU 49.5 92.2 7.8 1.8 1 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
With the exception of ambition and leadership, differences in the 
mean ranking of values when the case situation is, and is not 
specified, are found to be statistically significant for all 
other values. Difference is most significant in the case of 
prudence. When the case situation is not specified, it has a 
mean ranking of 2.6. However, when the case situation is 
specified, its mean ranking becomes 1.8. A difference of 0.75 is 
observed. Not unexpectedly, cooperation emerges again from a 
position of relative insignificance to a position of relative 
importance. When the case situation is not specified, it ranks 
fourth with a mean ranking of 3.6. However, when the case 
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situation is specified, it moves up to the second position with a 
mean ranking becomes 3.1. (Table 9.4.3) 
Table 9.4.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 4 
Mean of Ist Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
AMB 4.297 4.469 -. 172 
Coo 3.646 3.138 . 508 + 
LEA 4.229 4.409 -. 180 
BEN 3.115 3.688 -. 573 + 
COU 3.135 3.448 -. 313 
PRU 2.578 1.849 . 729 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Among the respondents, 77 agreed not to release information 
about interviews with Mrs. Chan. 115, however, disagreed. Among 
those who agreed, benevolence is often considered as the most 
preferred value alongside with prudence. On the other hand, 
among those who disagreed, cooperation is the most preferred 
value alongside with prudence. (Table 9.4.4) 
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Table 9.4.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement in Case No. 4 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AMB 4.344 4.552 -0.208 
coo 4.370 2.313 2.057 + 
LEA 4.357 4.444 -0.087 
BEN 3.084 4.091 -1.007 + 
cou 3.110 3.674 -0.564 + 
PRU 1.734 1.926 -0.192 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.5 Case Situation No. 5 
The scenario: You are the social worker in charge of the Big 
Brothers Programme which has proved to be extremely successful 
and is serving 100 young boys. Among the Big Brothers, you are 
particularly impressed by the performance of Edward who has been 
a big brother for seven months. 
One afternoon Edward mentioned that there was one problem he 
wanted to share with you in straight confidence. You assured him 
of your belief in the principle of confidentiality. 
Edward explained that he was originally unware of the 
programme's formal policy against accepting homosexuals as big 
brothers. Now that he knew he felt it obligated to inform you 
that he had been a homosexual for five years. He added that he 
would like very much to remain as a big brother, at least for 
Tommy, because their relationship was strong and seemed to be 
beneficial to both. He assured you that his homsexuality would 
not get in the way of this relationship. 
The statement: In view of Edward's homosexuality you ask him to 
resign as a volunteer of the Big Brothers Programme. 
The values: Honesty, justice, and loyalty; authenticity, empathy, 
and respect. 
The issue: We have here a case where morality comes into conflict 
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with professional values. Undoubtedly, homosexuality is totally 
unacceptable in the local context. The agency's policy is a true 
reflection of society's attitude towards the homosexuals. 
However, should the interest of Edward and Tommy be taken into 
consideration? 
Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
specified, empathy, justice, and respect are conceived to be more 
preferable. When the case situation is specified, however, 
honesty, justice, and respect are conceived to be more 
preferable. (Tables 9.5.1 and 9.5.2) 
Table 9.5.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 5 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AUT 11.9 39.7 60.3 3.9 5 
EMP 28.9 64.9 35.1 2.9 1 
RES 20.1 66.0 34.0 3.0 2 
HON 9.8 39.7 60.3 3.9 4 
JUS 25.8 62.4 37.6 3.0 3 
LOY 3.6 27.3 72.7 4.3 6 
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Table 9.5.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 5 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AUT 14.4 45.4 54.6 3.7 4 
EMP 7.7 35.6 64.4 4.0 6 
RES 24.7 57.7 42.3 3.2 2 
HON 18.6 52.1 47.9 3.4 3 
JUS 25.3 61.9 38.1 3.0 1 
LOY 9.3 45.4 54.6 3.8 5 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
Differences in the mean ranking of values when the case situation 
is, and is not specified, are found to be statistically 
significant for empathy, honesty, and loyalty. Difference is 
found to be greatest in the case of empathy. When the case 
situation is not specified, it ranks first with a mean ranking of 
2.9. However, when the case situation is specified, it ranks 
sixth with a mean ranking of 4.0. A difference of 1.1 can be 
recorded. (Table 9.5.3) 
Differences are found to be much smaller for honesty and 
loyalty. When the case situation is not specified, honesty has a 
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mean ranking of 3.9 and loyalty has a mean ranking of 4.3. 
However, when the case situation is specified, their mean 
rankings turn out to be 3.4 and 3.8 respectively, a difference of 
0.5 in both cases. 
Table 9.5.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 5 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
AUT 3.861 3.665 . 196 
EMP 2.902 4.000 -1.098 + 
RES 3.021 3.193 -. 172 
HON 3.876 3.366 . 510 + 
JUS 3.046 3.010 . 036 
LOY 4.294 3.766 . 528 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Among the respondents, 100 agreed to ask Edward to resign as 
a Big Brother and 94 disagreed. For those who agreed, honesty 
and justice are considered to be more preferable. On the other 
hand, for those who disagreed, respect is considered to be more 
preferable. (Table 9.5.4) 
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Table 9.5.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement in Case No. 5 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AUT 3.485 3.856 -0.371 
EMP 4.485 3.484 1.001 + 
RES 4.055 2.277 1.778 + 
HON 2.945 3.814 -0.869 + 
JUS 2.420 3.638 -1.218 + 
LOY 3.610 3.931 -0.321 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.6 Case Situation No. 6 
The scenario: Flora Lee is a fifteen-year-old girl but is 
functioning at the intellectual level of an eleven-year-old. One 
evening, Mrs. Lee noticed swelling in her daughter's abdomen. 
She took Flora to see Dr. Wong who explained to Flora that the 
swelling in her stomach was due to an infection and, because of 
that, she would have to go to a hospital at a later stage to have 
the problem corrected. 
Later, in the absence of Flora, Dr. Wong informed Mrs. Lee 
that her daughter was already five months pregnant. He suggested 
that Flora should not be told about her pregnancy. He was 
concerned about confusing and distressing Flora and felt that it 
was in her best interest not to be informed. He also suggested 
that Mrs. Lee should contact Social Welfare Department to arrange 
to have Flora's baby adopted. 
In your meeting with Mrs. Lee she expressed her ambivalence 
toward both of Dr. Wong's suggestions. She would like to have a 
second opinion from you. 
The statement: In view of Flora's limited intelligence you advise 
Mrs. Lee not to tell Flora about her pregnancy. 
The values: Honesty, justice, and loyalty; and ambition, 
cooperation, and leadership. 
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The issue: This case situation highlights the conflict between 
client's right to know and social workers' obligation to protect 
them from being harmed. Moreover, the issue of partnership is 
brought back again in this case situation. As a member of the 
treatment team, are we obliged to follow the recommendation of 
the team? Do we have the duty to persuade our clients to accept 
the recommendation? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, honesty and justice are 
considered as "highly preferable". (Table 9.6.1 and 9.6.2) 
Table 9.6.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 6 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AMB 7.3 18.3 81.7 4.4 6 
COO 4.7 34.6 65.4 4.1 4 
LEA 4.2 20.9 79.1 4.4 5 
HON 25.7 78.5 21.5 2.6 2 
JUS 45.5 90.1 9.9 2.0 1 
LOY 12.6 57.6 42.4 3.4 3 
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Table 9.6.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank Ordering of Values in Case No. 6 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
AMB 3.1 15.2 84.8 4.5 6 
COO 8.9 31.4 68.6 4.1 4 
LEA 3.7 24.1 75.9 4.3 5 
HON 36.6 76.4 23.6 2.4 2 
JUS 39.3 83.8 16.2 2.2 1 
LOY 8.4 62.3 37.7 3.4 3 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
With the exception of justice, difference in the rank ordering of 
values is not significant for any other values. Even in the case 
of justice, the difference is found to be very small, 
0.2. 
(Table 9.6.3) 
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Table 9.6.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 6 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
AMB 4.445 4.531 -. 086 
COO 4.115 4.079 . 036 
LEA 4.435 4.322 . 113 
HON 2.628 2.435 . 193 
JUS 1.979 2.236 -. 257 ++ 
LOY 3.398 3.398 . 000 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that 
Flora should be told about her pregnancy. Among the respondents, 
only 31 agreed to advise Mrs. Lee not to inform Flora. For those 
who agreed, cooperation and loyalty are considered to be more 
preferable. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, honesty 
and justice are conceived to be more preferable. (Table 9.6.4) 
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Table 9.6.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AMB 3.936 4.647 -0.711 + 
COO 2.468 4.391 -1.923 + 
LEA 3.694 4.444 -0.750 + 
HON 4.436 2.047 2.389 + 
JUS 3.532 1.984 1.548 + 
LOY 2.936 3.488 -0.552 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
9.2.7 Summary of Findings 
Figures from Table 9.6.5 indicate that when case situations 
are not specified, justice, empathy, and respect are conceived as 
highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.5, 
2.6, and 2.6 respectively. In each and every case situation, 
their mean rankings have never fallen below 3.0. 
Immediately following this important trio we can find 
honesty and prudence. The mean of their mean rankings are 3.2 
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and 3.3 respectively. Further down the list we can find a 
cluster of five values, including benevolence, authenticity, 
courage, loyalty, and cooperation. All of these values can be 
considered as moderately preferable. The mean of their mean 
rankings are 3.6,3.6,3.8,3.9, and 4.0 respectively. Finally, 
we can find two values which can be considered as least 
preferable: ambition and leadership. The means of their mean 
rankings are the same, 4.4. 
Table 9.6.5 Mean Rankings of Modes of Conduct 
When Case Situations Are Not Specified 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Mean Rank 
BEN 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.6 6 
cou 4.1 4.3 3.1 3.8 8 
PRU 3.6 3.8 2.6 3.3 5 
HON 3.2 3.9 2.6 3.2 4 
JUS 2.4 3.0 2.0 2.5 1 
LOY 3.9 4.3 3.4 3.9 9 
AMB 4.5 4.3 4.4 4.4 11 
coo 4.3 3.6 4.1 4.0 10 
LEA 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.4 11 
AUT 3.2 3.7 3.9 3.6 6 
EMP 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.6 2 
RES 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.6 2 
When case situations are specified, however, the degree of 
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preference of these values changes to a certain extent. Figures 
from Table 9.6.6 indicate that justice, honesty, and prudence are 
conceived as highly preferable. The means of their mean rankings 
are 2.5,2.7, and 2.8 respectively. In other words, empathy and 
respect have been replaced by honesty and prudence. 
Table 9.6.6 Mean Rankings of Modes of Conduct 
When Case Situations Are Specified 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Mean Rank 
BEN 4.4 4.2 3.7 4.1 10 
COU 4.3 3.0 3.4 3.6 6 
PRU 4.1 2.4 1.8 2.8 3 
HON 2.3 3.4 2.4 2.7 2 
JUS 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.5 1 
LOY 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.6 6 
AMB 4.6 4.5 4.5 4.5 12 
coo 3.6 3.1 4.1 3.6 6 
LEA 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.4 11 
AUT 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 9 
EMP 2.2 3.3 4.0 3.2 4 
RES 2.6 4.4 3.2 3.4 5 
Incidentally, empathy and respect have not fallen too far 
behind. As a matter of fact, they are found tracing honesty and 
prudence in the fourth and the fifth positions. The means of 
their mean rankings turn out to be 3.2 and 3.4 resepctively. 
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Both of these values can also be considered as highly preferable. 
Further down the list we have a cluster of five values, 
namely, courage, loyalty, cooperation, authenticity, and 
benevolence. All of these values can be considered as moderately 
preferable. The means of their mean rankings are found to be 
3.6,3.6,3.6,3.7, and 4.0 respectively. Finally, we can find 
two values which can be considered as least preferable: 
leadership and ambition. The means of their mean rankings are 
4.4 and 4.5 respectively. 
By comparing these two tables, we conclude that the 
following modes of conduct are conceived as highly preferable 
among social workers: empathy, honesty, justice, prudence, and 
respect. Furthermore, we note that the following modes of 
conduct are conceived as moderately preferable: authenticity, 
benevolence, cooperation, courage, and loyalty. Finally, we also 
note that the following modes of conduct are conceived as least 
preferable: ambition and leadership. 
The claim that values serve as a guide to action is not well 
sustantiated. By referring to Table 9.6.7, we can observed that 
with the exception of Case No. 6, difference of mean rankings is 
found to be statistically signigicant for some modes of conduct 
in all other cases. Differences are found to be the greatest in 
Case No. 3. We can observe from the same table that the degree 
of preference for courage, prudence, honesty, and cooperation 
increases significantly when the case situations are specified. 
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Quite the contrary, the degree of preference for benevolence, 
empathy, and respect decreases significantly when the case 
situations are specified. There is little change, however, for 
justice, loyalty, ambition, leadership, and authenticity. 
Table 9.6.7 Difference in Mean Rankings of 
Modes of Conduct 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
BEN -0.7 * -0.6 
COU * 1.3 
PRU -0.5 1.4 0.7 
HON 0.9 0.5 
JUS 
LOY * 0.5 
AMB * * * 
COO 0.8 0.5 
LEA * * * 
AUT -0.4 
EMP * -0.7 -1.1 
RES -0.4 -1.8 
Note: * Difference is not significant at < . 01 level. 
When the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient is 
computed for each value in each case situation, it is observed 
that significant correlation can be found in 30 out of 36 
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incidences. In two case situations, significant correlation can 
be found in all six values. In three case situations, 
significant correlation can be found in five values. In just one 
case situation, significant correlation can be found in only 
three values. (Table 9.6.8) 
Table 9.6.8 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient 
of Modes of Conduct 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 
BEN * ++ + 
COU + * + 
PRU * + + 
HON + * + 
JUS + + + 
LOY * + + 
AMB * + + 
COO + + + 
LEA + + + 
AUT ++ ++ + 
EMP + + + 
RES + + + 
Note: ++ Correlation is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Correlation is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Correlation is not significant at < . 05 level. 
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Looking at the table from another perspective, it is 
observed that significant correlation can be found in all three 
case situations for six modes of conduct: justice, cooperation, 
leadership, authenticity, empathy, and respect. Moreover, 
significant correlation can be found in two case situations for 
the remaining values: benevolence, courage, prudence, honesty, 
loyalty, and ambition. 
When the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is computed for 
each case situation, it is found that the coefficient is 
highly significant in four case situations, moderately 
significant in Case No. 3, and marginally significant in Case No. 
5. (Table 9.8.9) 
Table 9.6.9 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) 
According to Case Situations 
Case Situation 
No. 
No. of 
Cases 
W Chi-Square D. F. Level of 
Significance 
1 194 . 302 293.117 5 . 000 
2 192 . 293 281.220 5 . 000 
3 194 . 188 181.922 5 . 000 
4 192 . 307 294.313 5 . 000 
5 194 . 045 43.980 5 . 000 
6 191 . 315 301.049 5 . 000 
377 
In other words, respondents are found to be highly 
consistent in their pattern of rank ordering in four cases, 
moderately consistent in one case, and minimally consistent in 
the remaining case. 
9.3 Rank Ordering of End-States of Existence in Case Situations 
9.3.1 Case Situation No. 7 
The scenario: You are the superintendent of a residential 
training institution for boys with behavioural problems. It is 
located not too far away from private homes. Over the past years 
there had been many incidents of burglary in these private homes 
some of which were committed by boys living in the Hostel. 
About a week ago, you received a letter from the Government 
explaining that the site for the hostel would have to be 
reclaimed for the purpose of redevelopment into private homes. 
In return, you would be offered a site in a more remote area 
where a brand new hostel could be built. 
At the staff meeting, most staff resented the idea. They 
were of the opinion that the decision for reprovisioning was 
undemocratic. It favoured private developers and residents of 
private homes in the neighbourhood but it ignored their interest 
and the interest of boys living in the hostel. They proposed 
that the Government's offered by rejected. 
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The statement: In view of the reasons given by your staff, you 
refuse to accept the Government's offer. 
The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; freedom, peace, 
and progress. 
The issue: This is clearly a case of conflict of interest. Whose 
interest is paramount: private developers and residents of 
private homes, or the children? Undoubtedly, the interest of 
the children will be affected by the reprovisioning because, 
unavoidably, they will be isolated from the mainstream of life in 
the centre of the city. On the other hand, the feeling of 
security of life and of investment will definitely be enhanced as 
a result of the reprovisioning. Should social workers think in 
terms of the interest of the clients they serve, or in the 
interest of the public at large? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrepective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, equality and democracy are 
considered as "highly preferable". Freedom, on the other hand, 
is no longer considered as "highly preferable" when the case 
situation is specified. (Table 9.7.1 and 9.7.2) 
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Table 9.7.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 7 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
DEM 13.9 65.5 34.5 3.2 2 
EQU 40.2 82.0 18.0 2.3 1 
FRA 5.2 27.3 72.7 4.3 6 
FRE 17.0 59.8 40.2 3.2 3 
PEA 12.9 33.0 67.0 4.0 4 
PRO 10.8 32.5 67.5 4.0 5 
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Table 9.7.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 7 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
I Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
DEM 27.3 67.0 33.0 2.8 2 
EQU 35.1 77.8 22.2 2.4 1 
FRA 8.8 40.7 59.3 3.9 4 
FRE 6.2 34.5 65.5 4.1 6 
PEA 11.3 29.4 70.6 4.1 5 
PRO 11.3 49.0 51.0 3.6 3 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
Difference is most significant in the case of freedom. When the 
case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 3.2. 
However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking 
turns out to be 4.1, a difference of 0.9. Differences are also 
significant for democracy, fraternity, and progress, but such 
differences tend to be small when compared with that of freedom. 
(Table 9.7.3) 
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Table 9.7.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 7 
Mean of ist Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
DEM 3.186 2.840 . 346 ++ 
EQU 2.284 2.420 -. 136 
FRA 4.268 3.894 . 374 + 
FRE 3.232 4.111 -. 879 + 
PEA 3.995 4.106 -. 111 
PRO 4.036 3.629 . 407 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Among the respondents, 112 agreed to refuse to accept the 
Government's offer while 82 disagreed. For those who agreed, 
democracy and equality are considered as more preferable. On the 
other hand, for those who disagreed, peace and progress are 
considered as more preferable. (Table 9.7.4) 
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Table 9.7.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
DEM 2.089 3.866 -1.777 + 
EQU 1.857 3.189 -1.332 + 
FRA 4.071 3.652 0.419 ++ 
FRE 3.920 4.372 -0.452 ++ 
PEA 4.893 3.031 1.862 + 
PRO 4.170 2.890 1.280 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.8 Case Situation No. 8 
The scenario: Mr. and Mrs. Hung were happily married for sixty- 
two years. Until about a year ago, both of them managed to 
maintain good health. However, during the week before his 
eighty-first birthday, Mr. Hung suffered a severe stroke. Since 
then he was unable to walk without being held, could no longer 
read or understand conversations, was incontinent, and had 
considerable difficulty expressing himself clearly. 
After several weeks you informed Mrs. Hung that the hospital 
had done about all it could to help her husband and that a 
decision would need to be made about his future care. In 
response, Mrs. Hung said that she could not bear the thought of 
having someone else care for her husband and that she would like 
to try to care for him herself. She realized that it might be 
very hard for her to provide such care in view of her advanced 
age. 
The statement: In view of Mrs. Hung's determination you support 
her plan and prepare her for what caring for her husband might 
entail. 
The values: Comfort, love, and security; happiness, power, and 
pride. 
The issue: This is clearly a case which involves personal choice 
of well-being. Mrs. Hung is determined to sacrifice her survival 
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values in order to satisfy her self-actualizing values. Her 
ambition may not be materialised. She may experience a lot of 
difficulty in trying to care for her husband. Should we 
discourage her from doing this? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, love is conceived to be by far 
the most preferred value within the group. When the case 
situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.1. When 
the case situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 1.9. 
(Table 9.8.1 and 9.8.2) 
Table 9.8.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 8 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
COM 8.8 37.8 62.2 4.0 5 
LOV 47.7 85.5 14.5 2.1 1 
SEC 15.0 47.2 52.8 3.6 3 
HAP 9.3 52.8 47.2 3.6 2 
POW 6.7 30.6 69.4 4.1 6 
PRI 12.4 46.1 53.9 3.7 4 
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Table 9.8.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 8 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
COM 4.1 32.6 67.4 4.2 6 
LOV 59.6 84.5 15.5 1.9 1 
SEC 10.9 43.5 56.5 3.7 3 
HAP 8.3 54.4 45.6 3.5 2 
POW 8.3 41.5 58.5 3.8 4 
PRI 8.3 41.5 58.5 3.8 5 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
With the exception of power, difference in the mean ranking of 
values is not found to be significant for any other values. Even 
in the case of power, the difference is only 0.3. (Table 9.8.3) 
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Table 9.8.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 8 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
COM 3.959 4.150 -. 191 
LOV 2.088 1.948 . 140 
SEC 3.570 3.738 -. 168 
HAP 3.560 3.503 . 057 
POW 4.145 3.829 . 316 + 
PRI 3.679 3.832 -. 153 
Note: + Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that Mrs. 
Hung's plan should be supported. Among the respondents, only 28 
disagreed with the action specified in the statement. For those 
who agreed, love is considered as the most preferred value. On 
the other hand, for those who disagreed, power and security are 
considered as more preferable. (Table 9.8.4) 
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Table 9.8.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
COM 4.209 3.804 0.405 
LOV 1.703 3.393 -1.690 + 
SEC 3.955 2.464 1.491 + 
HAP 3.367 4.304 -0.937 + 
POW 3.973 2.982 0.991 + 
pRI 3.794 4.054 -0.260 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01. level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.9 Case Situation No. 9 
The scenario: Mr. Ip was placed in a mental hospital about two 
years ago for killing and wounding several young children. 
According to the medical staff of the hospital, they have done 
all that is possible to help him recover. In their view, Mr. Ip 
is now ready to be released to a halfway house for discharged 
mental patients where he can learn to readapt himself to life in 
the family and the society. 
You are the superintendent of the halfway house. In a way 
you share the view of the medical staff and you believe that the 
halfway house will be able to give him support that is most 
needed at this stage of his life. However, in view of Mr. Ip's 
violent behaviour which led to his admission, you can foretell 
the residents' reluctance in accepting him into the halfway 
house. You can also predict the society's reaction to the 
halfway house once its people learn about his presence. 
The statement: In view of the threat which Mr. Ip may bring to 
the halfway house, you refuse to admit him. 
The values: Freedom, peace, and progress; comfort, love, and 
security. 
The issue: This is clearly a case which involves a conflict of 
interest between Mr. Ip, residents of the halfway house, and the 
public at large. Whose interest is paramount? If we refuse to 
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admit Mr. Ip into the halfway house, his chance of full recovery 
will definitely be affected. If we admit him we may have to face 
the resistance of the residents and the public. Besides, without 
their support, Mr. Ip may not be able to benefit from the 
programme. 
Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
specified, both love and freedom are conceived to be highly 
preferable. However, when the case situation is specified, 
progress and love becomes the most preferred values. (Table 
9.9.1 and 9.9.2) 
Table 9.9.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 9 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
COM 26.9 73.1 4.2 6 
LOV 78.2 21.8 2.4 1 
SEC 37.8 62.2 3.9 5 
FRE 68.9 31.1 2.9 2 
PEA 45.1 54.9 3.8 3 
PRO 43.0 57.0 3.8 4 
390 
Table 9.9.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 9 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in 6) (in 6) 
COM 1.6 26.9 73.1 4.3 6 
LOV 29.5 65.3 34.7 2.9 2 
SEC 10.4 36.8 63.2 3.9 4 
FRE 17.6 60.6 39.4 3.2 3 
PEA 9.8 29.0 71.0 4.1 5 
PRO 31.1 74.6 25.4 2.6 1 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
Not unexpectedly, the value which emerges from a position of 
relative insignificance to a position of relative importance is 
progress. Findings indicate that when the case situation is not 
specified, progress has a mean ranking of 3.8. When the case 
situation is specified, however, its mean ranking becomes 2.6. A 
difference is 1.15 is observed. Differences are also significant 
for love, freedom, and peace, but such differences are small 
compared with that of progress. (Table 9.3.3) 
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Table 9.9.3 Differences in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 9 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
COM 4.228 4.290 -. 062 
LOV 2.440 2.878 -. 438 + 
SEC 3.938 3.915 . 023 
FRE 2.865 3.194 -. 329 ++ 
PEA 3.762 4.101 -. 339 + 
PRO 3.767 2.622 1.145 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that Mr. 
Ip should not be refused admission to the half-way house. Among 
the respondents, only 38 agreed that Mr. Ip should be refused 
admission. For those who agreed, peace and security are 
considered as more preferable. On the other hand, for those who 
disagreed, love and progress are considered as more preferable. 
(Table 9.9.4) 
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Table 9.9.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
COM 4.421 4.258 0.163 
LOV 4.382 2.510 1.872 + 
SEC 2.092 4.361 -2.269 + 
FRE 4.303 2.923 1.380 + 
PEA 2.066 4.600 -2.534 + 
PRO 3.737 2.348 1.389 + 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.10 Case No. 10 
The scenario: Residential institutions of the voluntary sector 
had been planning for the past twelve months to remove some 
children under their care to small group homes in areas which 
traditionally had high rates of referrals to them. It is 
believed that this move will be able to provide the children with 
better care and will enable them to participate more in the life 
of the community. 
After several months of hard work, you succeeded in setting 
up the first small gorup home in a public housing estate. 
However, a week before the small group home was to begin 
operation, you found yourself besieged with telephone calls from 
residents who were outraged about its opening in their community. 
You responded to most of the calls by explaining the reason for 
this move. You also assured each caller that the children being 
referred were carefully selected and would not pose a significant 
threat to the surrounding community. Even so, you received a 
signed petition early this morning, protesting the opening of the 
small group home in their community. 
The statement: In view of this petition you postpone the date of 
opening of the small group home. 
The values: Freedom, peace, and progress; happiness, power, and 
pride. 
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The issue: This is again a case of conflict of interest between 
the clients we serve and the public at large. Issues which have 
been brought up in previous cases emerge again in this case 
situation. 
Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
specified, freedom is conceived to be by far the most preferred 
value in this group. However, when the case situation is 
specified, progress turns out to be by far the most preferred 
value. (Table 9.10.1 and 9.10.2) 
Table 9.10.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 10 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
FRE 37.5 75.5 24.5 2.5 1 
PEA 16.1 56.8 43.2 3.4 2 
PRO 14.6 46.9 53.1 3.6 4 
HAP 16.1 48.4 51.6 3.5 3 
POW 4.7 28.6 71.4 4.2 6 
PRI 10.9 43.8 56.2 3.8 5 
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Table 9.10.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 10 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most 
Preferable 
(Rank 1) 
(in %) 
Highly 
Preferable 
(Ranks 1- 3) 
(in %) 
Least 
Preferable 
(Ranks 4- 5) 
(in '6) 
Mean Rank 
FRE 24.5 63.0 37.0 3.0 2 
PEA 27.1 47.9 52.1 3.4 3 
PRO 32.3 79.7 20.3 2.5 1 
HAP 4.2 30.2 69.8 4.2 6 
POW 7.8 43.2 56.8 3.8 4 
PRI 4.2 31.8 68.2 4.2 5 
Difference in mean ranking and compositerank ordering of values. 
Progress emerges once again from a position of relative 
insignificance to a position of relative importance in this case 
situation. When the case situation is not specified, it has a 
mean ranking of 3.6. However, when the case situation is 
specified, its mean ranking becomes 2.5. A difference of 1.1 is 
observed. Differences are also significant for freedom, 
happiness, power, and pride, but such differences are small when 
compared with that of progress. (Table 9.10.3) 
396 
Table 9.10.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 10 
Mean of 1st Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
FRE 2.526 2.995 -. 469 + 
PEA 3.385 3.383 . 002 
PRO 3.609 2.477 1.132 + 
HAP 3.521 4.203 -. 682 + 
POW 4.178 3.792 . 386 + 
PRI 3.760 4.151 -. 391 + 
Note: + Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Ambng the respondents, 75 agreed that the date of opening of 
the half-way house should be postponed, but 116 disagreed. This 
may be taken to imply that the opinions of the respondents are 
divided. For those who agreed, peace is considered as the most 
preferred value. On the other hand, for those who disagreed, 
freedom and progress are considered as the most preferred values. 
(Table 9.10.4) 
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Table 9.10.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
FRE 3.733 2.500 1.233 + 
PEA 1.587 4.530 -2.943 + 
PRO 3.193 2.017 1.176 + 
HAP 4.113 4.254 -0.141 
POW 4.033 3.660 0.373 
PRI 4.340 4.039 0.301 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.11 Case Situation No. 11 
The scenario: You are a young, promising social worker from a 
low-income family. You also serve as a member of the district 
board. With the support of your colleagues at the district 
board, you have been able to stimulate great interest in 
community care for the elderly and the handicapped. 
Early this week, your were approached by the executive 
director of your agency who 
transferred to the headquarter 
This meant that you would be 
it, a substantial increase in 
work, this also meant that you 
district board. 
informed you that you would be 
to take up administrative duties. 
given a promotion and, along with 
salary. In view of the nature of 
would have no time to serve in the 
The statment: You accept the promotion and cease serving as a 
member of the district board. 
The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; comfort, love, 
and security. 
The issue: This is again a case involving a conflict of interest. 
In this case, however, the public's interest is in conflict with 
personal interest. What should a social worker do under this 
condition? Should a social worker forego one's career prospect 
in pursuit of one's commitment for a better society? 
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Degree of preference of values. When the case situation is not 
specified, both equality and love are conceived as "highly 
preferable". However, when the case situation is specified, 
comfort, democracy, and equality are conceived as more 
preferable. (Table 9.11.1 and 9.11.2) 
Table 9.11.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 11 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in 96) 
COM 5.8 24.3 75.7 4.3 6 
LOV 35.4 68.8 31.2 2.7 2 
SEC 9.5 35.4 64.6 4.0 4 
DEM 10.6 61.9 38.1 3.2 3 
EQU 34.9 79.9 20.1 2.4 1 
FRA 3.7 29.6 70.4 4.3 5 
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Table 9.11.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 11 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
COM 26.5 59.3 40.7 3.1 1 
LOV 11.1 39.2 60.8 3.8 5 
SEC 10.6 33.3 66.7 3.9 6 
DEM 21.2 55.6 44.4 3.2 2 
EQU 13.2 57.7 42.3 3.3 3 
FRA 17.5 49.7 50.3 3.5 4 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
It seems important to point out that in this case situation, 
differences in the mean ranking of certain values when the case 
situation is, and is not specified, are found to be exceptionally 
high. Difference is greatest in the case of comfort. When the 
case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 4.3. 
However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking 
becomes 3.1, a difference of 1.2. 
Difference is also great in the case of love. When the case 
situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.7. 
However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking 
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turns out to be"3.8, a difference of 1.1. Difference is found to 
be almost equally as great in the case of equality. When the 
case situation is not specified, it has a mean ranking of 2.4. 
However, when the case situation is specified, its mean ranking 
becomes 3.3, a difference of 0.9. 
Finally, difference is found to be not much smaller in the 
case of fraternity. When the case situation is not specified, 
the mean ranking of fraternity is 4.3. However, when the case 
situation is specified, its mean ranking becomes 3.5, a 
difference of 0.8. (Table 9.11.3) 
Table 9.11.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 11 
Mean of ist Mean of 2nd Difference Significance 
Survey Survey 
COM 4.318 3.124 1.194 + 
LOV 2.730 3.839 -1.109 + 
SEC 4.011 3.958 . 053 
DEM 3.249 3.241 . 008 
EQU 2.434 3.349 -. 915 + 
FRA 4.259 3.489 . 770 + 
Note: + Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
402 
Among the respondents, 109 agreed that the promotion should 
be accepted. On the other hand, 80 disagreed. It may be taken 
to imply that the opinions of the respondents are divided. For 
those who agreed, equality and security are considered as more 
preferable. However, for those who disagreed, democracy and 
fraternity are considered as more preferable. (Table 9.11.4) 
Table 9.11.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
AUT 5.000 3.725 1.275 
EMP 3.000 3.291 -0.291 
RES 1.667 4.432 -2.765 + 
BEN 3.667 4.207 -0.540 
COU 4.333 2.990 1.343 
PRU 3.333 2.356 0.977 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
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9.2.12 Case Situation No. 12 
The scenario: As a community worker you have devoted great effort 
in developing indigenous leaders in the community where you work. 
In the forthcoming by-election for a member of the district 
board, you have been approached by both of the candidates. You 
are personally more impressed by the performance of Mr. Lee who 
has instigated quite a number of worthwhile projects in the 
community. In your opinion, Mr. Lee has the ability and the 
commitment to serve in the interest of the neighbourhood. 
Moreover, Mr. Lee has openly indicated his plan to make his work 
at the district board a lifelong career. 
Comparing with Mr. Lee, Mr. Leung seems to have neither of 
Mr. Lee's strengths but he has the support of most indigenous 
leaders in the community. They find him more sociable and more 
compliant. They have, in fact, pledge support for Mr. Leung and 
requested you to do the same. 
The statement: In view of Mr. Leung's popularity among the 
indigenous leaders, you pledged support for him. 
The values: Democracy, equality, and fraternity; happiness, 
power, and pride. 
The issue: This interesting case involves a conflict between 
personal judgment and judgment of the community. In ordinary 
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situations, social workers as individuals are entitled to 
personal judgment and are encouraged to standby one's own 
judgment. In this case, however, social workers also have the 
responsibility to standby the judgment made by members of the 
community, particularly when it relates to the interest of the 
community. What should a social worker do? 
Degree of preference of values. Irrespective of whether the case 
situation is, or is not specified, democracy and equality are 
conceived to be "highly preferable". (Table 9.12.1 and 9.12.2) 
Table 9.12.1 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 12 
When Case Situation Is Not Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
DEM 15.2 66.5 33.5 3.0 2 
EQU 48.2 86.9 13.1 2.1 1 
FRA 6.3 37.7 62.3 4.0 5 
HAP 16.2 43.5 56.5 3.7 3 
POW 3.7 25.7 74.3 4.3 6 
PRI 10.5 39.8 60.2 3.9 4 
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Table 9.12.2 Degree of Preference, Mean Ranking, and 
Composite Rank of Values in Case No. 12 
When Case Situation Is Specified 
Most Highly Least Mean Rank 
Preferable Preferable Preferable 
(Rank 1) (Ranks 1- 3) (Ranks 4- 5) 
(in %) (in %) (in %) 
DEM 39.8 83.2 16.8 2.2 1 
EQU 34.6 83.8 16.2 2.2 2 
FRA 5.6 35.6 64.4 4.0 5 
HAP 3.1 20.4 79.6 4.5 6 
POW 9.4 36.1 63.9 4.0 3 
PRI 7.3 35.6 64.4 4.0 4 
Difference in mean ranking and composite rank ordering of values. 
Is there any difference in the rank ordering of values in these 
two situations, i. e., when the case situation is, and is not 
specified? 
Difference is greatest in the case of democracy. When the 
case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of democracy is 
3.0. However, when the case situation is specified, its mean 
ranking becomes 2.2, a difference of 0.8. 
Difference is just as great in the case of happiness. When 
the case situation is not specified, the mean ranking of 
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happiness is 3.7. However, when the case situation is specified, 
its mean ranking becomes 4.5, again a difference of 0.8. (Table 
9.12.3) 
Table 9.12.3 Difference in Mean Rankings and 
T-test of Values in Case No. 12 
Mean of Ist 
Survey 
Mean of 2nd 
Survey 
Difference Significance 
DEM 3.000 2.217 . 783 + 
EQU 2.079 2.220 -. 121 
FRA 4.042 4.042 . 000 
HAP 3.696 4.482 -. 786 + 
POW 4.319 4.005 . 314 ++ 
PRI 3.864 4.034 -. 170 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level. 
The general feeling of the respondents seems to be that the 
worker should abide by one's own preference. Among the 
respondents, only 20 agreed to pledge support for the candidate 
selected by the indigenous leaders. For those who agreed, 
democracy is considered as the most preferred value. On the 
other hand, for those who disagreed, equality is considered as 
the most preferred value alongside with democracy. (Table 
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9.12.4) 
Table 9.12.4 T-test of Difference in Mean Rankings between 
Respondents Who Agreed and Those Who Disagreed 
with the Statement 
Mean Ranking of Mean Ranking of Difference Significance 
the Agreed the Disagreed 
DEM 2.150 2.225 -0.075 
EQU 3.250 2.099 1.151 + 
FRA 3.200 4.140 -0.940 + 
HAP 4.700 4.456 0.244 
POW 3.500 4.064 -0.564 
PRI 4.200 4.015 0.185 
Note: ++ Difference is significant at < . *05 level 
+ Difference is significant at < . 01 level 
* Difference is not significant at < . 05 level 
9.3.7 Summary of Findings 
Figures from Table 9.12.5 indicate that when case situations 
are not specified, equality, and love are conceived to be highly 
preferable. The means of their mean rankings are 2.3 and 2.4 
respectively. In each and every case situation, their mean 
rankings have never fallen below 2.7. 
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Table 9.12.5 Mean Ranking of End-States of Existence 
When Case Situations Are Not Specified 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 Mean Rank 
DEM 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.1 4 
EQU 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.3 1 
FRA 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.2 11 
FRE 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.9 3 
PEA 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.7 6 
PRO 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.8 8 
COM 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.2 11 
LOV 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.4 2 
SEC 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.8 8 
HAP 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.6 5 
POW 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.2 11 
PRI 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.8 8 
Immediately following this pair of values we have freedom 
and democracy which can also be described as highly preferable. 
The means of their mean rankings are 2.9 and 3.1 respectively. 
In each and every case situation, their mean rankings have never 
fallen below 3.2. 
Further down the list we can find a cluster of five values, 
including happiness, peace, progress, security, and pride all of 
which can be described as moderately preferable. The mean of 
their mean rankings are 3.6,3.7,3.8,3.8, and 3.8 respectively. 
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Finally, we have a group of three values, fraternity, 
comfort, and power. They can be described as least preferable. 
All of them have a mean ranking of 4.2. 
When case situations are specified, equality, democracy, 
love, and progress can be described as highly preferable. The 
mean of their mean rankings are found to be 2.3,2.4,2.9, and 
2.9 respectively. In this case, freedom has been replaced by 
progress. (Table 9.12.6) 
Table 9.12.6 Mean Rankings of End-States of Existence 
When Case Situations Are Specified 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 Mean Rank 
DEM 2.8 3.2 2.2 2.7 2 
EQU 2.4 3.3 2.2 2.6 1 
FRA 3.9 3.5 4.0 3.8 6 
FRE 4.1 3.2 3.0 3.4 5 
PEA 4.1 4.1 3.4 3.9 '9.8 
PRO 3.6 2.6 2.5 2.9 3 
COM 4.2 4.3 3.1 3.9 -9-Y 
LOV 1.9 2.9 3.8 2.9 3 
SEC 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.8 6 
HAP 3.5 4.2 4.5 4.1 12 
POW 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.9 `q 
PRI 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.0 11 
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Incidentally, freedom is not too far behind. It occupies 
the fifth position with a mean of mean ranking of 3.4. It may 
also be considered as highly preferable. 
Further down the list we have a cluster of seven values, 
including security and fraternity, peace, comfort, and power, 
pride and happiness. Their mean rankings are 3.8,3.8,3.9,3,9, 
3,9,4.0, and 4.1 respectively. 
By comparing these two tables we conclude that the following 
end-states of existence are conceived as highly preferable among 
social workers: democracy, equality, freedom, progress, and love. 
Furthermore, we note that the following end-states of existence 
are conceived as moderately preferable: happiness, peace, pride, 
and security. Finally, we also note that the following end- 
states of existence are conceived as least preferable: comfort, 
fraternity, and power. 
Again, the claim that values serve as a guide to action is 
not well substantiated. By referring to Table 9.12.7, we can 
observe that difference in mean rankings is found to be 
statistically significant for one or more end-states of existence 
in all case situations. Differences are found to be the greatest 
in Case No. 11. We can observe from the same table that the 
degree of preference for democracy, fraternity, progress, 
comfort, and power increases significantly when the case 
situations are specified. Quite the contrary, the degree of 
preference for equality, freedom, love, and happiness decreases 
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significantly when the case situations are specified. There is 
little change, however, for peace, security, and pride. 
Table 9.12.7 Difference in Mean Rankings of 
End-States of Existence 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
DEM * * 0.8 
EQU * -0.9 
FRA 0.4 0.8 * 
FRE -0.9 * -0.5 
PEA * -0.3 
PRO 0.4 1.2 1.1 
COM * * 1.2 
LOV * -0.5 -1.1 
SEC 
HAP * -0.7 -0.8 
POW 0.3 0.4 
PRI * -0.4 
* Different is not significant at < . 01 level. 
When the Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient is 
computed for each value in each case-situation, it is observed 
that significant correlation can be found in 31 out of 36 
incidences. In three case situations, significant correlation 
can be found in all six values. In one case situation, 
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significant correlation can be found in five values. Finally, in 
two case situations, significant correlation can be found in four 
values. (Table 9.12.8) 
Table 9.12.8 Spearman Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient 
of End-States of Existence 
Case 7 Case 8 Case 9 Case 10 Case 11 Case 12 
DEM * * ++ 
EQU + ++ + 
FRA ++ + + 
FRE + + + 
PEA + ++ + 
PRO + + + 
COM ++ + ++ 
LOV + + ++ 
SEC + + * 
HAP + + 
POW + + + 
PRI + ++ 
++ Correlation is significant at < . 05 level. 
+ Correlation is significant at < . 01 level. 
* Correlation is not significant at < . 05 level. 
Looking at the table from another perspective, it is 
observed that significant correlation can be found in all three 
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case situations for most end-states of existence. However, 
significant correlation can be found in two case situations for 
security, happiness, and pride, and in only one case situation 
for democracy. 
When the Kendall Coefficient of Concordance is computed for 
each case situation, it is found that the coefficient is highly 
significant in one case situation, moderately significant in four 
case situations, and minimally significant in one case situation. 
(Table 9.12.9) 
Table 9.12.9 Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (W) 
According to Cases No. 7 to No. 12 
Case Situation No. of W Chi-Square D. F. Level of 
No. Cases Significance 
7 194 . 163 157.877 5 . 000 
8 193 . 202 194.412 5 . 000 
9 193 . 158 152.357 5 . 000 
10 192 . 151 145.135 5 . 000 
11 189 . 036 34.253 5 . 000 
12 191 . 332 316.743 5 . 000 
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Section Four 
Conclusion 
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Chapter Ten 
Summary and Implications of Findings 
10.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, the purpose is to raise questions and 
to draw conclusions from the research findings. The questions 
that must be raised and answered can be generalized as including: 
(1) What is the significance of this study? (2) What has been 
achieved? (3) What implications do the research findings have on 
social work, social work education, and research on values? 
What is the significance of this study? To reiterate, the 
central purpose of this study is to suggest a definition of 
social work which is socially more acceptable and culturally more 
compatible. To accomplish this, this researcher began with an 
attempt to identify a cluster of social work values, to formulate 
a social work value system, and to establish a relationship 
between value and action in social work practice. 
Very briefly, the first chapter of this report began with 
the observation that social work was striving to acquire a 
professional status. It was followed by the assumption that the 
professionalization of social work was not undesirable. The 
validity of this assumption has not been discussed thus far but 
it will be discussed later on in this chapter. Also included in 
the first chapter was a description of the major problem 
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confronting social work in its struggle for professionalization - 
the problem of definition. 
Relating to this, the second chapter 
discussion of the problem. As a result of 
services and diversity of its methods, 
experienced great difficulty in creating 
itself. This has also proved to be detrimen 
gain recognition as a profession. 
was devoted to a 
the breadth of its 
social work has 
a clear image for 
tal in its effort to 
The most widely quoted definition in the social work 
literature is probably the Working Definition of Social Work 
Practice. Published in 1958, Harriett M. Bartlett noted that 
social work practice could be recognized by a constellation of 
five components - value, purpose, sanction, knowledge, and 
method. She added that none of these components was, by itself, 
unique to social work or characteristic of social work practice 
but, when taken as a whole, social work practice could be 
recognized by the particular content and configuration of these 
components. (p. 5) 
The major contribution of the Working Definition lies in its 
stipulation that the practice of social work is recognized by a 
constellation of five components. Many definitions formulated 
after this have made reference to these components. Needless to 
say, the Working Definition has its limitations. 
In a critique of the Working Definition, William E. Gordon 
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(1962) identified three of its limitations. The one most 
relevant to this study noted that "the components ... appeared to 
stand separate and equal to each other, held together only by the 
assertion that all must be present to some degree for the 
practice to be considered social work practice" (pp. 4-5). Thus, 
in his opinion, the Working Definition "cannot readily serve as a 
guide for further study and development until its components are 
functionally related" (p. 5). As a solution, he suggested that 
since "purposes are largely set by values and techniques are 
derived from knowledge" (p. 12), much more emphasis than before 
should be placed on the values and knowledge on which practice 
was based. This suggestion is well received but insofar as the 
functional relationship between knowledge and values is 
concerned, he has offered no solution. 
In concluding the discussion, this researcher noted that 
improvements could still be made in relation to the following: 
(1) What are the basic components of social work practice 
and what is the justification for their inclusion? 
(2) What is the functional relationship of these components 
to one another and to action in social work practice? 
(3) What are the contents of these components? 
What are the basic components of social work practice and 
what is the justification for their inclusion? Since social work 
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is striving to acquire a professional status and it is assumed 
that its professionalization is not undesirable, the basic 
components of social work should not be determined without 
specific reference to the characteristics of a profession. 
Following a thorough review of three contemporary approaches to 
the study of professions in Chapter Three, this researcher noted 
that if social work was to become a profession, it had to undergo 
a long process, trying to accomplish the following tasks: to 
obtain the power to deliver services and to control its work, and 
to acquire the essential characteristics of a profession, namely, 
(1) a statement of purpose, (2) a body of knowledge, (3) a system 
of values, and (4) a code of conduct. Consequently, he included 
these four characteristics as the basic components of social work 
practice. 
What is the functional relationship of these components to 
one another and to action in social work practice? What are the 
contents of these components? One major strength of Gordon's 
definition of social work is his assertion that purposes are 
largely set by values and techniques are derived from knowledge. 
However, there is no indication of the relationship between 
values and knowledge. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, 
values are functionally related not only to purposes but also to 
the other components. Following from this, he postulated that 
(1) if the meaning of value in relation to action were clarified, 
the functional relationship of these components to one another 
and to action in social work practice would be more obvious, and 
(2) if the contents of social work values were determined, the 
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contents of the other components would also come to surface. 
Thus in Chapters Four and Five, an attempt was made to clarify 
the meaning of value and action and to suggest their functional 
relationship with the other components. Subsequently, in three 
consecutive chapters - Chapters Seven to Nine - an effort was 
made to identify a cluster of social work values, to formulate a 
social work value system, and to explain how this value system 
could be used to determine the contents of the other components. 
10.2 Summary of Findings 
1. A cluster of twenty-four values has been identified. In the 
social work literature, one often hears the claim that the most 
important characteristic of social work is its diversity. Quite 
the contrary, social work values are often treated as if they are 
homogeneous. Many social workers seem to hold on to the belief 
that social work values are derived from one single dimension. 
Socialist social workers, for instance, tend to have a stronger 
preference for liberty, equality, and fraternity; clinical social 
workers, on the other hand, tend to prefer authenticity, empathy, 
and respect; and social work administrators tend to advocate for 
effort, effectiveness, and efficiency. However, this is not 
necessarily the case. In this study, values were found to emerge 
from four dimensions: (1) the moral dimension, (2) the 
organizational dimension, (3) the psychological dimension, and 
(4) the political dimension. Moreover, these dimensions seemed 
to correspond well with the subdivisions which appeared in the 
work of Milton Rokeach on the Nature of Human Values (1973). 
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According to Rokeach, values could be divided into end-- 
states of existence and modes of conduct. Furthermore, the end- 
states of existence could be subdivided into social values (cf. 
the social dimension) and personal values (cf. the psychological 
dimension) whereas the modes of conduct could be subdivided into 
moral values (cf. the moral dimension) and competence values (cf. 
the organizational dimension). These subdivisions gave this 
researcher the freedom to choose from a wide spectrum of values. 
With these subdivisions in mind, this researcher ended up 
with the following selections: 
(1) social values - democracy, equality, fraternity, 
freedom, peace, and progress; 
(2) personal values - comfort, happiness, love, power, 
pride, and security; 
(3) moral values - benevolence, courage, honesty, justice, 
loyalty, and prudence; and 
(4) competence values - ambition, authenticity, cooperation, 
empathy, leadership, and respect. 
Unavoidably, many will question the rationale for the 
inclusion of these values and the exclusion of all others. While 
admitting that the validity of these choices has not been tested, 
this researcher is prepared to defend his position by claiming 
that all these values have been carefully chosen through an 
extensive literature search and they represent values which, in 
his opinion, should be given high preference. 
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Many of these chosen values are, in fact, familiar to social 
workers because they often appear in the social work literature. 
However, there are also others which have rarely been mentioned. 
Insofar as this researcher is concerned, these values -- ambition, 
cooperation, and leadership - are as important as the others. At 
this moment in time, when social workers around the world are 
striving for professionalism, they must maintain an acceptable 
standard of professional practice. This can only be achieved 
through an emphasis on competence in their work. Unfortunately, 
the importance of these competence values is often 
underestimated. 
2. The degree of preference of the end-states of existence has 
been found to appear as following: 
(1) highly preferable - democracy, equality, freedom, love, 
and progress; 
(2) moderately preferable - happiness, peace, pride, and 
security; and 
(3) least preferable - comfort, fraternity, and power. 
Similarly, the degree of preference of the modes of conduct has 
been found to appear as following: 
(1) highly preferable -- empathy, honesty, justice, prudence 
and respect; 
(2) moderately preferable - authenticity, benevolence, co- 
operation, courage, and loyalty; and 
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(3) least preferable - ambition and leadership. 
The original intention of the value surveys was to organize 
these values into a social work value system. The social work 
value system consists of two subsystems: the end-states of 
existence and the modes of conduct. Each of these subsystems 
consists of twelve values which, theoretically, can be arranged 
in order of preference as conceived by the social workers. In 
reality, however, the composite rankings of some of these values 
were so close to one another that all attempts to prove that one 
value was more preferable than another were found to be 
unsubstantiated. It seemed more appropriate, therefore, to place 
values with similar composite rankings in a group and, according 
to the degree of preference of these values, labelled them as 
highly preferable, moderately preferable, or least preferable. 
In what way can the formation of these groups of values be 
explained? From the researcher's point of view, it is a 
reflection of the lack of consensus among social workers as to 
the order of preference of these values. In the social work 
literature, values are often listed in groups. There is little 
discussion of the relative importance of these values. As a 
consequence, values which are listed as a group tend to be 
conceived as of equal importance. Empathy and respect, for 
instance, are often mentioned together. Both have been rated as 
highly preferable. Similarly, benevolence and courage often 
appear alongside one another. Again, both have been rated as 
moderately preferable. For the moment, we may have to accept 
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this as a reality but the situation needs to be improved and 
improvement can be made as soon as social workers begin to 
discuss the relative importance of these values. 
How do the research findings affect the idea of a social 
work value system? In spite of the difficulty mentioned above, 
the idea of a social work value system is not weakened. Even if 
social workers have failed in ranking these chosen values 
individually, they have succeeded in ranking them in groups. 
This is already a giant step forward. They are now certain that 
they have a stronger preference for the highly preferables and 
less preference for the moderately preferables. 
3. In case situations where the conflict of values is obvious, 
social workers tend to rearrange the rank ordering of some of 
these values. 
When the case situations were not specified, findings of the 
Value Survey revealed that the rank ordering of the end-states of 
existence was as following: 
equality, love, freedom, democracy, 
peace, progress, happiness, security, pride, fraternity, 
comfort, and power. 
similarly, when the case situations were not specified, the rank 
ordering of the modes of conduct was found to appear as 
following: 
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respect, justice, empathy, 
honesty, authenticity, prudence, loyalty, benevolence, 
courage, 
cooperation, leadership, and ambition. 
However, when the case situations were specified, findings of the 
Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed that of the end-states 
of existence, 
(1) the degree of preference for comfort, democracy, 
fraternity, power, and progress increased significantly; 
(2) the degree of preference for equality, freedom, 
happiness, and love decreased significantly; and 
(3) there was little change for peace, pride, and security. 
Similarly, when the case situations were not specified, findings 
of the Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed that, of the 
modes of conduct, 
(1) the degree of preference for cooperation, courage, 
honesty, and prudence increased significantly; 
(2) the degree of preference for benevolence, empathy, and 
respect decreased significantly; and 
(3) there was little change in ambition, authenticity, 
justice, leadership, and loyalty. 
What calls for this kind of rearrangement? Does it suggest 
that the practical application of social work values are 
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ultimately and always subject to some form of influence which is 
beyond the control of the social worker? (Horne, 1987, p. 94) 
Not so. Insofar as this researcher is concerned, this is merely 
a reflection of the need for further elaboration of the meaning 
of value. This will be done later on in this chapter. 
4. In case situations where the conflict of values is obvious, 
social workers tend to hold different views on the issues 
involved. 
Findings of the Value-Action Relationship Survey revealed 
that social workers had different views on how they would act in 
specific case situations. When social workers were asked if they 
agreed or disagreed with the action of the social worker in 
specific case situations, almost all respondents (ranging from 
79% to 98.5%) gave the same answer in six case situations. In 
the six remaining case situations, the opinions were divided. 
Even the smaller group of respondents ranged from 37.5% to 
48.5%. In all case situations, those who agreed and those who 
disagreed were found to have radically different preferences on 
values. Insofar as the most preferred end-states of existence 
were concerned, the choice seemed to be between (1) democracy and 
equality and (2) freedom, love, and progress. Similarly, insofar 
as the most preferred modes of conduct were concerned, the choice 
seemed to be between (1) honesty, justice, and prudence and (2) 
empathy and respect. 
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10.3 Implications for Social Work: A Personal View of Social Work 
What is social work? Based on the research findings, social 
work is, first of all, an occupation within the social welfare 
institution which aspires to become a full profession. 
The social welfare institution is here defined as a nation's 
system of social welfare policies and services that seeks "to 
prevent, alleviate, or contribute to the solution of recognized 
social problems, or to improve the well-being of individuals, 
groups, or communities" (Zastrow, 1990, p. 8). 
What is a profession? What does it take for social work to 
become a profession? Is the professionalization of social work 
desirable? Even though each of the contemporary approaches to 
definition has its strengths, the experience of social work in 
its struggle for professionalization raises serious doubts about 
the adequacy of these approaches. As an alternative, this 
researcher tries to incorporate all their ideas and come up with 
the following definition: 
a profession is an occupation which has been granted, by 
significant others in society, a status and, along with it, 
the power to deliver services and to control its work in a 
delimited area of activity, after having undergone a 
developmental process whereby it succeeded in leading 
significant others to believe that it has acquired a high 
degree of a constellation of characteristics society has 
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come to accept as distinctive of a profession. 
This constellation of characteristics includes: (1) a body of 
knowledge, (2) a system of values, (3) a statement of purpose, 
and (4) a code of conduct. In this understanding, to become a 
profession, social work has to undergo a long process and to do 
at least two things, both at the same time. On the one hand, it 
has to acquire the characteristics of a profession listed above 
and, on the other hand, it has to obtain a licence and a mandate 
from significant others in society to deliver services and to 
control its work in a delimited area of human activity. 
What is this delimited area of human activity? Since social 
work is defined as an occupation within the social welfare 
institution, the activities of the social worker are necessarily 
circumscribed by the scope of social welfare. Thus the social 
worker may be required: (1) to influence the development of 
social welfare policies, (2) to participate in the management and 
(3) to participate in the provision of social welfare services. 
Who are the significant others in society? Are they 
prepared to enlarge the mandate of social work to cover (1) the 
development of social welfare policies, (2) the management of 
social welfare services, and (3) the provision of social welfare 
services? In the opinion of this researcher, the significant 
others in society may not necessarily include the elites. The 
consumers of social welfare services also have their influence in 
a democratic society. Provided that they are better organized, 
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they represent the significant others in society as much as the 
elites. 
Nonetheless, the society is anxiously looking out for an 
occupation to assume full responsibility for the management of 
social welfare services and is, therefore, quite prepared to 
delegate this responsibility to any occupation which has 
indicated interest. Unfortunately, perhaps with the exception of 
social work, none of the occupations within the social welfare 
institution has done so. Consequently, if social work is 
interested in assuming this responsibility, it should have no 
difficulty in obtaining a mandate to do so. Insofar as the 
provision of social welfare services is concerned, the society 
sees the need for a collaborative effort and social work is 
prepared to work closely with other occupational groups. 
The problem rests with the development of social welfare 
policies. Even though social work has long indicated interest in 
performing this task, the society is not prepared to delegate 
this responsibility to any occupation, including social work. 
This, however, should not be taken as a total rejection. In a 
democratic society, the development of social welfare policies 
should, at least in principle, involve all people in the society. 
If it is the people's wish to pursue greater democracy and 
equality, the responsibility for making this happen should fall 
upon all members of the society. No occupation should claim and 
be given full responsibility. However, this does not imply that 
social work, or any other occupation, should refrain from 
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exercising its influence. Even if the society is not prepared to 
delegate this responsibility to social work, it certainly 
welcomes the contribution of social workers. 
Should social work become professionalized? On the surface 
it seems natural that social workers will actively support social 
work's move toward increased professionalization. Benefits to 
the profession include higher social status, stronger social 
influence, and greater bargaining power for pay and work 
conditions. The client will also enjoy better protection and a 
higher quality of service. Moreover, social workers tend to 
believe that professionalization will give them the authority to 
initiate social change. 
In contrast to this benign approach to professionalism, a 
conflicting perspective suggests that the professions are merely 
the society's instruments for social control. Instead of giving 
clients the kind of protection they need, professionalization 
tends to protect the interest of the professionals. Thus 
increased professionalization is often blamed for increase in the 
price of services. 
While not denying the evidences of abuses by some 
professionals, the fear that increased professionalization will 
force social work to abandon its social purpose is found to be 
unsubstantiated. Even though social work will not be able to 
claim a monopoly in the development of social welfare policies, 
it can play a major role in influencing the development of such 
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policies. 
researcher 
undesirable. 
In view of this, it is the contention of this 
that the professionalization of social work is not 
What happens when the social worker is engaged in social 
work practice? In social work practice, the social worker draws 
upon a body of knowledge, screened by a system of values, to 
produce and reproduce practice principles which monitor his 
action in an effort to bring about effective changes either in 
the person, or in society, or in the interaction between them. 
Our understanding of social work practice is noticeably 
enriched by the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) on structuration. 
In social work practice, the patterning of social relations 
between the social worker and the client leads to the formation 
of a social system. This social system can be extended to 
include the agency which the social worker represents and the 
environment in which the client functions. During the helping 
process, the social worker and the client become agents of social 
actions which are normally carried out in the practical 
consciousness of the agents. However, there are often times when 
the social worker is required to monitor reflexively his 
interaction with the client. What characterizes the reflexively 
monitored type of social action is when the social worker is 
asked to account for his activities, he is able to explain 
discursively. This usually happens when the social worker is 
confronted with situations which involve a conflict of values. 
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Knowledge in this definition of social work includes: (1) 
professional knowledge, i. e., all that one has learned in 
professional training - knowledge about the person, the social 
welfare institution, and the society; knowledge about practice 
methods and skills; knowledge about values and the professional 
code of conduct; and knowledge about one's authority and 
responsibility; and (2) personal knowledge, i. e., all that one 
has acquired in one's life experience - one's value system and 
moral codes, one's personal needs and adequacy of one's social 
functioning, one's outlook in life, past achievements, present 
lifestyle, and future aspirations. The integration of these two 
sources becomes the knowledge of the social worker. However, it 
needs to point out that even though one's professional knowledge 
may be standardized through the social work curriculum, his 
personal knowledge is unique to himself. This helps to explain 
why social workers who have undergone similar training programmes 
may have radically different views on many issues. 
What is a social work value? In the fourth chapter of this 
report, four approaches to defining values were discussed and, in 
conclusion, the following definition of a social work value was 
suggested: 
A social work value is a mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence which is believed to be professionally and 
socially more preferable than most modes of conduct or end- 
states of existence. 
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Similarly, a social work value system was defined as: 
an organization of modes of conduct and end-states of 
existence which is believed to be professionally and 
socially preferable, along a continuum of relative 
preference. 
In relation to action, values are of two types: (1) values 
as they are learned, either in one's professional training or in 
one's life experiences and (2) values as they are used in the 
production and reproduction of social action. In the case of the 
former, values may be acquired in one's life experience or in 
one's professional training. As a consequence, social workers 
with similar training may differ in the way they rank social work 
values. Values of this type form part of the social worker's 
body of knowledge. They are cognitive in nature. In the case of 
the latter, values function as a screen. It is here that 
selected knowledge, including learned values, is drawn upon by 
the social worker and used to produce and reproduce practice 
principles which monitor his action. This requires the social 
worker to make a decision on what knowledge is to be used and 
what practice principles are to be produced and reproduced. Used 
in this sense, values are evaluative in nature. When values are 
used to represent part of the social worker's body of knowledge, 
they have no direct relationship with action. Quite the 
contrary, when values are used as a screen, they shape the 
direction of action. This helps to explain why social workers 
were found to have rearranged the rank ordering of values when 
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the case situations were specified. 
What are the purposes of social work? The purposes of 
social work are derived from one type of values - the end-states 
of existence. It has often been noted in the social work 
literature that social work has a dual purpose: the social and 
the personal. This is confirmed in the two surveys. Based on 
the research findings, it was revealed that democracy, equality, 
freedom, love, and progress were highly preferable among the end- 
states of existence. Thus the social purpose of social work is 
to contribute to the building of a society which promotes 
democracy and equality while safeguarding freedom and progress. 
This may seem to be self-contradictory but, in view of the 
political uncertainty of Hong Kong, it is a valid reflection of 
the feelings of its people. In other words, social change in 
Hong Kong means much more than the building of a social movement 
for the transformation to socialism. Social change requires 
social workers to promote democracy and equality without 
forsaking freedom and progress. Expressed in this way, social 
change is much more acceptable to the elites and to the consumers 
of social welfare services. To accomplish this task, social 
workers may find the method of intervention suggested by Jeffry 
Galper (1980) helpful. In providing services to clients, social 
workers may find it necessary to sow the seeds for bringing about 
a movement toward the kind of society that is conceived to be 
preferable, not by radical social workers, but by the society as 
a whole. 
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Since love is conceived to be the most preferred personal 
value, the personal purpose of social work must be to ensure that 
everyone is able to give love to and receive love from 
significant others. This points to the need to maintain ties 
with one's support systems and is in agreement with the concept 
of commmunity care, whether it be care in the community or care 
by the community. 
The attainment of social work purposes is guided by practice 
principles which are derived from another set of social work 
values - the modes of conduct. This does not imply that 
knowledge is unimportant. It only points to the need for a 
creative use of knowledge. Despite the importance of knowledge, 
there are often times when knowledge simply cannot provide social 
workers with specific instructions. Their creativity rests with 
their ability to make decisions about what to do and how to 
achieve them. This is what is referred to as using values as a 
screen. 
In social work practice, the most preferred modes of conduct 
were found to include empathy, honesty, justice, prudence, and 
respect. Empathizing and respecting our clients is, beyond any 
doubt, important in social work, but this should not be taken to 
imply that we must allow our clients to have a freehand in 
whatever they want to do. Insofar as this researcher is 
concerned, the principle of self-determination has to be 
practised within certain limits. There should be a place for 
honesty, justice, and prudence. Respect implies the acceptance 
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of our clients' strengths as well as weaknesses, their ability as 
well as inability to make decisions at the time help is given to 
them. Thus we need to be honest with ourselves and with our 
clients and, after having analysed the problem situation 
prudently, we may choose to explain to the clients the way we 
think and the way we feel and then act according to what we think 
and feel is right and just. In other words, empathy and respect 
are not the only values of social work. Their use has to be 
tempered with honesty, justice, and prudence. 
An important question can now be raised. What makes this 
definition of social work better than the ones provided by 
Bartlett (1958) and Gordon (1962)? In my view, this definition 
has included the essential components of social work - knowledge, 
value, purpose, and code of ethics. Having defined value in the 
way we do, we have also succeeded in formulating a social work 
value system which has incorporated values of different 
orientations. Moreover, based on the theory of structuration, we 
have succeeded in clarifying the functional relationship of these 
components to one another and to action in social work practice. 
Needless to say, knowledge is essential in social work practice 
but when confronted with such a wide array of knowledge to be 
chosen from and applied to such a wide variety of case 
situations, social workers must rely on personal judgment to make 
a decision on what knowledge is to be used in specific case 
situations. This is how values become functionally related to 
knowledge and are used to guide its selection. 
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10.4 Implications for Social Work Education 
Social work is a value-laden profession. Its value base 
permeates the social work curriculum. Since values play such a 
crucial role in social work practice, it is essential that the 
educational programme: (1) helps students clarify their own 
values, and (2) foster the development of those values in 
students which are consistent with social work practice. Why, 
and how can this be accomplished? 
First of all, we are all guilty of stereotyping which is 
often the result of the use of personal values instead of 
professional values to guide our judgment. This happens more 
often when there is a conflict of professional values. In Case 
Situation No. 5, for instance, the opinions of the social workers 
were very divided. Almost equal number of respondents indicated 
agreement or disagreement with the social worker's action to ask 
Edward to resign as a volunteer of the Big Brothers Programme. 
This result is, in fact, expected. In the absence of any clear 
indication within the profession of the relative importance of 
empathy and respect as against honesty and justice, social 
workers resort to personal judgment. However, in order to ensure 
that the judgment is based on one's knowledge of professional 
values instead of personal values, an understanding of how 
unconscious stereotypes become ingrained in one's personal value 
system, and how they can cloud judgment, is crucial for social 
workers. Hence, the educational programme must try to help 
social workers in training to clarify their personal values and 
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provide opportunities for them to discover how their judgments 
may be clouded by the unconscious use of stereotypes. 
Secondly, in social work education, we tend to emphasize the 
importance of learning but learning the professional values does 
not necessarily imply the internalization of these values and the 
use of such values in social work practice. In Case Situation 
No. 3, for instance, even though the repondents were well aware 
of the importance of empathy and respect, almost all of them 
relied on courage and prudence to help them make their judgment. 
The reason for this may be explained in the following way. 
Based on our understanding of values, every social worker in 
training must have two set of values - the personal and the 
professional. Before the internalization of social work values 
can take place, the social worker must go through a process 
whereby these two sets of values are compared. This process will 
take less time to complete if there is little difference between 
them. It tends to take a longer period if the difference between 
them is large. Fortunately, social workers in training tend to 
have personal values which are quite consistent with professional 
values. Otherwise, they would not choose to study social work in 
the first place. 
If the difference is large, social workers in 
training may benefit from discussions which highlight the 
conflict between these two sets of values. My contention is that 
these two sets of values tend to include similar values. What 
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distinguishes one from the other is the way these values are 
described and ranked. Hence, the educational programme should 
include discussions which help social workers in training to 
clarify the meaning of these values and to compare the rank 
ordering of these two sets of values. Such discussions will help 
to foster the development of values which are consistent with 
their professional values. 
Finally, even if the internalization process is successful 
and social work values are conceived by the social worker as 
being compatible with his personal values, there is yet another 
problem. In real life situations, there are many external 
constraints which may come from clients, colleagues, agencies, 
the profession, or the society. It is of little use to refer to 
the professional code of conduct because it does not offer any 
ready solution. In Case Situation No. 2, for instance, the 
conflict of interest between the family we served and the agency 
in which we worked was obvious. In view of the family's 
objection, would you postpone the plan for Beth's discharge? The 
opinions of the social workers were quite divided. Findings of 
the survey revealed that about 60 percent of the respondents 
would postpone while the remaining 40 percent would not postpone 
the discharge plan. In other words, only 40 percent of the 
respondents would ignore the external contraints and go ahead 
with their plan. The remaining 60 percent would take the 
external constraints into consideration and modify their plan 
accordingly. 
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How should social workers in training act within these 
external constraints? Unfortunately, there is no ready answer. 
The social work value system formulated in this study can only 
specify the degree of preference of these values. It cannot 
specify the rank ordering of these values. What is required to 
produce a more satisfactory answer is to conduct more research 
along this direction. 
10.5 Implications for Research on Values 
The method of ranking used in this st 
effective in ordering social work values 
degree of preference and the use of case 
proved to be effective in explicating the 
values and action. With some revision, the 
used for comparative studies on values. 
udy has proved to be 
according to their 
situations has also 
relationship between 
questionnaire can be 
First of all, this study can be used to compare the value 
systems of social workers in different societies, of different 
ethnicity, or with different orientations. Findings of these 
comparative studies will be able to shed light on the existence 
or non-existence of a universal value system for the social work 
profession. 
The study can also be used to compare the value systems of 
social work and the other occupational groups. Since social 
workers have to work collaboratively with many occupational 
groups in the provision of services, it would be helpful to know 
440 
that social work values are compatible or incompatible with the 
values of these occupational groups. Becoming aware of the 
similarities or differences of these value systems will ensure 
better cooperation with them. 
In future research, it may be advisable to reduce the number 
of values from twenty-four to sixteen, including: 
(1) social values - democracy, equality, freedom and 
progress; 
(2) personal values - love, happiness, pride, and security; 
(3) moral values - benevolence, honesty, justice, and 
prudence; and 
(4) competence values - cooperation, empathy, respect, and 
leadership. 
The values which have been left out are either the 
moderately preferred or the least preferred. Their absence will 
have little effect on the outcome of the study. Moreover, by 
reducing the number of values available for selection, the 
respondents will have to think more carefully in the way they 
rank these values. As a consequence, the reliability of the 
study will be increased. 
10.6 Concluding Statements 
Social work is a value-laden profession. The purpose of 
social work and the code of conduct of social workers are derived 
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from social work values. Even knowledge is helpful only if it is 
compatible with these values. Empirical research on values is, 
therefore, urgently needed and this exploratory study is nothing 
more than the beginning of an attempt to meet this need. 
Social work values are basically the same for most social 
workers in most societies and, in this sense, they are universal. 
They define the purposes of social work and the code of conduct 
of its practitioners. However, social workers and societies tend 
to differ in the way they rank these values. Values which 
reflect unmet needs often receive higher rankings whereas values 
which reflect met needs are usually given lower rankings. As a 
consequence, social workers and societies also differ in their 
preference for the purposes of social work and the code of 
conduct. Based on this understanding, social work is socially 
more acceptable and culturally more compatible. 
At this moment in Hong Kong, for instance, the major purpose 
of social work is the pursuit of greater democracy and equality. 
This does not imply that freedom and progress are conceived as 
unimportant but this does reveal that as a result of the 
political uncertainty of the current situation, democracy and 
equality are conceived to be more important. 
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Appendix A: Letter No. 1 
November 19,1988 
The Administrator 
Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital 
10 Bonham Road 
Hong Kong 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
I am planning to conduct an exploratory study of social work 
values in Hong Kong. The study is first of its kind. Its 
findings is expected to be of great value to social work training 
in the local context. However, the success of the study depends 
entirely on your cooperation and the cooperation of your staff. 
In this planning stage, I need your assistance in sending me 
a xeroxed copy of the Listing of Social Workers you submitted to 
the social Welfare Department earlier this year. The list is to 
be used for one single purpose - sampling. You can have my 
assurance that all information provided will be kept in strict 
confidence. Moreover, all findings will appear as aggregate 
data. Any information on individual agency or worker will have 
no place in the report. 
At a later stage, I shall have to interview some of your 
staff. Their participation is strictly voluntary. Even so, I 
would like to take this opportunity to seek your approval in 
approaching them individually or in groups. 
To facilitate future contact, I would also like to have the 
name of one of your staff whom I can contact if and when such a 
need arises. 
Thank you very much for your assistance. In case if you 
have any query, feel free to contact me at 0-6952546 during 
office hours. 
Yours sincerely, 
Daniel F. Chan 
Lecturer 
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Appendix B: Letter No. 2 
17th February, 1989 
Dear Respondents, 
Allow me to take up some of your precious time to explain 
the support that is needed of you. Included in this letter is a 
questionnaire which is specially designed for my long years of 
research on social work values and is distributed to hundreds of 
social work practitioners in Hong Kong, selected through a random 
sampling process. Please read it carefully, complete it, and 
return it to me in the self--addressed envelope. If you have any 
query, feel free to call me at 0-6952546 during office hours. 
The questionnaire is a long one and one that may take you an 
an hour or two to complete. Nonetheless, I can assure you that 
your effort will not be wasted. Findings of this research will 
be able to make a contribution to the clarification of values in 
social work practice. 
The questionnaire is divided into FOUR sections. Section 
One is by far the longest. It involves an analysis of twelve 
case situations. Section Two and Section Three are similar. In 
each section you are required to rank a list of twelve values in 
order of your preference. Section Four is on personal 
particulars. Instructions for completing the questionnaire are 
given at the beginning of each section. 
As an indication of my appreciation of your support, I am 
prepared to provide you with a summary of the research findings 
when it is available and, basing on the research findings, to 
organize a seminar on social work values and implications for 
social work practice. Please indicate below your interest in 
receiving the summary and/or attending the seminar. 
1. I am interested/not interested* in receiving a summary of 
the research findings. 
2. I am interested/not interested* in attending a seminar on 
social work values. 
Thank you again for your support without which the research 
will stand no chance of completion. 
Yours sincerely, 
Daniel F. Chan 
Lecturer 
* please delete whichever is inappropriate 
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Appendix C: Letter No. 3 
17th March, 1989 
Dear Colleagues, 
This is a letter of appeal, my personal appeal for your 
earnest support. 
The questionnaire which I mailed to you on February 17 and 
the information derived from it form an important part of my 
research on social work values in Hong Kong. Undeniably, the 
questionnaire is a long one and one that may take an hour or two 
of your most precious time to complete. Nonetheless, I hope that 
you would respond to my appeal by going through the questionnaire 
carefully, completing it, and returning it to me on or before 
April 15. Needless to say, all information will be kept in 
strict confidence. However, if you choose not to include your 
name and address, you are welcome to do so. Moreover, if you 
need further clarification, feel free to call me at 0-6952546 
during office hours. 
Thank you again for your support without which the research 
will stand no chance of completion. 
Yours sincerely, 
Daniel F. Chan 
Lecturer 
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Appendix D: List of Participating Agencies 
Aberdeen Kai-fong Welfare Association Community Centre 
Agency for Volunteer Service 
Baptist Oi Kwan Social Service 
Boys' & Girls' Clubs Association of Hong Kong, the 
Caritas - Hong Kong 
Chinese Rhenish Church Hong Kong Synod, the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, the 
Chinese YMCA, the 
Christian Family Service Centre 
City Polytechnic of Hong Kong 
Family Planning Association of Hong Kong, the 
Friends of Scouting, the 
Heep Hong Society for Handicapped Children 
Hong Kong Association for the Mentally Handicapped, the 
Hong Kong Baptist College 
Hong Kong Catholic Marriage Advisory Council, the 
Hong Kong Children & Youth Services, the 
Hong Kong Christian Service 
Hong Kong Council of Social Service, the 
Hong Kong Family Welfare Society 
Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups, the 
Hong Kong Juvenile Care Centre 
Hong Kong PHAB Association 
Hong Kong Playground Association 
Hong Kong Polytechnic 
Hong Kong Red Cross 
Hong Kong Shue Yan College 
Hong Kong Society for Rehabilitation, the 
Hong Kong Society for the Aged, the 
Hong Kong Student Aid Society 
International Social Service Hong Kong Branch 
Mental Health Association of Hong Kong 
Methodist Epworth Village Community Centre 
New Life Psychiatric Rehabilitation Association 
Norwegian Missionary Society 
Po Leung Kuk 
Sheng Kung Hui Diocesan Welfare Council 
Salvation Army, the 
Social Welfare Department, Hong Kong Government 
Society for the Aid and Rehabilitation of Drug Abusers, the 
Society for the Rehabilitation of Offenders, Hong Kong, the 
Society of Boys' Centres 
Spastics Association of Hong Kong, the 
St. James' Settlement 
Tung Wah Group of Hospitals 
University of Hong Kong, the 
Yan Chai Hospital 
Yan Oi Tong Community & Indoor Sports Centre 
Yang Memorial Social Service Centre 
Young Women's Christian Association, Hong Kong 
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Appendix E: Research Questionnaire 
Section one : Analysis of Case Situations 
In this part of the Questionnaire, twelve case situations 
are included. Following the presentation of each case situation 
is a short statement, an agreement-disagreement measuring scale 
and a list of six values each of which is briefly defined. The 
values included in the first six case situations represent modes 
of conduct that are found to be desirable for social workers in 
their interaction with clients or colleagues. On the other hand, 
the values included in the last six case situations represent 
end-states of existence that are found to be desirable for the 
recipients of social services or for the society at large. Read 
through these case situations carefully and do the following for 
each: 
1. Specify whether you agree or disagree with the statement by 
placing a v/ in the appropriate space. 
2. Specify the intensity of your agreement or disagreement by 
placing a/ in the appropriate space. 
3. Write 1 next to the value which you consider is the most 
important, 2 next to the value which you consider is second in 
importance, and 3 next to the value which you consider is third 
in importance in guiding you to your decision. Make sure that 
you have chosen three and have left the remaining three 
unnumbered. 
The Sample is an illustration of how this section can be 
completed. 
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Sample 
Mr. Chu, a client of yours, has been found to have a serious 
genetic disease, but one that does not manifest itself until 
later in life. He tells you that he does not want his wife to 
know about his condition because he wants to have children. He 
is afraid that his wife may not be willing to become pregnant if 
she knows about his condition. The chance that a child of theirs 
will inherit this genetic disease is 25 percent. 
In view of Mr. Chu's genetic condition, you Agree  
comply with his request. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
---------------------------------------- ------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
--------------- -------- ------------------------------ 
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one 
----------- 
to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one- 
self and consistent in one's thought and action 
----------------- ------- ----------------------------- 
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, 
------------ 
accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
others and the meaning of those feelings 
-------------------- ----- ---------------------------- 
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing 
- ---------- 
with others; requires one to seek and tell the 
truth 
------------- -------- ---------------------- ---------- 
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; 
- ---------- 
requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 1 
right and what is wrong 
------------------------ -- - -------------------------- 
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of 
- ---------- 
others; requires one to remain faithful to one's 3 
promises 
-------------------- ---- ----------------------------- 
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right 
- ---------- 
to self-determination, confidentiality and 2 
privacy and ability to be rule-following 
-------------------- --- ------------------------------ 
Explanation: I do not comply with Mr. Chu's request 
------------ 
because I 
feel the need to be fair to both Mr. and Mrs. Chu, to respect 
Mrs. Chu's right to self-determination as much as Mr. Chu's. 
Besides, Mr. and Mrs. Chu belongs to a family and is, therefore, 
considered as a unit of attention. For this reason I feel 
obligated to serve in the interest of both. 
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1. You supervise a unit of eight social workers. Annie is by 
far the most experienced and the most capable one among them. In 
appreciation of her work, you have recently submitted a strong 
recommendation to the administration to support her bid for 
promotion. 
Last week Annie was out all week on sick leave. She 
returned to work earlier this week bringing with her a note from 
her doctor confirming her illness. In the meantime your cousin 
had been on a trip to Malaysia all of last week. When you had 
dinner with her yesterday, she told you all about the trip and 
showed you the photos of the interesting people she had met on 
the trip. Annie was among them. 
When you confronted Annie this morning, she readily admitted 
her fault, apologized for her dishonesty, and promised that she 
would not repeat the same mistake ever again. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of Annie's excellent performance in Agree 
the past, you forgive her for her dishonesty 
and take no further action. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of 
others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, 
forgiving, and accepting 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on 
controversies; requires one to take risks, to 
withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing 
with others; requires one to seek and tell the 
truth 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; 
requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 
right and what is wrong 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of 
others; requires one to remain faithful to one's 
promises 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; 
requires one to be broadminded and to exercise 
judgment based on knowledge and consultation 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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2. Beth, a client of yours, is an eight-year-old girl, the 
youngest of four children in the family. She has been a resident 
in a home for the mentally retarded for the last three years. 
According to the assessment she is trainable. 
Both of Beth's parents are employed. They visit her about 
once a month. For the past year she has also spent one weekend a 
month at home. Her home visits have been successful. Both 
Beth and her family look forward to these monthly visits. 
Beth is now ready to return to her family. She is excited 
about the idea. In a meeting with Beth's parents you explain to 
them about the home's recommendation and inform them about 
community resources which can be obtained in the neighbourhood 
where they live. However, Beth's parents refuse to consider the 
recommendation. They are happy with the present arrangement and 
they feel that it would be too much of a strain on the family if 
Beth is to live at home again. 
In view of the parents' objection, you Agree 
postpone the plan for Beth's discharge. Disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, 
and to advance in knowledge and position; requires 
dedication and hard work 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one 
to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one- 
self and consistent in one's thought and action 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of 
a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires 
one to be cooperative and follow instructions 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, 
accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
others and the meaning of those feelings 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from 
others; requires one to be persuasive and to 
exercise one's power and authority 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right 
to self-determination, confidentiality and 
privacy and ability to be rule-following 
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3. Calvin, a sixteen-year-old student, has a spinal problem as 
a result of an injury suffered about a year ago. He has been 
receiving constant and painful treatments since the day he was 
injured. 
Recently Calvin confided to you, a medical social worker at 
the hospital in which he is receiving treatment, that he had 
decided to commit suicide. The reason he wants to put an end to 
his life is that his widowed father wants to remarry and he feels 
that he is in the way. Besides, he also finds the pain 
increasingly intolerable. 
Calvin does not want anyone, not even his father, to know 
about his decision. He asks you for help in finding a foolproof 
way to end his life. 
In view of Calvin's medical condition, you Agree 
comply with his request. Disagree 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one 
to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one- 
self and consistent in one's thought and action 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of 
others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, 
forgiving, and accepting 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on 
controversies; requires one to take risks, to 
withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, 
accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
others and the meaning of those feelings 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; 
requires one to be broadminded and to exercise 
judgment based on knowledge and consultation 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right 
to self-determination, confidentiality and 
privacy and ability to be rule-following 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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4. After marrying for eight years, Mrs. Chan divorced Mr. Chan 
and obtained custody of their child, May. However, six months 
after the divorce, Mrs. Chan was informed that her husband had 
remarried and was planning to appeal to court for the child's 
custody. Disturbed by the information Mrs. Chan approached a 
family service agency and requested for counseling service. 
In a series of four weekly interviews Mrs. Chan brought up a 
number of issues, including her fear about loosing May and her 
concern about her inability to cope with her daughter's temper 
tantrums. She also talked about various ways of handling her 
frustrations, including the use of physical restraint. 
This morning, you received a phone call from a social worker 
at the Social Welfare Department. She mentioned that she was 
preparing a report on the Chans for the custodial hearing. She 
requested for information about your interviews with Mrs. Chan. 
In her view, Mrs. Chan was incapable of raising May properly. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of Mrs. Chan's present condition you Agree 
refuse to release information about your 
interviews with her. Disagree 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
------------------------------------------------------ ----------- 
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, 
and to advance in knowledge and position; requires 
dedication and hard work 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of 
others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, 
forgiving, and accepting 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of 
a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires 
one to be cooperative and follow instructions 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on 
controversies; requires one to take risks, to 
withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from 
others; requires one to be persuasive and to 
exercise one's power and authority 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; 
requires one to be broadminded and to exercise 
judgment based on knowledge and consultation 
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5. You are the social worker in charge of the Big Brothers 
Programme which has proved to be extremely successful and is 
serving 100 young boys. Among the Big Brothers, you are 
particularly impressed by the performance of Edward who has been 
a big brother for seven months. 
One afternoon Edward mentioned that there was one problem he 
wanted to share with you in strict confidence. You assured him 
of your belief in the principle of confidentiality. 
Edward explained that he was originally unaware of the 
programme's formal policy against accepting homosexuals as big 
brothers. Now that he knew he felt it obligated to inform you 
that he had been a homosexual for five years. He added that he 
would like very much to remain as a big brother, at least for 
Tommy, because their relationship was strong and seemed to be 
beneficial to both. He assured you that his homsexuality would 
not get in the way of this relationship. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of Edward's homosexuality you ask Agree 
him to resign as a volunteer of the Big 
Brothers Programme. Disagree 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one 
to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one- 
self and consistent in one's thought and action 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, 
accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
others and the meaning of those feelings 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing 
with others; requires one to seek and tell the 
truth 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; 
requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 
right and what is wrong 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of 
others; requires one to remain faithful to one's 
promises 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right 
to self-determination, confidentiality and 
privacy and ability to be rule-following 
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6. Flora Lee is fifteen but is functioning at the intellectual 
level of an eleven-year-old. One evening, Mrs. Lee noticed 
swelling in her daughter's abdomen. Mrs. Lee took Flora to see 
Dr. Wong who explained to Flora that the swelling in her stomach 
was due to an infection and, because of that, she would have to 
go to hospital at a later stage to have the problem corrected. 
Later, in the absence of Flora, Dr. Wong informed Mrs. Lee 
that her daughter was already five months pregnant. He suggested 
that Flora should not be told about her pregnancy. He was 
concerned about confusing and distressing Flora and felt that it 
was in her best interest not to be informed. He also suggested 
that Mrs. Lee should contact the Social Welfare Department to 
arrange to have Flora's baby adopted. 
In your meeting with Mrs. Lee she expressed her ambivalence 
toward both of Dr. Wong's suggestions. She would like to have a 
second opinion from you. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of Flora's limited intelligence you Agree 
advise Mrs. Lee not to tell Flora about her 
pregnancy. Disagree 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, 
and to advance in knowledge and position; requires 
dedication and hard work 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of 
a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires 
one to be cooperative and follow instructions 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing 
with others; requires one to seek and tell the 
truth 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; 
requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 
right and what is wrong 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from 
others; requires one to be persuasive and to 
exercise one's power and authority 
------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of 
others; requires one to remain faithful to one's 
promises 
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7. You are the superintendent of a residential training 
institution for boys with behavioural problems. It is located 
not too far away from private homes. Over the past years there 
had been many incidents of burglary in these private homes some 
of which were committed by boys living in the Hostel. 
About a week ago, you received a letter from the Government 
explaining that the site for the hostel would have to be 
reclaimed for the purpose of redevelopment into private homes. 
In return, you would be offered a site in a more remote area 
where a brand new hostel could be built. 
At the staff meeting, most staff resented the idea. They 
were of the opinion that the decision for reprovisioning was 
undemocratic. It favoured private developers and residents of 
private homes in the neighbourhood but it ignored their interest 
and the interest of boys living in the hostel. They proposed 
that the Government's offer be rejected. 
In view of the reasons given by your staff, Agree 
you refuse to accept the Government's offer. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
---------------------------------------------------- -r ------------ 
Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to take 
part in the governing process which affects them 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to equal 
treatment and an equal share of society's resources 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from 
society's commitment to promote mutual help and 
social responsibility 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to live 
or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from 
society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain 
order and stability, and to enforce law 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from 
society's commitment to improve the quality of 
life of everyone in society 
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8. Mr. and Mrs. Hung were happily married for sixty-two years. 
Until about a year ago, both of them managed to maintain good 
health. However, during the week before his eighty-first 
birthday, Mr. Hung suffered a severe stroke. Since then he was 
unable to walk without being held, could no longer read or 
understand conversations, was incontinent, and had considerable 
difficulty expressing himself clearly. 
After several weeks you informed Mrs. Hung that the hospital 
had done about all it could to help her husband and that a 
decision would need to be made about 'his future care. In 
response, Mrs. Hung said that she could not bear the thought of 
having someone else care for her husband and that she would like 
to try to care for him herself. She realized that she would need 
to be available to her husband nearly twenty-four hours a day and 
that it might be very hard for her to provide such care in view 
of her advanced age. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of Mrs. Hung's determination you Agree 
support her plan and prepare her for what 
caring for her husband might entail Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from 
one's possession of basic goods essential for 
quality living 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from 
one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one 
hopes to obtain, or achieve 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from 
one's ability to give affection to and receive 
affection from significant others in one's life 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from 
one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's 
resources to cope with one's problems 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving 
from society's and significant other's recognition 
of one's contribution to work, family, and society 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving 
from the absence of fear of death and violence and 
uncertainty of future 
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9. Mr. Ip was placed in a mental hospital about two years ago 
for killing and wounding several young children. According to 
the medical staff of the hospital, they have done all that is 
possible to help him recover. In their view, Mr. Ip is now ready 
to be released to a halfway house for discharged mental patients 
where he can learn to readapt himself to life in the family and 
the society. 
You are the superintendent of the halfway house. In a way 
you share the view of the medical staff and you believe that the 
halfway house will be able to give him the support that is most 
needed at this stage of his life. However, in view of Mr. Ip's 
violent behaviour which led to his admission, you can foretell 
the residents' reluctance in accepting him into the halfway 
house. You can also predict the society's reaction to the 
halfway house once its people learn about his presence. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
In view of the threat which Mr. Ip may bring Agree 
to the halfway house, you refuse to admit 
him. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from 
one's possession of basic goods essential for 
quality living 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to live 
or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from 
one's ability to give affection to and receive 
affection from significant others in one's life 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from 
society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain 
order and stability, and to enforce law 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from 
society's commitment to improve the quality of 
life of everyone in society 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving 
from the absence of fear of death and violence and 
uncertainty of future 
-- ------------------------------------------------------ ----------- 
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10. Residential institutions of the voluntary sector had been 
planning for the past twelve months to remove some children under 
their care to small group homes in areas which traditionally had 
high rates of referrals to them. It is believed that this move 
will be able to provide the children with better care and will 
enable them to participate more in the life of the community. 
After several months of hard work, you succeeded in 
setting up the first small group home in a public housing estate. 
However, a week before the small group home was to begin 
operation, you found yourself besieged with telephone calls from 
residents who were outraged about its opening in their community. 
You responded to most of the calls by explaining the reason for 
this move. You also assured each caller that the children being 
referred were carefully selected and would not pose a significant 
threat to the surrounding community. Even so, you received a 
signed petition early this morning, protesting the opening of the 
small group home in their community. 
In view of this petition you postpone the Agree 
date of opening of the small group home. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to live 
or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from 
one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one 
hopes to obtain, or achieve 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from 
society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain 
order and stability, and to enforce law 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from 
one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's 
resources to cope with one's problems 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving 
from society's and significant other's recognition 
of one's contribution to work, family, and society 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from 
society's commitment to improve the quality of 
life of everyone in society 
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11. You are a young, promising social worker from a low-income 
family. You also serve as a member of the district board. With 
the support of your colleagues at the district board, you have 
been able to stimulate great interest in community care for the 
elderly and the handicapped. 
Early this week, your were approached by the executive 
director of your agency who informed you that you would be 
transferred to the headquarters to take up administrative duties. 
This meant that you would be given a promotion and, along with 
it, a substantial increase in salary. In view of the nature of 
work, this also meant that you would not have time to serve in 
the district board. 
You accept the promotion and cease serving as Agree 
a member of the district board. Disagree 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from 
one's possession of basic goods essential for 
quality living 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to take 
part in the governing process which affects them 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to equal 
treatment and an equal share of society's resources 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from 
society's commitment to promote mutual help and 
social responsibility 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from 
one's ability to give affection to and receive 
affection from significant others in one's life 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving 
from the absence of fear of death and violence and 
uncertainty of future 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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12. As a community worker you have devoted great effort in 
developing indigenous leaders in the community where you work. 
In the forthcoming by-election for a member of the district 
board, you have been approached by both of the candidates. You 
are personally more impressed by the performance of Mr. Lee who 
has instigated quite a number of worthwhile projects in the 
community. In your opinion, Mr. Lee has the ability and the 
commitment to serve in the interest of the neighbourhood. 
Moreover, Mr. Lee has openly indicated his plan to make his work 
at the district board a lifelong career. 
Comparing with Mr. Lee, Mr. Leung seems to have neither of 
Mr. Lee's strengths but he has the support of most indigenous 
leaders in the communit y. They find him more sociable and more 
compliant. They have, in fact, pledged suppor t for Mr. Leung and 
requested 
---- 
you to do the 
------------- 
same. 
------ ------ 
In view of Mr. Leung's 
----------------- 
popularity among the 
------------------- 
Agree 
indigenous leaders, you pledge support for 
him. 
---------- ------------- ----------------------- 
Disagree 
------------------- 
Intensity of your agreement or disagreement: 
Strong Strong 
Agreement Disagreement 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Among the values listed below, rank them in order of importance 
in helping you come to a decision: 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to take 
part in the governing process which affects them 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to equal 
treatment and an equal share of society's resources 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from 
society's commitment to promote mutual help and 
social responsibility 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from 
one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one 
hopes to obtain, or achieve 
------------------------------------------------------ 
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from 
one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's 
resources to cope with one's problems 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving 
- 
from society's and significant other's recognition 
of one's contribution to work, family, and society 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
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Section Two : Ranking of Values (1) 
You have here a list of twelve values each of which is 
briefly defined to indicate an end-state of existence which we, 
as social workers, hope to acquire either in society or for our 
clients. Read through this list carefully, write 1 next to the 
value which you consider is the most preferable, 2 next to the 
value which you consider is second in preference, 3 next to the 
value which you consider is third in preference, and continue 
with this method of ranking until you have assigned a number 
(ranging from 1 to 12) to each value on the list to indicate your 
order of preference for these values. No number should be 
repeated. 
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Ranking of values in order of your preference. 
--------------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Comfort: a feeling of satisfaction, deriving from 
one's possession of basic goods essential for 
quality living 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Democracy: a sense of involvement, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to take 
part in the governing process which affects them 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Equality: a sense of fairness, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to equal 
treatment and an equal share of society's resources 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Fraternity: a sense of brotherhood, resulting from 
society's commitment to promote mutual help and 
social responsibility 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Freedom: a sense of autonomy, resulting from 
society's recognition of everyone's right to live 
or act as one chooses, rightly or wrongly 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Happiness: a feeling of contentment, deriving from 
one's ability to obtain, or achieve, what one 
hopes to obtain, or achieve 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Love: a feeling of being accepted, deriving from 
one's ability to give affection to and receive 
affection from significant others in one's life 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Peace: a sense of social harmony, resulting from 
society's commitment to prevent war, to maintain 
order and stability, and to enforce law 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Power: a feeling of self in control, deriving from 
one's ability to mobilize one's own and society's 
resources to meet one's needs 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Pride: a feeling of dignity and worth, deriving 
from society's and significant other's recognition 
of one's contribution to work, family, and society 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Progress: a sense of well-being, resulting from 
society's commitment to improve the quality of 
life of everyone in society 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Security: a feeling of inner harmony, deriving 
from the absence of fear of death and violence and 
uncertainty of future 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Section Three : Ranking of Values (2) 
You have here another list of twelve values each of which is 
briefly defined to indicate a preferable mode of conduct to be 
found in social workers, particularly in their interaction with 
clients or colleagues. Read through this list carefully, write 1 
next to the value which you consider is the most preferable, 2 
next to the value which you consider is second in preference, 3 
next to the value which you consider is third in preference, and 
continue with this method of ranking until you have assigned a 
number (ranging from 1 to 12) to each value on the list to 
indicate your order of preference for these values. No number 
should be repeated. 
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Ranking of values in order of your preference. 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Ambition: a commitment to work, to produce result, 
and to advance in knowledge and position; requires 
dedication and hard work 
---------------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Authenticity: an absence of pretence; requires one 
to have self-awareness, to be in touch with one- 
self and consistent in one's thought and action 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Benevolence: a compassion for the suffering of 
others; requires one to be paternalistic, loving, 
forgiving, and accepting 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Cooperation: a willingness to work as a member of 
a team and to pursue the team's goals; requires 
one to be cooperative and follow instructions 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Courage: a readiness to take a stand on 
controversies; requires one to take risks, to 
withstand criticism & to endure danger or hardship 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Empathy: a capacity to perceive and communicate, 
accurately and with sensitivity, the feelings of 
others and the meaning of those feelings 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- Honesty: a commitment to truthfulness in dealing 
with others; requires one to seek and tell the 
truth 
--------------------------------------------------=-- ----------- Justice: a disposition to act with fairness; 
requires one to exercise moral judgment on what is 
right and what is wrong 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Leadership: an ability to solicit support from 
others; requires one to be persuasive and to 
exercise one's power and authority 
----------------------------------------------------- ----------- Loyalty: a commitment to serve in the interest of 
others; requires one to remain faithful to one's 
promises 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Prudence: a disposition to act cautiously; 
requires one to be broadminded and to exercise 
judgment based on knowledge and consultation 
------------------------------------------------------ ---------- 
Respect: a willingness to recognize other's right 
to self--determination, confidentiality and 
privacy and ability to be rule-following 
------------------------------------------------------- ----------- 
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Section Four : Personal Particulars 
Needless to say all information provided in this section 
will be kept in strict confidence. To faciliate contact in case 
if it is needed in future, your are requested to fill in your 
name, mailing address and telephone number in the spaces 
provided. 
Among the items, 3,4 and 9 are self-explanatory. 
In Item 5, the rank of social workers refers to the 
substantive rank. The acting rank of any worker, who is acting 
at a higher rank either with a view for promotion or for 
administrative convenience, is ignored. The rank 'SWO & above' 
includes SWO, SSWO, CSWO and all ranks above these; 'Lecturer, 
Field Instructor and Supervisor' includes all those whose main 
employment, either full-time or part-time, is in training 
institutions. 
In Item 6, 'Highest Qualification' refers to the highest 
recognized qualification attained by social workers. 'Degree 
training in SW' includes both undergraduate or post-graduate 
training in social work; 'Non-degree training in SW' includes 
diploma in social work, certificate in social studies, 
certificate issued by the former Institute on Social Work 
Training, and cadetship; 'Untrained in SW' includes non-social- 
work degrees, non-social-work diplomas, matriculation, and school 
certificate. 
In Item 7, 'Area of Service' refers to those areas of 
service reported by social workers in the data-input form. For 
social workers who are engaged in more than one type of service, 
the service in which they spend the highest proportion of their 
time should be recorded. 
In item 8, 'Job Role' refers to the social worker's primary 
function as reported in the data-input form. For social workers 
who are engaged in more than one type of function, the function 
in which they spend the highest proportion of their time should 
be recorded. 
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Personal Particulars: 
1. Name and Mailing Address: 
2. Telephone Number: 
3. Sex: 4. Age: 
Male 20 - 34 
Female 35 & above 
5. Rank: 6. Highest Qualification: 
SWO & above Degree training 
in SW 
ASWO 
SSWA & SWA Non-degree training 
in SW 
Lecturer, Field 
Instructor & 
Supervisor Untrained in SW 
7. Area of Service: 8. Job Role: 
Offenders and Frontline 
drug abusers 
Supervisory 
Family welfare 
Administrative 
Elderly 
Teaching & 
Community training 
development 
9. Length of Service 
Young people in SW Field 
Rehabilitation 5 years or less 
Medical social over 5- 10 years 
service 
over 10 - 15 years 
Training 
over 15 - 20 years 
Central 
administration over 20 years 
Others 
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